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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2005(See Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 141, fn. 9 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ] [“ ‘No . . . interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him. 2005(See Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 141, fn. 9 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ] [“ ‘No . . . interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him. | 2 | 3 |
Jones v. United Statesred2 sentences1992In Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ], the United States Supreme Court discussed that very point: “The Court in Jones [v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 ( 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 )] was quite careful to note that ‘wrongful’ presence at the scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the search. [Citation.] The Court stated: ‘No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a sear 1992In Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ], the United States Supreme Court discussed that very point: “The Court in Jones [v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 ( 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 )] was quite careful to note that ‘wrongful’ presence at the scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the search. [Citation.] The Court stated: ‘No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a sear | 1 | 4 |
People v. Melnykgreen2 sentences2005This would of course not avail those who, by virtue of their wrongful presence, cannot invoke the privacy of the premises searched.’ ” (Italics omitted.)]; accord People v. Melnyk (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1533 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 570 ].) To accept defendant’s assertion that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy while driving a stolen vehicle would be to overlook the word “unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” As noted, Officer Dapser received information that a specific vehicle was being driven recklessly—information that soon was 2005This would of course not avail those who, by virtue of their wrongful presence, cannot invoke the privacy of the premises searched.’ ” (Italics omitted.)]; accord People v. Melnyk (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1533 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 570 ].) To accept defendant’s assertion that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy while driving a stolen vehicle would be to overlook the word “unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” As noted, Officer Dapser received information that a specific vehicle was being driven recklessly—information that soon was | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kourygreen2 sentences1992Standing: Jones to Rakas to Olson “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. [Citations.]” (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 131, fn. 1 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 393 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ]; see also People v. Ybarra (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1360 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 200 ]; People v. Koury (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 685 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 870 ].) In Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ], the Supreme Court held “anyone legitimately on premi 1992Standing: Jones to Rakas to Olson “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. [Citations.]” (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 131, fn. 1 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 393 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ]; see also People v. Ybarra (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1360 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 200 ]; People v. Koury (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 685 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 870 ].) In Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ], the Supreme Court held “anyone legitimately on premi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ybarragreen2 sentences1992Standing: Jones to Rakas to Olson “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. [Citations.]” (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 131, fn. 1 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 393 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ]; see also People v. Ybarra (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1360 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 200 ]; People v. Koury (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 685 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 870 ].) In Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ], the Supreme Court held “anyone legitimately on premi 1992Standing: Jones to Rakas to Olson “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. [Citations.]” (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 131, fn. 1 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 393 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ]; see also People v. Ybarra (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1360 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 200 ]; People v. Koury (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 685 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 870 ].) In Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ], the Supreme Court held “anyone legitimately on premi | 1 | 1 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992Standing: Jones to Rakas to Olson “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. [Citations.]” (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 131, fn. 1 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 393 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ]; see also People v. Ybarra (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1360 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 200 ]; People v. Koury (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 685 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 870 ].) In Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ], the Supreme Court held “anyone legitimately on premi 1992Standing: Jones to Rakas to Olson “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. [Citations.]” (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 131, fn. 1 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 393 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ]; see also People v. Ybarra (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1360 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 200 ]; People v. Koury (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 685 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 870 ].) In Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ], the Supreme Court held “anyone legitimately on premi | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Marylandred2 sentences1992Standing: Jones to Rakas to Olson “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. [Citations.]” (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 131, fn. 1 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 393 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ]; see also People v. Ybarra (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1360 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 200 ]; People v. Koury (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 685 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 870 ].) In Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ], the Supreme Court held “anyone legitimately on premi 1992Standing: Jones to Rakas to Olson “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. [Citations.]” (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 131, fn. 1 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 393 , 99 S.Ct. 421 ]; see also People v. Ybarra (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1360 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 200 ]; People v. Koury (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 685 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 870 ].) In Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ], the Supreme Court held “anyone legitimately on premi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Salvuccigreen2 sentences1985As the People correctly point out, the Holloway holding on standing relied upon the principle of Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 267 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 706 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ], that “anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality.” However, the Supreme Court rejected this “automatic standing” rule in United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 84-85 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 619, 623-624 , 100 S.Ct. 2547 ]. 1985As the People correctly point out, the Holloway holding on standing relied upon the principle of Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 267 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 706 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ], that “anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality.” However, the Supreme Court rejected this “automatic standing” rule in United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 84-85 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 619, 623-624 , 100 S.Ct. 2547 ]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. John M. Salvucci, Jr., Joseph G. Zackular
red
1 sentence1985There the court stated: “Relying on Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that since respondents were charged with crimes of possession, they were entitled to claim ‘automatic standing’ to challenge the legality of the search which produced the evidence against them, without regard to whether they had an expectation of privacy in the premises searched. 599 F.2d 1094 (1979). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.