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5 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1912–1990 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences1983See People v. Garcia, 627 P.2d 255 (Colo. App.1980). 1983See People v. Garcia, 627 P.2d 255 (Colo.App.1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. City of Seattle
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2 sentences1912Such always was the equity of the case, and the constitution makes the hitherto disregarded equity now the law of it.” Chief Justice Hayt quotes with approval the above excerpt from Brown v. Seattle, supra, hence this unqualified rule of damages has received the sanction of our supreme court. 1912Such always was the equity of the case, and the constitution makes the hitherto disregarded equity now the law of it.” Chief Justice Hayt quotes with approval the above excerpt from Brown v. Seattle, supra, hence this unqualified rule of damages has received the sanction of our supreme court. | 2 | 1912–1912 |
Rupert Ex Rel. Rupert v. Stienne
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2 sentences1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). 1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Falco v. PADOS
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2 sentences1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). 1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Elam v. Elam
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2 sentences1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). 1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Owens v. Auto Mut. Indemnity Co.
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2 sentences1990Some courts adhere to an unqualified rule of parental immunity, e.g., Owens v. Auto Mutual Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9 , 177 So. 133 (1937); Horton v. Unigard Ins. 1990Some courts adhere to an unqualified rule of parental immunity, e.g., Owens v. Auto Mutual Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9 , 177 So. 133 (1937); Horton v. Unigard Ins. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Gibson v. Gibson
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2 sentences1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). 1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114
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2 sentences1990However, as noted above, this reasoning is undercut by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle permitting a wrongful discharge claim to go forward in state court even though, under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, a grievance procedure was established for determining whether an employee had been discharged for “just cause.” Moreover, the “qualified privilege” standard articulated by this court in Dominguez and Churchey is virtually indistinguishable from the standard approved by the Supreme Court in Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 4 1990However, as noted above, this reasoning is undercut by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle permitting a wrongful discharge claim to go forward in state court even though, under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, a grievance procedure was established for determining whether an employee had been discharged for “just cause.” Moreover, the “qualified privilege” standard articulated by this court in Dominguez and Churchey is virtually indistinguishable from the standard approved by the Supreme Court in Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 4 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
William E. Hasten v. Phillips Petroleum Company and American Stevedoring Corporation
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1 sentence1990In support of its holding recognizing the unqualified privilege, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hasten explained its earlier Mendicki decision by stating that the recognition of the unqualified privilege was required because “the libel action would clearly call for adjudication of the merits of the allegations of dishonesty which were the core issue in the grievance proceeding.” Hasten, 640 F.2d at 279 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal
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1 sentence1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Wood v. Wood
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2 sentences1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). 1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin
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2 sentences1990However, as noted above, this reasoning is undercut by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle permitting a wrongful discharge claim to go forward in state court even though, under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, a grievance procedure was established for determining whether an employee had been discharged for “just cause.” Moreover, the “qualified privilege” standard articulated by this court in Dominguez and Churchey is virtually indistinguishable from the standard approved by the Supreme Court in Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 4 1990However, as noted above, this reasoning is undercut by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle permitting a wrongful discharge claim to go forward in state court even though, under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, a grievance procedure was established for determining whether an employee had been discharged for “just cause.” Moreover, the “qualified privilege” standard articulated by this court in Dominguez and Churchey is virtually indistinguishable from the standard approved by the Supreme Court in Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 4 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co.
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1 sentence1990Co., 355 So.2d 154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), cert. dismissed, 373 So.2d 459 (Fla.1979); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521 (Miss.1971), while others have abolished the doctrine entirely, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132 , 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119 , 370 A.2d 191 (1977). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.