tension between doctrine in California

2014(Bourhis, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 328 .) The Supreme Court acknowledged the tension between the rule articulated in the statute of limitations cases (no retroactive revival) and the rule for notices of appeal (retroactive revival), and concluded that “the two approaches can be reconciled.” (Id. at p. 329.) The court explained that Revenue and Taxation Code section 23305a provides that revival “ ‘shall be without prejudice to any action, defense or right which has accrued by reason of the original suspension or forfeiture,’ ” and that the statute of limitations cases “explain that those statute

2014(Bourhis, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 18 p. 328.) The Supreme Court acknowledged the tension between the rule articulated in the statute of limitations cases (no retroactive revival) and the rule for notices of appeal (retroactive revival), and concluded that “the two approaches can be reconciled.” (Id. at p. 329.) The court explained that Revenue and Taxation Code section 23305a provides that revival “ ‘shall be without prejudice to any action, defense or right which has accrued by reason of the original suspension or forfeiture,’ ” and that the statute of limitations cases “explain that those statu

1997This is so despite United States v. Bailey (1980) 444 U.S. 394 [ 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575 ], in which the court mentioned that escape from federal custody must be a continuing offense because “[g]iven the continuing threat to society posed by an escaped prisoner, ‘the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.’ ” (Id. at p. 413 [ 100 S.Ct. at p. 636 ].) Bailey did not overrule Toussie , however; in fact it relied on it but explained that “the tension between the doctrine of continuing offenses and the policy of

1997This is so despite United States v. Bailey (1980) 444 U.S. 394 [ 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575 ], in which the court mentioned that escape from federal custody must be a continuing offense because “[g]iven the continuing threat to society posed by an escaped prisoner, ‘the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.’ ” (Id. at p. 413 [ 100 S.Ct. at p. 636 ].) Bailey did not overrule Toussie , however; in fact it relied on it but explained that “the tension between the doctrine of continuing offenses and the policy of

1997(See also U.S. v. Vowiell (9th Cir. 1989) 869 F.2d 1264, 1268-1269 .)

1997Palacios’s reliance on Toussie v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 112, 115 [ 90 S.Ct. 858, 860 , 25 L.Ed.2d 156 ], for the general proposition that “the doctrine of continuing offenses ahould be applied in only limited circumstances” is undercut by the fact that the Toussie court’s explicit concern was the tension between the doctrine of continuing offenses and the principle of repose inherent in statutes of limitation (ibid., see also U.S. v. Gray (9th Cir. 1989) 876 F.2d 1411,1418 ), not the due process problems underlying the ex post facto prohibition.