benefits of the exclusionary rule in Florida

1983In essence, United States v. Salvucci, supra, stands for the proposition that one accused of a possessory crime may claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule only if one’s own Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, a direct reversal of the rule that formerly prevailed under Jones v. United States, 362, U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725 (1960).

1982In that case the Supreme Court overruled the "automatic standing" rule of Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 (1960), and held that a defendant charged with a crime of possession can claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule only if his own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated.

2008While there is no doubt that application of the exclusionary rule to section 901.211 would deter violations of this statute — indeed, this is the goal of the exclusionary rule, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 , 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (noting that the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct) — the benefits of the exclusionary rule are totally irrelevant when a court determines whether the rule applies to a specific state statute in the absence of a constitutional violation.

2008While there is no doubt that application of the exclusionary rule to section 901.211 would deter violations of this statute — indeed, this is the goal of the exclusionary rule, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 , 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (noting that the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct) — the benefits of the exclusionary rule are totally irrelevant when a court determines whether the rule applies to a specific state statute in the absence of a constitutional violation.

1990State v Rome, 500 So.2d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Sears, supra. Inasmuch as the record shows that the County Court erroneously considered standing as to the search before it considered standing to contest the initial “stop,” it is, therefore, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the lower court’s order allowing standing to the Appellee and granting the motion to suppress is quashed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1984In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that the proponent of a motion to suppress has a burden of establishing that his own constitutional rights were violated by the challenged search and seizure.

1984In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that the proponent of a motion to suppress has a burden of establishing that his own constitutional rights were violated by the challenged search and seizure.