recognized legal defense in Connecticut

1992I It is the law in Connecticut that, “ ‘[i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction. [State v. Rosado, 178 Conn. 704, 707-708 , 425 A.2d 108 (1979)]. “[A] defendant is ‘entitled to have instructions presented relating to any theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible . . .

1992I It is the law in Connecticut that, “ ‘[i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction. [State v. Rosado, 178 Conn. 704, 707-708 , 425 A.2d 108 (1979)]. “[A] defendant is ‘entitled to have instructions presented relating to any theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible . . .

1995We agree. “ Tf the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.’ State v. Fuller, 199 Conn. 273, 278 , 506 A.2d 556 (1986).

1995We agree. “ Tf the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.’ State v. Fuller, 199 Conn. 273, 278 , 506 A.2d 556 (1986).

1997Id., 707-708 . “[A] defendant is ‘entitled to have instructions presented relating to any theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible . . . .’ United States v. Platt, 435 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir. 1970), quoting United States v. O’Connor, 237 F.2d 466 , 474 n.8 (2d Cir. 1956).” United States v. Alfonso-Perez, 535 F.2d 1362, 1365 (2d Cir. 1976).

1987“If the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction. [State v. Rosado, 178 Conn. 704, 707-708 , 425 A.2d 108 (1979)]. ‘[A] defendant is “entitled to have instructions presented relating to any theoiy of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible . . . . ” United States v. Platt, 435 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir. 1970), quoting United States v. O’Connor, 237 F.2d 466 , 474 n.8 (2d

2001We are guided by the principle that “[i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, 232 Conn. 537, 545 , 656 A.2d 657 (1995).

2001We are guided by the principle that “[i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, 232 Conn. 537, 545 , 656 A.2d 657 (1995).

2009Thus, “[i]f [a] defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense . . . the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lynch, 287 Conn. 464, 470 , 948 A.2d 1026 (2008).

2009Thus, “[i]f [a] defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense . . . the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lynch, 287 Conn. 464, 470 , 948 A.2d 1026 (2008).

2008“It is trae that [i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cruz, 75 Conn. App. 500, 510 , 816 A.2d 683 (2003), aff'd, 269 Conn. 97 , 848 A.2d 445 (2004).

2008“It is trae that [i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cruz, 75 Conn. App. 500, 510 , 816 A.2d 683 (2003), aff'd, 269 Conn. 97 , 848 A.2d 445 (2004).

2008“It is trae that [i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cruz, 75 Conn. App. 500, 510 , 816 A.2d 683 (2003), aff'd, 269 Conn. 97 , 848 A.2d 445 (2004).

2008“It is trae that [i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cruz, 75 Conn. App. 500, 510 , 816 A.2d 683 (2003), aff'd, 269 Conn. 97 , 848 A.2d 445 (2004).

2009A fundamental element of due process is the right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 261 Conn. 553, 573 , 804 A.2d 781 (2002).

2009A fundamental element of due process is the right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 261 Conn. 553, 573 , 804 A.2d 781 (2002).

2020The defendant’s right to such an instruction is founded on the principles of due process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lynch, 287 Conn. 464, 470 , 948 A.2d 1026 (2008). ‘‘A challenge to the validity of jury instructions presents a question of law over which this court has plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mann v. Reagan, 108 Conn. App. 566, 576 , 948 A.2d 1075 (2008).

2020The defendant’s right to such an instruction is founded on the principles of due process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lynch, 287 Conn. 464, 470 , 948 A.2d 1026 (2008). ‘‘A challenge to the validity of jury instructions presents a question of law over which this court has plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mann v. Reagan, 108 Conn. App. 566, 576 , 948 A.2d 1075 (2008).

2010A defendant who asserts a recognized legal defense, the availability of which is supported by the evidence, is entitled as a matter of law to a theory of defense instruction.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryant, 233 Conn. 1, 8-9 , 658 A.2d 89 (1995).

2010A defendant who asserts a recognized legal defense, the availability of which is supported by the evidence, is entitled as a matter of law to a theory of defense instruction.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryant, 233 Conn. 1, 8-9 , 658 A.2d 89 (1995).

2003In determining whether the court violated the defendant’s due process rights, we first consider whether he asserted his right to receive the instruction or whether the court omitted the instruction because the defen dant’s counsel agreed that it should do so. 3 “A defendant must . . . assert a recognized legal defense before such a charge will become obligatory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morales, 71 Conn. App. 790, 819 , 804 A.2d 902 , cert. denied, 262 Conn. 902 , 810 A.2d 270 (2002).

2003In determining whether the court violated the defendant’s due process rights, we first consider whether he asserted his right to receive the instruction or whether the court omitted the instruction because the defen dant’s counsel agreed that it should do so. 3 “A defendant must . . . assert a recognized legal defense before such a charge will become obligatory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morales, 71 Conn. App. 790, 819 , 804 A.2d 902 , cert. denied, 262 Conn. 902 , 810 A.2d 270 (2002).

2003It is true that “[i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bailey, 209 Conn. 322, 340 , 551 A.2d 1206 (1988).

2003It is true that “[i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bailey, 209 Conn. 322, 340 , 551 A.2d 1206 (1988).

2003In determining whether the court violated the defendant’s due process rights, we first consider whether he asserted his right to receive the instruction or whether the court omitted the instruction because the defen dant’s counsel agreed that it should do so. 3 “A defendant must . . . assert a recognized legal defense before such a charge will become obligatory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morales, 71 Conn. App. 790, 819 , 804 A.2d 902 , cert. denied, 262 Conn. 902 , 810 A.2d 270 (2002).

2003In determining whether the court violated the defendant’s due process rights, we first consider whether he asserted his right to receive the instruction or whether the court omitted the instruction because the defen dant’s counsel agreed that it should do so. 3 “A defendant must . . . assert a recognized legal defense before such a charge will become obligatory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morales, 71 Conn. App. 790, 819 , 804 A.2d 902 , cert. denied, 262 Conn. 902 , 810 A.2d 270 (2002).

2002A claim of innocence or a denial of participation in the crime charged is not a legally recognized defense and does not entitle a defendant to a theory of defense charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 88-89 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993).

2002A claim of innocence or a denial of participation in the crime charged is not a legally recognized defense and does not entitle a defendant to a theory of defense charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 88-89 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993).

2001As a specific matter, in deciding whether the trial court improperly failed to provide the jury instruction on nonexclusive possession of the premises, as requested by the defendant, “we must adopt the version of the facts most favorable to the defendant which the evidence would reasonably support.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henning, 220 Conn. 417, 428 , 599 A.2d 1065 (1991); see also State v. Lewis, 245 Conn. 779, 810 , 717 A.2d 1140 (1998); State v. Edwards, 234 Conn. 381, 389 , 661 A.2d 1037 (1995).

2001As a specific matter, in deciding whether the trial court improperly failed to provide the jury instruction on nonexclusive possession of the premises, as requested by the defendant, “we must adopt the version of the facts most favorable to the defendant which the evidence would reasonably support.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henning, 220 Conn. 417, 428 , 599 A.2d 1065 (1991); see also State v. Lewis, 245 Conn. 779, 810 , 717 A.2d 1140 (1998); State v. Edwards, 234 Conn. 381, 389 , 661 A.2d 1037 (1995).

2001“As a general rule, a defendant is entitled to have instructions on a defense for which there is evidence produced at trial to justify the instruction, no matter how weak or incredible the claim.” State v. Varszegi, 236 Conn. 266, 282 , 673 A.2d 90 (1996); see State v. Havican, 213 Conn. 593, 597 , 569 A.2d 1089 (1990) (“ ‘[i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction’ ”).

2001“As a general rule, a defendant is entitled to have instructions on a defense for which there is evidence produced at trial to justify the instruction, no matter how weak or incredible the claim.” State v. Varszegi, 236 Conn. 266, 282 , 673 A.2d 90 (1996); see State v. Havican, 213 Conn. 593, 597 , 569 A.2d 1089 (1990) (“ ‘[i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction’ ”).

2001As a specific matter, in deciding whether the trial court improperly failed to provide the jury instruction on nonexclusive possession of the premises, as requested by the defendant, “we must adopt the version of the facts most favorable to the defendant which the evidence would reasonably support.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henning, 220 Conn. 417, 428 , 599 A.2d 1065 (1991); see also State v. Lewis, 245 Conn. 779, 810 , 717 A.2d 1140 (1998); State v. Edwards, 234 Conn. 381, 389 , 661 A.2d 1037 (1995).

2001As a specific matter, in deciding whether the trial court improperly failed to provide the jury instruction on nonexclusive possession of the premises, as requested by the defendant, “we must adopt the version of the facts most favorable to the defendant which the evidence would reasonably support.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henning, 220 Conn. 417, 428 , 599 A.2d 1065 (1991); see also State v. Lewis, 245 Conn. 779, 810 , 717 A.2d 1140 (1998); State v. Edwards, 234 Conn. 381, 389 , 661 A.2d 1037 (1995).

2001A fundamental element of due process is the right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miller, 55 Conn. App. 298, 301-302 , 739 A.2d 1264 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 923 , 747 A.2d 519 (2000).

2001A fundamental element of due process is the right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miller, 55 Conn. App. 298, 301-302 , 739 A.2d 1264 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 923 , 747 A.2d 519 (2000).

2001A fundamental element of due process is the right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miller, 55 Conn. App. 298, 301-302 , 739 A.2d 1264 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 923 , 747 A.2d 519 (2000).

2001A fundamental element of due process is the right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miller, 55 Conn. App. 298, 301-302 , 739 A.2d 1264 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 923 , 747 A.2d 519 (2000).

1999State v. Desimone , 241 Conn. 439 , 459 n. 27 (1997); State v. Breton , 235 Conn. 206 , 243 (1995).

1999State v. Desimone , 241 Conn. 439 , 459 n. 27 (1997); State v. Breton , 235 Conn. 206 , 243 (1995).

1996Section 53a-54a (a) provides in pertinent part that “it shall be an affirmative defense [to the dime of murder] that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be ... .” “Extreme emotional disturbance ‘is a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter.’ ” State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn.

1996Section 53a-54a (a) provides in pertinent part that “it shall be an affirmative defense [to the dime of murder] that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be ... .” “Extreme emotional disturbance ‘is a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter.’ ” State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn.

1996Because “[ejxtreme emotional disturbance is a recognized legal defense to murder”; State v. Bryan, 34 Conn. App. 317, 321 , 641 A.2d 443 (1994); we grant review under the third Golding prong.

1996Because “[ejxtreme emotional disturbance is a recognized legal defense to murder”; State v. Bryan, 34 Conn. App. 317, 321 , 641 A.2d 443 (1994); we grant review under the third Golding prong.