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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marriage of Nicholsgreen2 sentences2002(In re Marriage of Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at pp. 107-108; In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 673, fn. 4 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 13 ].) The courts have not established an unvarying rule for determining the existence or value of a law practice’s goodwill for purposes of a marital dissolution (In re Marriage of Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 109 ), and, as one treatise notes, “[c]oncededly, ‘capitalization of the excess earnings’ method may be adopted.” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2002) ¶ 8:1445 (rev. # 1, 2002).) The “ ‘excess earnings’ 2002(In re Marriage of Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at pp. 107-108; In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 673, fn. 4 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 13 ].) The courts have not established an unvarying rule for determining the existence or value of a law practice’s goodwill for purposes of a marital dissolution (In re Marriage of Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 109 ), and, as one treatise notes, “[c]oncededly, ‘capitalization of the excess earnings’ method may be adopted.” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2002) ¶ 8:1445 (rev. # 1, 2002).) The “ ‘excess earnings’ | 1 | 1 |
Osmont v. All Persons, Etc.green2 sentences1929(Osmont v. All Persons, etc., 165 Cal. 587, 592 [ 133 Pac. 480 ], and eases therein cited.) The question to be decided on this motion to dismiss is one determining the appellate jurisdiction of this court. 1929(Osmont v. All Persons, etc., 165 Cal. 587, 592 [ 133 Pac. 480 ], and eases therein cited.) The question to be decided on this motion to dismiss is one determining the appellate jurisdiction of this court. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marriage of Garrity and Bishton
red
1 sentence2002(Id., ¶ 8:1422 (rev. # 1, 2000).) In In re Marriage of Garrity and Bishton, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at page 688 , footnote 14, the court explained the excess earnings method as follows: “Pursuant to this method, one first determines a practitioner’s average annual net earnings (before income taxes) by reference to any period that seems reasonably illustrative of the current rate of earnings. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Marriage of Lopez
red
1 sentence2002(In re Marriage of Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at pp. 107-108; In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 673, fn. 4 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 13 ].) The courts have not established an unvarying rule for determining the existence or value of a law practice’s goodwill for purposes of a marital dissolution (In re Marriage of Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 109 ), and, as one treatise notes, “[c]oncededly, ‘capitalization of the excess earnings’ method may be adopted.” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2002) ¶ 8:1445 (rev. # 1, 2002).) The “ ‘excess earnings’ | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Johnson v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1967Thus, while the instant problem is relatively uncomplicated, dictum that purports to establish an unvarying rule regarding application of Miranda to all retrials hereafter, including cases reversed on nonconstitutional grounds (see, e.g., People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 374 , 426 P.2d 942 ]), is likely to constitute “an unjustifiable burden on the administration of justice” (Johnson v. New Jersey (1966) 384 U.S. 719 , 733 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 882, 892 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 ]). 1967Thus, while the instant problem is relatively uncomplicated, dictum that purports to establish an unvarying rule regarding application of Miranda to all retrials hereafter, including cases reversed on nonconstitutional grounds (see, e.g., People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 374 , 426 P.2d 942 ]), is likely to constitute “an unjustifiable burden on the administration of justice” (Johnson v. New Jersey (1966) 384 U.S. 719 , 733 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 882, 892 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 ]). | 1 | 1967–1967 |
People v. Pennington
green
2 sentences1967Thus, while the instant problem is relatively uncomplicated, dictum that purports to establish an unvarying rule regarding application of Miranda to all retrials hereafter, including cases reversed on nonconstitutional grounds (see, e.g., People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 374 , 426 P.2d 942 ]), is likely to constitute “an unjustifiable burden on the administration of justice” (Johnson v. New Jersey (1966) 384 U.S. 719 , 733 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 882, 892 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 ]). 1967Thus, while the instant problem is relatively uncomplicated, dictum that purports to establish an unvarying rule regarding application of Miranda to all retrials hereafter, including cases reversed on nonconstitutional grounds (see, e.g., People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 374 , 426 P.2d 942 ]), is likely to constitute “an unjustifiable burden on the administration of justice” (Johnson v. New Jersey (1966) 384 U.S. 719 , 733 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 882, 892 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 ]). | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Exchange Securities Co. v. Rossini
green
2 sentences1942In support of its argument that it is the unvarying rule in this state that all covenants in leases are independent, plaintiff cites two California cases: Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143 [ 146 P. 423 , Ann.Cas. 1916D, 370], and Exchange Securities Go. v. Rossini, 44 Cal.App. 583 [ 186 P. 828 ]. 1942In support of its argument that it is the unvarying rule in this state that all covenants in leases are independent, plaintiff cites two California cases: Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143 [ 146 P. 423 , Ann.Cas. 1916D, 370], and Exchange Securities Go. v. Rossini, 44 Cal.App. 583 [ 186 P. 828 ]. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Arnold v. Krigbaum
red
2 sentences1942In support of its argument that it is the unvarying rule in this state that all covenants in leases are independent, plaintiff cites two California cases: Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143 [ 146 P. 423 , Ann.Cas. 1916D, 370], and Exchange Securities Go. v. Rossini, 44 Cal.App. 583 [ 186 P. 828 ]. 1942In support of its argument that it is the unvarying rule in this state that all covenants in leases are independent, plaintiff cites two California cases: Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143 [ 146 P. 423 , Ann.Cas. 1916D, 370], and Exchange Securities Go. v. Rossini, 44 Cal.App. 583 [ 186 P. 828 ]. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Glade Coal Mining Co. v. Harris
neutral
1 sentence1912Va. 152 , [ 63 S. E. 873 ]; Shoptaw v. Ridgway’s Adm’r, (Ky.) 60 S. W. 723 ; Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276 , [ 30 N. W. 880 ]; Kelsa v. Graves, 64 Kan. 777 , [ 68 Pac. 607 ]; McLure v. Colclough, 17 Ala. 96 .) In diverse terms this unvarying rule is declared by the courts Thus, “An actual or formal delivery of a deed never was necessary. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Conlan v. Grace
green
2 sentences1912Va. 152 , [ 63 S. E. 873 ]; Shoptaw v. Ridgway’s Adm’r, (Ky.) 60 S. W. 723 ; Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276 , [ 30 N. W. 880 ]; Kelsa v. Graves, 64 Kan. 777 , [ 68 Pac. 607 ]; McLure v. Colclough, 17 Ala. 96 .) In diverse terms this unvarying rule is declared by the courts Thus, “An actual or formal delivery of a deed never was necessary. 1912Va. 152 , [ 63 S. E. 873 ]; Shoptaw v. Ridgway’s Adm’r, (Ky.) 60 S. W. 723 ; Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276 , [ 30 N. W. 880 ]; Kelsa v. Graves, 64 Kan. 777 , [ 68 Pac. 607 ]; McLure v. Colclough, 17 Ala. 96 .) In diverse terms this unvarying rule is declared by the courts Thus, “An actual or formal delivery of a deed never was necessary. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Kelsa v. Graves
green
2 sentences1912Va. 152 , [ 63 S. E. 873 ]; Shoptaw v. Ridgway’s Adm’r, (Ky.) 60 S. W. 723 ; Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276 , [ 30 N. W. 880 ]; Kelsa v. Graves, 64 Kan. 777 , [ 68 Pac. 607 ]; McLure v. Colclough, 17 Ala. 96 .) In diverse terms this unvarying rule is declared by the courts Thus, “An actual or formal delivery of a deed never was necessary. 1912Va. 152 , [ 63 S. E. 873 ]; Shoptaw v. Ridgway’s Adm’r, (Ky.) 60 S. W. 723 ; Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276 , [ 30 N. W. 880 ]; Kelsa v. Graves, 64 Kan. 777 , [ 68 Pac. 607 ]; McLure v. Colclough, 17 Ala. 96 .) In diverse terms this unvarying rule is declared by the courts Thus, “An actual or formal delivery of a deed never was necessary. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.