exhibit hearing in Connecticut

2019See, e.g., Schallenkamp v. DelPonte , supra, 229 Conn. at 41 , 639 A.2d 1018 (determination regarding reliability of evidence is strictly within province of administrative hearing officer, and "the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Lawrence v. Kozlowski , supra, 171 Conn. at 708 , 372 A.2d 110 ("The [hearing officer's] function is that of an administrative agency, although he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.

2019See, e.g., Schallenkamp v. DelPonte , supra, 229 Conn. at 41 , 639 A.2d 1018 (determination regarding reliability of evidence is strictly within province of administrative hearing officer, and "the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); Lawrence v. Kozlowski , supra, 171 Conn. at 708 , 372 A.2d 110 ("The [hearing officer's] function is that of an administrative agency, although he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.

2016Stromberg received a report, which the state sought to have admitted as an exhibit at the hearing. 4 The defendant, noting that this report was actually an affidavit from an employee of the laboratory named *567 Stephanie Brumley, 5 objected on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), 6 and General Statutes § 53a-32.

2016Stromberg received a report, which the state sought to have admitted as an exhibit at the hearing. 4 The defendant, noting that this report was actually an affidavit from an employee of the laboratory named *567 Stephanie Brumley, 5 objected on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), 6 and General Statutes § 53a-32.

2015We therefore rely on the facts set forth in the defendant’s trial court memorandum of law, as well as the search warrant affidavit, which the state introduced as an exhibit in the hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress. 4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2015We therefore rely on the facts set forth in the defendant’s trial court memorandum of law, as well as the search warrant affidavit, which the state introduced as an exhibit in the hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress. 4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2003(First Count, ¶ 1.) Future brought tort and contract claims against the defendants in its original complaint. ( Id. , ¶ 2.) The application for a temporary CT Page 3802 injunction was based, in part, on an alleged employment agreement dated September 7, 1997 ("agreement"). ( Id. ¶ 3.) This agreement was marked as an exhibit at the hearing held on the application for a temporary injunction on January 16, 17 and 22, 2001 before Judge Nadeau. ( Id. , ¶¶ 4, 5.) On January 22, 2001, during the hearing, the defendants presented evidence that Farren's signature on the agreement was forged. ( Id. , ¶

1966Labbadia v. Bailey, 152 Conn. 187, 192 , 205 A.2d 377 . (e) The other evidential rulings complained of relate to the cross-examination by his own counsel of the defendant, who had been called as a witness by the plaintiff in its case in chief.

1966Labbadia v. Bailey, 152 Conn. 187, 192 , 205 A.2d 377 . (e) The other evidential rulings complained of relate to the cross-examination by his own counsel of the defendant, who had been called as a witness by the plaintiff in its case in chief.