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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Guerrared2 sentences2022The other “factors of reliance and burden on the administration of justice are of significant relevance only when the question of retroactivity is a close one after the purpose of the new rule is considered.” (Ibid.; see Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 401-402.) make substantive changes to the Three Strikes law (pp. 20-23, ante) but instead addressed the procedural issue of how the court should go about making the determination of whether a prior conviction counts as a strike. 2011Further, if the rule relates to characteristics of the judicial system which are essential to minimizing convictions of the innocent, it will apply retroactively regardless of the reliance of prosecutors on former law, and regardless of the burden which retroactivity will place upon the judicial system.” (Johnson, at p. 413.) “[T]he most consistent application of this principle [of applying new rules retroactively] has been in cases in which the primary purpose of the new rule is to promote reliable determinations of guilt or innocence.” (Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 402 .) In light of these | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Johnson
green
2 sentences2022Under Johnson, the retroactivity of a new rule is determined by “ ‘ “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” ’ ” (Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 410 .) The first factor — the purpose of the new rule — is the critical factor in determining retroactivity. 2020Under the state standard, “the retroactivity of a new rule ‘is to be determined by “‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.’”’ [Citation.]” (In re Lucero, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 45 , quoting In re Johnson, supra, at p. 413 .) The first factor is of primary importance and will generally be deemed controlling if the new rule’s purpose plainly favors retroactive or prospective application. | 3 | 2008–2022 |
In re Corpus
green
1 sentence2020(Ruedas, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 800 .) “[T]he factors of reliance and burden on the administration of justice are of significant relevance only when the question of retroactivity is a close one after the purpose of the new rule is considered.” (In re Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 410 .) 22 Under the state retroactivity test, “the more directly the new rule in question serves to preclude the conviction of innocent persons, the more likely it is that the rule will be afforded retrospective application. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re Lucero
green
1 sentence2020Under the state standard, “the retroactivity of a new rule ‘is to be determined by “‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.’”’ [Citation.]” (In re Lucero, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 45 , quoting In re Johnson, supra, at p. 413 .) The first factor is of primary importance and will generally be deemed controlling if the new rule’s purpose plainly favors retroactive or prospective application. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2016In Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra, 577 U.S. at page _ [ 136 S.Ct. at p. 729 ], the court held that “when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule.” Respondent argues Montgomery v. Louisiana has no effect on the retroactivity of Chiu because Chiu did not concern a substantive rule of federal constitutional law but an interpretation of California statute. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re Pratt
green
2 sentences2008Johnson held that the retroactivity of a new rule "is to be determined by `"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."`" ( Id. at p. 410.) The Johnson test was taken verbatim from Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 249 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 248 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 ], a (now outdated) United States Supreme Court case governing when decisions should be applied retroactively on direct review, even though t 2008Johnson held that the retroactivity of a new rule "is to be determined by `"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."`" ( Id. at p. 410.) The Johnson test was taken verbatim from Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 249 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 248 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 ], a (now outdated) United States Supreme Court case governing when decisions should be applied retroactively on direct review, even though t | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Desist v. United States
yellow
2 sentences2008Johnson held that the retroactivity of a new rule "is to be determined by `"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."`" ( Id. at p. 410.) The Johnson test was taken verbatim from Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 249 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 248 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 ], a (now outdated) United States Supreme Court case governing when decisions should be applied retroactively on direct review, even though t 2008Johnson held that the retroactivity of a new rule "is to be determined by `"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."`" ( Id. at p. 410.) The Johnson test was taken verbatim from Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 249 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 248 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 ], a (now outdated) United States Supreme Court case governing when decisions should be applied retroactively on direct review, even though t | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Fare v. Joe R.
green
2 sentences2008Johnson held that the retroactivity of a new rule "is to be determined by `"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."`" ( Id. at p. 410.) The Johnson test was taken verbatim from Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 249 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 248 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 ], a (now outdated) United States Supreme Court case governing when decisions should be applied retroactively on direct review, even though t 2008Johnson held that the retroactivity of a new rule "is to be determined by `"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."`" ( Id. at p. 410.) The Johnson test was taken verbatim from Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 249 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 248 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 ], a (now outdated) United States Supreme Court case governing when decisions should be applied retroactively on direct review, even though t | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Barber v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences2008Johnson held that the retroactivity of a new rule "is to be determined by `"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."`" ( Id. at p. 410.) The Johnson test was taken verbatim from Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 249 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 248 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 ], a (now outdated) United States Supreme Court case governing when decisions should be applied retroactively on direct review, even though t 2008Johnson held that the retroactivity of a new rule "is to be determined by `"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."`" ( Id. at p. 410.) The Johnson test was taken verbatim from Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 249 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 248 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 ], a (now outdated) United States Supreme Court case governing when decisions should be applied retroactively on direct review, even though t | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Fare v. Scott K.
green
2 sentences2008Johnson held that the retroactivity of a new rule "is to be determined by `"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."`" ( Id. at p. 410.) The Johnson test was taken verbatim from Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 249 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 248 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 ], a (now outdated) United States Supreme Court case governing when decisions should be applied retroactively on direct review, even though t 2008Johnson held that the retroactivity of a new rule "is to be determined by `"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."`" ( Id. at p. 410.) The Johnson test was taken verbatim from Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 249 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 248 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 ], a (now outdated) United States Supreme Court case governing when decisions should be applied retroactively on direct review, even though t | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.