recordation claim (California) · Go Syfert
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recordation claim in California

5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2014 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

CaseFollowedCited
Rheem Manufacturing Co. v. United Statesgreen
cal · 1962 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014The lien is subordinate to recorded encumbrances antedating the commencement of the work of improvement [citation], but takes priority over all subsequent encumbrances [citation].” (Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803, 808 ; see also Idaco Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Sav. & Loan Ass’n. (1969) 265 Cal.App.2d 490, 499, fn. 3 (Idaco Lumber) [“[a]s a general rule the deed of trust held by a lender or other party will have priority over mechanics’ liens if the deed of trust held by the lender was recorded prior to the time the work of improvement first commenced”].) Thu

11
Forsgren Associates, Inc. v. Pacific Golf Community Development LLCgreen
calctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014To preserve a mechanic’s lien, the lien claimant must record a claim of lien within certain time periods following the completion or cessation of work. [Citations.] The recordation of the claim of lien provides constructive notice of the lien to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers. [Citation.] [¶] Although the claim of lien may be recorded after the work is completed, the lien relates back to the date the first labor or material was furnished for the work of improvement. . . .” (Forsgren Associates, Inc. v. Pacific Golf Community Development LLC (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 135, 145-146 (Forsgre

11
Vallely Investments, L.P. v. BancAmerica Commercial Corp.green
calctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014The lien is subordinate to recorded encumbrances antedating the commencement of the work of improvement [citation], but takes priority over all subsequent encumbrances [citation].” (Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803, 808 ; see also Idaco Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Sav. & Loan Ass’n. (1969) 265 Cal.App.2d 490, 499, fn. 3 (Idaco Lumber) [“[a]s a general rule the deed of trust held by a lender or other party will have priority over mechanics’ liens if the deed of trust held by the lender was recorded prior to the time the work of improvement first commenced”].) Thu

11
Idaco Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen
calctapp · 1968 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014The lien is subordinate to recorded encumbrances antedating the commencement of the work of improvement [citation], but takes priority over all subsequent encumbrances [citation].” (Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803, 808 ; see also Idaco Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Sav. & Loan Ass’n. (1969) 265 Cal.App.2d 490, 499, fn. 3 (Idaco Lumber) [“[a]s a general rule the deed of trust held by a lender or other party will have priority over mechanics’ liens if the deed of trust held by the lender was recorded prior to the time the work of improvement first commenced”].) Thu

2014The lien is subordinate to recorded encumbrances antedating the commencement of the work of improvement [citation], but takes priority over all subsequent encumbrances [citation].” (Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803, 808 ; see also Idaco Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Sav. & Loan Ass’n. (1969) 265 Cal.App.2d 490, 499, fn. 3 (Idaco Lumber) [“[a]s a general rule the deed of trust held by a lender or other party will have priority over mechanics’ liens if the deed of trust held by the lender was recorded prior to the time the work of improvement first commenced”].) Thu

11
Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Leegreen
calctapp · 1972 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006(Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Lee (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 621, 631-632 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Simons Brick Co. v. Hetzel (1925) 72 Cal.App. 1, 5 [ 236 P. 357 ]; Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1247 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ]; see Cal. Mechanic’s Liens and Related Construction Remedies (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2005) § 2.64, pp. 78-79.) In light of the foregoing principles, the factual issues framed by the pleadings (as reflected in the four-part judicial declaration and the nature of the quiet title judgment sought by PAT) are: (1) whether PAT is the holder of the opt

2006(Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Lee (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 621, 631-632 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Simons Brick Co. v. Hetzel (1925) 72 Cal.App. 1, 5 [ 236 P. 357 ]; Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1247 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ]; see Cal. Mechanic’s Liens and Related Construction Remedies (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2005) § 2.64, pp. 78-79.) In light of the foregoing principles, the factual issues framed by the pleadings (as reflected in the four-part judicial declaration and the nature of the quiet title judgment sought by PAT) are: (1) whether PAT is the holder of the opt

11
Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.green
calctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006(Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Lee (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 621, 631-632 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Simons Brick Co. v. Hetzel (1925) 72 Cal.App. 1, 5 [ 236 P. 357 ]; Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1247 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ]; see Cal. Mechanic’s Liens and Related Construction Remedies (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2005) § 2.64, pp. 78-79.) In light of the foregoing principles, the factual issues framed by the pleadings (as reflected in the four-part judicial declaration and the nature of the quiet title judgment sought by PAT) are: (1) whether PAT is the holder of the opt

2006(Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Lee (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 621, 631-632 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Simons Brick Co. v. Hetzel (1925) 72 Cal.App. 1, 5 [ 236 P. 357 ]; Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1247 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ]; see Cal. Mechanic’s Liens and Related Construction Remedies (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2005) § 2.64, pp. 78-79.) In light of the foregoing principles, the factual issues framed by the pleadings (as reflected in the four-part judicial declaration and the nature of the quiet title judgment sought by PAT) are: (1) whether PAT is the holder of the opt

11
Simons Brick Co. v. Hetzelgreen
calctapp · 1925 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006(Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Lee (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 621, 631-632 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Simons Brick Co. v. Hetzel (1925) 72 Cal.App. 1, 5 [ 236 P. 357 ]; Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1247 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ]; see Cal. Mechanic’s Liens and Related Construction Remedies (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2005) § 2.64, pp. 78-79.) In light of the foregoing principles, the factual issues framed by the pleadings (as reflected in the four-part judicial declaration and the nature of the quiet title judgment sought by PAT) are: (1) whether PAT is the holder of the opt

2006(Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Lee (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 621, 631-632 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 106 ]; Simons Brick Co. v. Hetzel (1925) 72 Cal.App. 1, 5 [ 236 P. 357 ]; Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1247 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298 ]; see Cal. Mechanic’s Liens and Related Construction Remedies (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2005) § 2.64, pp. 78-79.) In light of the foregoing principles, the factual issues framed by the pleadings (as reflected in the four-part judicial declaration and the nature of the quiet title judgment sought by PAT) are: (1) whether PAT is the holder of the opt

11
Bradford v. State of Californiagreen
calctapp · 1973 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000This, plaintiff contends, was the exact injury the ordinance’s recordation requirement was designed to prevent: “The only conceivable purpose of recording that [instability] information . . . was to put future purchasers (and others involved in property purchases, such as lenders and title companies) on notice of the instability.” (See Grenell v. City of Hermosa Beach (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 864, 870-871 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 315 ] [city ordinances requiring city to issue report on authorized use, zoning classification, etc., of property being purchased were designed to protect against purchaser’s buy

2000This, plaintiff contends, was the exact injury the ordinance’s recordation requirement was designed to prevent: “The only conceivable purpose of recording that [instability] information . . . was to put future purchasers (and others involved in property purchases, such as lenders and title companies) on notice of the instability.” (See Grenell v. City of Hermosa Beach (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 864, 870-871 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 315 ] [city ordinances requiring city to issue report on authorized use, zoning classification, etc., of property being purchased were designed to protect against purchaser’s buy

11
Grenell v. City of Hermosa Beachgreen
calctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000This, plaintiff contends, was the exact injury the ordinance’s recordation requirement was designed to prevent: “The only conceivable purpose of recording that [instability] information . . . was to put future purchasers (and others involved in property purchases, such as lenders and title companies) on notice of the instability.” (See Grenell v. City of Hermosa Beach (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 864, 870-871 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 315 ] [city ordinances requiring city to issue report on authorized use, zoning classification, etc., of property being purchased were designed to protect against purchaser’s buy

2000This, plaintiff contends, was the exact injury the ordinance’s recordation requirement was designed to prevent: “The only conceivable purpose of recording that [instability] information . . . was to put future purchasers (and others involved in property purchases, such as lenders and title companies) on notice of the instability.” (See Grenell v. City of Hermosa Beach (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 864, 870-871 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 315 ] [city ordinances requiring city to issue report on authorized use, zoning classification, etc., of property being purchased were designed to protect against purchaser’s buy

11
Albertson v. Raboffgreen
cal · 1956 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
2 sentences

1972The tort of wrongful disparagement of title has been defined as follows: “ ‘One who, without a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue and disparaging to another’s property in land, chattels or intangible things under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a third person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the impairment of vendibility thus caused.’ ” (Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 541 [ 134 P.2d 217 ], quoting Rest., Torts, § 624 [overruled in part on other

1972The tort of wrongful disparagement of title has been defined as follows: “ ‘One who, without a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue and disparaging to another’s property in land, chattels or intangible things under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a third person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the impairment of vendibility thus caused.’ ” (Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 541 [ 134 P.2d 217 ], quoting Rest., Torts, § 624 [overruled in part on other

11
Gudger v. Mantongreen
cal · 1943 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
2 sentences

1972The tort of wrongful disparagement of title has been defined as follows: “ ‘One who, without a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue and disparaging to another’s property in land, chattels or intangible things under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a third person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the impairment of vendibility thus caused.’ ” (Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 541 [ 134 P.2d 217 ], quoting Rest., Torts, § 624 [overruled in part on other

1972The tort of wrongful disparagement of title has been defined as follows: “ ‘One who, without a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue and disparaging to another’s property in land, chattels or intangible things under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that the conduct of a third person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the impairment of vendibility thus caused.’ ” (Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal.2d 537, 541 [ 134 P.2d 217 ], quoting Rest., Torts, § 624 [overruled in part on other

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court green
cal · 1976
1 sentence

2014The lien is subordinate to recorded encumbrances antedating the commencement of the work of improvement [citation], but takes priority over all subsequent encumbrances [citation].” (Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803, 808 ; see also Idaco Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Sav. & Loan Ass’n. (1969) 265 Cal.App.2d 490, 499, fn. 3 (Idaco Lumber) [“[a]s a general rule the deed of trust held by a lender or other party will have priority over mechanics’ liens if the deed of trust held by the lender was recorded prior to the time the work of improvement first commenced”].) Thu

12014–2014
Haggis v. City of Los Angeles green
cal · 2000
1 sentence

2000True, the recordation also may provide warning to potential purchasers and lenders . . . but that effect is aptly described as ‘incidental’ [citation] to the ordinance’s enforcement goals. [The ordinance] exists to protect the public against unsafe building and land conditions, not to regulate the marketing of real estate.” (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 503 .) Again, reading the text of the SAR provisions, it is evident that the dominant, the overriding, and quite possibly the exclusive purpose of review of building plans by the SAR committee is aesthetic and scenic, rather than the preserv

12000–2000
Nunn v. State of California green
cal · 1984
2 sentences

2000True, the recordation also may provide warning to potential purchasers and lenders (assuming what has not been demonstrated, that the recorded notice would be disclosed by a standard title search), but that effect is aptly described as "incidental" ( Nunn v. State of California, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 626 , 200 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 677 P.2d 846 ) to the ordinance's enforcement goals.

2000True, the recordation also may provide warning to potential purchasers and lenders (assuming what has not been demonstrated, that the recorded notice would be disclosed by a standard title search), but that effect is aptly described as “incidental” (Nunn v. State of California, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 626 ) to the ordinance’s enforcement goals.

12000–2000

Where else courts name it

LA 13 (1939–1990) CA 5 (1972–2014) AZ 2 (2011–2011) NJ 2 (1995–2019) NY 2 (1989–1997) FL 2 (1993–1997)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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