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43 California opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Putnamgreen2 sentences1948(People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 889 [ 129 P.2d 367 ]; People v. Lucas, 16 Cal.2d 178, 181 [ 105 P.2d 102 , 130 A.L.R. 1485 ].) Appellant complains of the last sentence in the instruction in which the jury was told that the fact that the charge is difficult to disprove should not deter them from finding appellant guilty if they were convinced from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. 1948(People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 889 [ 129 P.2d 367 ]; People v. Lucas, 16 Cal.2d 178, 181 [ 105 P.2d 102 , 130 A.L.R. 1485 ].) Appellant complains of the last sentence in the instruction in which the jury was told that the fact that the charge is difficult to disprove should not deter them from finding appellant guilty if they were convinced from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Lucasgreen2 sentences1948(People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 889 [ 129 P.2d 367 ]; People v. Lucas, 16 Cal.2d 178, 181 [ 105 P.2d 102 , 130 A.L.R. 1485 ].) Appellant complains of the last sentence in the instruction in which the jury was told that the fact that the charge is difficult to disprove should not deter them from finding appellant guilty if they were convinced from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. 1948(People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 889 [ 129 P.2d 367 ]; People v. Lucas, 16 Cal.2d 178, 181 [ 105 P.2d 102 , 130 A.L.R. 1485 ].) Appellant complains of the last sentence in the instruction in which the jury was told that the fact that the charge is difficult to disprove should not deter them from finding appellant guilty if they were convinced from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Gonzalesgreen2 sentences2024(People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494 , 503–504; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 473–474; Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176.) Moreover, assuming without deciding that the reference to believability as a distinct purpose in the last sentence of the instruction may create some ambiguity, we consider it unlikely that the jury here would have applied the instruction in an impermissible manner. 2020You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not [L.L.’s] conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of his testimony.” (Italics added.)~ Defendant contends the italicized portion of the last sentence of the instruction “affirmatively invites the jury to apply the expert’s testimony case-specifically to evaluate the believability of an alleged victim who testified at trial.” 12 In Munch, the court pointed out it had rejected this assertion, and it did so again in the case before it. “[W]e rejected these cont | 1 | 4 |
People v. Grandberrygreen2 sentences2026(See People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 604 ; People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 312 ; § 1259.) 42 Tapia acknowledges that multiple California courts have rejected his contention that the language of CALCRIM 1193 impermissibly bolsters a complaining witness’s testimony. 2025(See People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 604 [absent reversible error, defendant’s substantial rights are unaffected]). 5 See People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1301 [CSAAS evidence is needed “ ‘to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior’ ”]; People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162 , 171 [CSAAS evidence is admissible to “disabuse jurors of five commonly held ‘myths’ or misconceptions about child sexual abuse”]; People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504 [“The purpose of CSAAS is to understand a child’s reactions wh | 1 | 3 |
People v. McAlpingreen2 sentences2025But like much of the other evidence that comes in at a trial, it may be used indirectly to assist the jury in evaluating whether the alleged victim’s statements are believable.”].) Consistent with settled law, the CALCRIM No. 1193 instruction expressly precluded the use of Dr. Urquiza’s testimony to find that defendant committed the charged and uncharged crimes. ( McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300-1301.) The last sentence of the instruction told the jury it could consider CSAAS evidence only in deciding whether the conduct of Doe 1, Doe 2, Doe 3, and Doe 4 was consistent with the conduct o 2025(See People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 604 [absent reversible error, defendant’s substantial rights are unaffected]). 5 See People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1301 [CSAAS evidence is needed “ ‘to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior’ ”]; People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162 , 171 [CSAAS evidence is admissible to “disabuse jurors of five commonly held ‘myths’ or misconceptions about child sexual abuse”]; People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504 [“The purpose of CSAAS is to understand a child’s reactions wh | 1 | 2 |
Hammond v. Crabtreegreen2 sentences1995In Estate of Crabtree, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at page 1123, our colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District rejected a similar argument when they held: “Among other changes, the [January 1, 1990,] amendment added the last sentence of rule 2(a), which provides that service of a ‘file-stamped copy’ of the judgment or appealable order is sufficient to provide ‘notice of entry.’ We interpret the rule change literally: by its terms the rule no longer requires that the document served give notice of when an appealable judgment or order was entered but only requires notice of when the judgment or order 1992(Estate of Crabtree (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1119 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 224 ].) The language of rule 2(a)(2) clearly and unambiguously states the 60-day appeal period runs from the date the document entitled “notice of entry” of judgment is served. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Prietogreen1 sentence2023(Cf. People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 256-257 (Prieto) [instruction that omits element of special circumstance subject to review under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ].) The complete instruction referred to attempted robbery several times. 9 It referred jurors to separate instructions on attempted robbery and told them to apply those instructions when deciding whether the special circumstance had been proven, a point reinforced by the trial court’s admonishment to “[p]ay careful attention to all of [its] instructions and consider them together.” Prosecutors’ closing arguments | 1 | 1 |
People v. Andersengreen1 sentence2021First, he asserts the instruction affected his substantial rights and is therefore reviewable on appeal without an objection below. (§ 1259; People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 [“Ascertaining whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim—at least to the extent of ascertaining whether the asserted error would result in prejudice if error it was”].) Second, he contends if the issue is deemed forfeited on appeal then his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistan | 1 | 1 |
Delmonico v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc.green2 sentences1995In Estate of Crabtree, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at page 1123, our colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District rejected a similar argument when they held: “Among other changes, the [January 1, 1990,] amendment added the last sentence of rule 2(a), which provides that service of a ‘file-stamped copy’ of the judgment or appealable order is sufficient to provide ‘notice of entry.’ We interpret the rule change literally: by its terms the rule no longer requires that the document served give notice of when an appealable judgment or order was entered but only requires notice of when the judgment or order 1995In Estate of Crabtree, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at page 1123, our colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District rejected a similar argument when they held: “Among other changes, the [January 1, 1990,] amendment added the last sentence of rule 2(a), which provides that service of a ‘file-stamped copy’ of the judgment or appealable order is sufficient to provide ‘notice of entry.’ We interpret the rule change literally: by its terms the rule no longer requires that the document served give notice of when an appealable judgment or order was entered but only requires notice of when the judgment or order | 1 | 1 |
People v. Simongreen2 sentences1993The weight to which such circumstances *1439 is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.” (CALJIC No. 2.52; see § 1127c.) Appellant argues the trial court had a sua sponte duty to modify the last sentence of the instruction to read: “Whether or not evidence of flight shows a consciousness of guilt, and the significance to be attached to such circumstance, are matters for your determination.” (See People v. Simon (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 841, 850, fn. 10 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 373 ] where the trial court gave the modified instruction.) Appellant is mistaken. 1993The weight to which such circumstances *1439 is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.” (CALJIC No. 2.52; see § 1127c.) Appellant argues the trial court had a sua sponte duty to modify the last sentence of the instruction to read: “Whether or not evidence of flight shows a consciousness of guilt, and the significance to be attached to such circumstance, are matters for your determination.” (See People v. Simon (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 841, 850, fn. 10 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 373 ] where the trial court gave the modified instruction.) Appellant is mistaken. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pensingergreen2 sentences1993CALJIC No. 2.52 incorporates the instructional language of section 1127c which states “No further instruction on the subject of flight need be given.” (See also People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1243-1245 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 805 P.2d 899 ].) If appellant sought a modification of a correct instruction it was his duty to request the modification. 1993CALJIC No. 2.52 incorporates the instructional language of section 1127c which states “No further instruction on the subject of flight need be given.” (See also People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1243-1245 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 805 P.2d 899 ].) If appellant sought a modification of a correct instruction it was his duty to request the modification. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. De Leongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Palmer v. City of Long Beachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hilyar v. Union Ice Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Martz v. Ruizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Seperman v. Lyon Fire Proof Storage Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ridge v. Boulder Creek Union Junior-Senior High School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Haeusslergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Andre v. Allynngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ramseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Craingreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pollumgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Raffingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stevensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mateogreen1 sentence2025The trial court instructed the jurors that Dr. Carmichael’s testimony about CSAAS was “offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse” and “is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him.” In the same vein, Dr. Carmichael testified that there is no “checklist” for 4 The Court of Appeal in Housley concluded that a jury must be instructed that CSAAS evidence “is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested; and [] the exper | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rivera
green
2 sentences2026(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326 .) Dr. Maltby’s testimony was appropriately limited—she did not render an opinion on whether the victims were molested and clarified that CSAAS is a “group of concepts,” rather than “a diagnostic tool.” The prosecutor did not argue improper inferences from Dr. Maltby’s testimony. 2023Focusing on the last sentence of the instruction, Ortiz asserts that “[t]he instruction allows the jury to find that, because a complaining witness’s conduct after the fact was consistent with having been sexually abused, the complaining witness is more believable.” 23 “We review a claim of instructional error de novo. [Citation.] The challenged instruction is considered ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, | 4 | 2023–2026 |
People v. Gomez
green
2 sentences2026(See People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 604 ; People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 312 ; § 1259.) 42 Tapia acknowledges that multiple California courts have rejected his contention that the language of CALCRIM 1193 impermissibly bolsters a complaining witness’s testimony. 2023(See People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 604 ; People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 312 ; Pen. | 2 | 2023–2026 |
Kuehn v. Lowthian
green
2 sentences1954It omits the customary expression "if you find," the absence of which tends to suggest there has been a violation; it refers to evidence in excuse or justification to "balance" the presumption, instead of to "overcome," or its equivalent; the next to the last sentence tends to assume the "violation" of a statute and a "failure" to observe other precautions, and tends to obscure the test which is clearly and correctly stated in the last sentence of the instruction. [14] "A court is under no duty and indeed should not give an instruction which, although technically a correct statement of the law 1954It omits the customary expression “if you find,” the absence of which tends to suggest there has been a violation; it refers to evidence in excuse or justification to “balance” the presumption, instead of to “ overcome, ’ ’ or its equivalent; the next to the last sentence tends to assume the “violation” of a statute and a “failure” to observe other precautions, and tends to obscure the test which is clearly and correctly stated in the last sentence of the instruction. “ A court is under no duty and indeed should not give an instruction which, although technically a correct statement of the law | 2 | 1954–1954 |
People v. Bowker
green
1 sentence2025(See People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 604 [absent reversible error, defendant’s substantial rights are unaffected]). 5 See People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1301 [CSAAS evidence is needed “ ‘to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior’ ”]; People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162 , 171 [CSAAS evidence is admissible to “disabuse jurors of five commonly held ‘myths’ or misconceptions about child sexual abuse”]; People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504 [“The purpose of CSAAS is to understand a child’s reactions wh | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Housley
green
2 sentences2025Analysis Relying principally on People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947 (Housley), Ronquillo argues that CALCRIM 1193 is defective because it does not instruct that “ ‘the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be 11 used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.’ ”4 Ronquillo further argues that the last sentence of the instruction provided to his jury is improper because “CSAAS testimony has been strictly limited to providing evidence that the victim’s behavior was not necessarily inconsistent with that of an abused child.”5 We are not persuaded by Ronquillo’ 2025The trial court instructed the jurors that Dr. Carmichael’s testimony about CSAAS was “offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse” and “is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him.” In the same vein, Dr. Carmichael testified that there is no “checklist” for 4 The Court of Appeal in Housley concluded that a jury must be instructed that CSAAS evidence “is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested; and [] the exper | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Rivas
green
1 sentence2024(People v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1428 .) The last sentence of the instruction reminds the jury that it may not convict the defendant unless the prosecution has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Chapman v. California
red
1 sentence2023(Cf. People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 256-257 (Prieto) [instruction that omits element of special circumstance subject to review under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ].) The complete instruction referred to attempted robbery several times. 9 It referred jurors to separate instructions on attempted robbery and told them to apply those instructions when deciding whether the special circumstance had been proven, a point reinforced by the trial court’s admonishment to “[p]ay careful attention to all of [its] instructions and consider them together.” Prosecutors’ closing arguments | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Patino
green
1 sentence2022(See Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 174; Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1746–1747.) Turning to Celestine’s challenge to the related jury instruction, he argues that although the instruction correctly told the jurors that they could not use Dr. Carmichael’s testimony as evidence that he committed the crimes, the last sentence of the instruction impermissibly allowed the jurors to use that testimony in deciding the believability of Jane Doe’s testimony. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Sexton
green
1 sentence2020Our 14 conclusion is further supported by the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s analysis in People v. Sexton (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 457 , which recently rejected a challenge to identical language in CALCRIM No. 850, which applies to expert testimony about intimate partner battering.2 There, the court reasoned: “Read in context, the last sentence of the instruction contains a direction with specific and general aspects. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Washington
green
1 sentence2014It does not require the passage of any particular period of time.” (See CALCRIM No. 521.) 29 degree murder. [Citation.] To hold otherwise would obliterate the distinction between the two degrees of murder.” (People v. Washington (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 620, 624 .) Defendant also requested the court leave out the phrase “does not require deliberation,” so that the last sentence of the instruction would read: “It [malice aforethought] does not require the passage of any particular period of time.” The court correctly rejected this request as well. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2014(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.18, 23-24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) “Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) Robbery is a form of aggravated larceny. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Her
neutral
1 sentence2013The defendant's beliefs were unreasonable." (Italics added.) Appellant contends that the last sentence of the instruction is incorrect, specifically the use of the plural "beliefs." As respondent points out, appellant's claim appears to be based on People v. Her (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 349 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Moore v. Preventive Medicine Medical Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992Under this scenario one can only speculate how long it took to convince Manjeot to vote guilty. [7] It is not contended that the jury was confused or misled by the apparently inadvertent double negative in the last sentence of the instruction. [8] In Moore v. Preventive Medicine Group, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 728 [ 223 Cal. Rptr. 859 ], the court found no prejudice where jurors, in considering damages, discussed how much of the recovery the plaintiff's attorney would receive. 1992Under this scenario one can only speculate how long it took to convince Manjeot to vote guilty. [7] It is not contended that the jury was confused or misled by the apparently inadvertent double negative in the last sentence of the instruction. [8] In Moore v. Preventive Medicine Group, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 728 [ 223 Cal. Rptr. 859 ], the court found no prejudice where jurors, in considering damages, discussed how much of the recovery the plaintiff's attorney would receive. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Hammond
green
2 sentences1989(People v. Hammond, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 469 .) In People v. Hammond, supra, it was held that when a defendant is charged not only with the perpetrator’s planned offense but with another offense ultimately committed as a natural and probable consequence thereof, the jury must be given an instruction clarifying its duty to determine whether the act committed was in fact a natural and probable consequence of the criminal act knowingly and intentionally encouraged. ( 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 469 .) 2 The jury in this case was given the first sentence of the foregoing portion of CALJIC No. 3.00 1989(People v. Hammond, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 469 .) In People v. Hammond, supra, it was held that when a defendant is charged not only with the perpetrator’s planned offense but with another offense ultimately committed as a natural and probable consequence thereof, the jury must be given an instruction clarifying its duty to determine whether the act committed was in fact a natural and probable consequence of the criminal act knowingly and intentionally encouraged. ( 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 469 .) 2 The jury in this case was given the first sentence of the foregoing portion of CALJIC No. 3.00 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
In Re Francis W.
green
1 sentence1986We thus agree with the Court of Appeal in In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892 , 898 . . ., that there is ‘no basis in reason to distinguish between an original and a supplementary proceeding’ and with its conclusion that when a supplemental petition charges acts of misconduct or crimes which may lead to substantially more restrictive punishment or custody the bifurcated hearing procedure established for original proceedings by sections 701 and 702 should be utilized and the juvenile accorded the same const’" tutional and statutory rights that he has on an original petition.” (Id., at p. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. MacKen
green
2 sentences1975Code, § 604; People v. Lem You, 97 Cal. 224 [ 32 P. 11 ]; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31 [ 89 P.2d 173 ].) Secondly, the presumption is rebuttable and the jury was again properly reminded by the last sentence of the instruction that if there be any reasonable doubt of defendant’s knowledge, they should find that he did not know of the stolen nature of the property. 1975Code, § 604; People v. Lem You, 97 Cal. 224 [ 32 P. 11 ]; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31 [ 89 P.2d 173 ].) Secondly, the presumption is rebuttable and the jury was again properly reminded by the last sentence of the instruction that if there be any reasonable doubt of defendant’s knowledge, they should find that he did not know of the stolen nature of the property. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Lem You
green
1 sentence1975Code, § 604; People v. Lem You, 97 Cal. 224 [ 32 P. 11 ]; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31 [ 89 P.2d 173 ].) Secondly, the presumption is rebuttable and the jury was again properly reminded by the last sentence of the instruction that if there be any reasonable doubt of defendant’s knowledge, they should find that he did not know of the stolen nature of the property. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Lusk v. Durant Nursery Co.
green
1 sentence1975Code, § 604; People v. Lem You, 97 Cal. 224 [ 32 P. 11 ]; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31 [ 89 P.2d 173 ].) Secondly, the presumption is rebuttable and the jury was again properly reminded by the last sentence of the instruction that if there be any reasonable doubt of defendant’s knowledge, they should find that he did not know of the stolen nature of the property. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Griffin v. California green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Stephan v. United States green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| United States v. Toner green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Levy v. Helvering green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Indianapolis v. Wheeler green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Mehling v. Zigman green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Stickel v. San Diego Electric Railway Co. green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Guerra v. Balestrieri green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Christensen v. Harmonson green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Burroughs v. Ben's Auto Park, Inc. green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| People v. Wolff green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Shanley v. American Olive Co. green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Dowd v. Atlas Taxicab & Auto Service Co. green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Crane v. Blatt green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Galloway v. United Railroads green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Estate of Ross green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Scarborough v. Urgo green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Silveira v. Iversen green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.