thought defense in California

2021As in Nieves, the trial court’s “stern remarks and periodic sarcasm . . . impugned counsel’s competence and ‘inevitably conveyed to the jury the message that the trial court thought that defense counsel was wasting . . . time by asking inappropriate questions.’ [Citation.]” (Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 483 .) In particular, “[t]he trial court’s comments implying that defense counsel was behaving unethically or in an underhanded fashion constitute[s] misconduct.” ( Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1240-1241.) In Sturm, the California Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s numerous “sua sp

2021This was not a case in which the trial court also expressed sarcasm, impatience, and annoyance toward the prosecution, which might have “indicat[ed] its comments were a matter of personal style, not the result of a belief that any of the attorneys was incompetent or that the defense case lacked merit.” (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 914 ; see also People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th 582, 605 [court made remarks critical of defense counsel but also expressed annoyance at prosecutor]; People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 79 [noting the trial judge “frequently addressed the prosecutors i

1979Let us have the jury back.” Mr. Diamond: “So I can’t ask this witness any more questions about ‘Deep Throat?’ ” The Court: “That’s correct.” While the court in one place gave lip service to exercising its discretion under section 352 of the Evidence Code, it is apparent from the foregoing quotations and from the record as a whole that the trial court thought the rule of In re Harris, 56 Cal.2d 880 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 889 , 366 P.2d 305 ], (that it was a denial of due process for the trial court in an obscenity case to preclude defendant from offering evidence of contemporary community standards), h

1979Let us have the jury back.” Mr. Diamond: “So I can’t ask this witness any more questions about ‘Deep Throat?’ ” The Court: “That’s correct.” While the court in one place gave lip service to exercising its discretion under section 352 of the Evidence Code, it is apparent from the foregoing quotations and from the record as a whole that the trial court thought the rule of In re Harris, 56 Cal.2d 880 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 889 , 366 P.2d 305 ], (that it was a denial of due process for the trial court in an obscenity case to preclude defendant from offering evidence of contemporary community standards), h

1979Let us have the jury back.” Mr. Diamond: “So I can’t ask this witness any more questions about ‘Deep Throat?’ ” The Court: “That’s correct.” While the court in one place gave lip service to exercising its discretion under section 352 of the Evidence Code, it is apparent from the foregoing quotations and from the record as a whole that the trial court thought the rule of In re Harris, 56 Cal.2d 880 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 889 , 366 P.2d 305 ], (that it was a denial of due process for the trial court in an obscenity case to preclude defendant from offering evidence of contemporary community standards), h

1977G., supra, 11 Cal.3d 679 , and provide a thread of uniformity in the standard of proof in all cases which attempt to sever the rights of natural parents to their children. 3 This is not a criminal proceeding nor does it involve incarceration and concomitant loss of liberty so we must reject the thought the standard of proof should be beyond a reasonable doubt as suggested by the appellant. 4 In summarizing the evidence the judge did say, “I must confess it was a very close case on the facts,” but this is a comment we often hear from judges even in criminal cases where the standard of proof is

1941Sales Corp., 11 Cal. (2d) 64, 70 [ 77 Pac. (2d) 1059 ], that “an inference is dispelled as a matter of law when it is rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence which is not open to doubt even though such evidence is produced by the opposite side ’ ’ and that ‘ ‘ if the opposition evidence is conflicting, vague or uncertain, or is weakened by contradictions or improbabilities, an inference is not dispelled as a matter of law,” is simply emphatically expressive of the thought and the principle that if any contradictory evidence appears the inference is not dispelled and the motion