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5 California opinions name it 1 courts 1974–1996 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1986(See People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 711-712 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 639 P.2d 267 ]; Albermont Petroleum, Ltd. v. Cunningham (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 84, 89 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 405 ].) It follows that when the juvenile court is determining the truth of the allegations of a supplemental petition, i.e., the jurisdictional phase, the minor is entitled to the same panoply of constitutional protections (including proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the benefits of the exclusionary rule) that he would have been entitled to on an original petition. 1986(See People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 711-712 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 639 P.2d 267 ]; Albermont Petroleum, Ltd. v. Cunningham (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 84, 89 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 405 ].) It follows that when the juvenile court is determining the truth of the allegations of a supplemental petition, i.e., the jurisdictional phase, the minor is entitled to the same panoply of constitutional protections (including proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the benefits of the exclusionary rule) that he would have been entitled to on an original petition. | 2 | 2 |
Albermont Petroleum, Ltd. v. Cunninghamred2 sentences1986(See People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 711-712 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 639 P.2d 267 ]; Albermont Petroleum, Ltd. v. Cunningham (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 84, 89 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 405 ].) It follows that when the juvenile court is determining the truth of the allegations of a supplemental petition, i.e., the jurisdictional phase, the minor is entitled to the same panoply of constitutional protections (including proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the benefits of the exclusionary rule) that he would have been entitled to on an original petition. 1986(See People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 711-712 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 639 P.2d 267 ]; Albermont Petroleum, Ltd. v. Cunningham (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 84, 89 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 405 ].) It follows that when the juvenile court is determining the truth of the allegations of a supplemental petition, i.e., the jurisdictional phase, the minor is entitled to the same panoply of constitutional protections (including proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the benefits of the exclusionary rule) that he would have been entitled to on an original petition. | 2 | 2 |
Ford v. Arthur N.red2 sentences1996The due process guarantees have been expanded to proceedings “where a supplementary petition charges acts which, if they were charged in an original petition, would require these protections and would constitute a crime if committed by an adult [citation], and the disposition results in a substantially more restrictive punishment.” (In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 277 ]; cited with approval in In re Authur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 240 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 545 P.2d 1345 ].) *1437 The right to counsel in an adult criminal trial “ ‘is not a right confined to repres 1986(See People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 711-712 [ 180 Cal. Rptr. 196 , 639 P.2d 267 ]; Albermont Petroleum, Ltd. v. Cunningham (1960) 186 Cal. App.2d 84, 89 [ 9 Cal. Rptr. 405 ].) (6) It follows that when the juvenile court is determining the truth of the allegations of a supplemental petition, i.e., the jurisdictional phase, the minor is entitled to the same panoply of constitutional protections (including proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the benefits of the exclusionary rule) that he would have been entitled to on an original petition. ( In re Arthur N., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 240 ; I | 1 | 3 |
Kirkpatrick v. Roderick P.green2 sentences1996(In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Two years later, the California Supreme Court, while recognizing the “ ‘humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system,’ ” stated that “certain basic rules of due process must be observed. . . .” (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 455-456 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ].) These fundamental rights of due process have been expanded to encompass the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]) and to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 1 1996(In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Two years later, the California Supreme Court, while recognizing the “ ‘humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system,’ ” stated that “certain basic rules of due process must be observed. . . .” (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 455-456 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ].) These fundamental rights of due process have been expanded to encompass the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]) and to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 1 | 1 | 3 |
Thornton v. Dennis M.green2 sentences1996(In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Two years later, the California Supreme Court, while recognizing the “ ‘humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system,’ ” stated that “certain basic rules of due process must be observed. . . .” (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 455-456 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ].) These fundamental rights of due process have been expanded to encompass the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]) and to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 1 1996(In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Two years later, the California Supreme Court, while recognizing the “ ‘humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system,’ ” stated that “certain basic rules of due process must be observed. . . .” (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 455-456 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ].) These fundamental rights of due process have been expanded to encompass the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]) and to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 1 | 1 | 1 |
Mempa v. Rhaygreen2 sentences1996The due process guarantees have been expanded to proceedings “where a supplementary petition charges acts which, if they were charged in an original petition, would require these protections and would constitute a crime if committed by an adult [citation], and the disposition results in a substantially more restrictive punishment.” (In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 277 ]; cited with approval in In re Authur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 240 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 545 P.2d 1345 ].) *1437 The right to counsel in an adult criminal trial “ ‘is not a right confined to repres 1996The due process guarantees have been expanded to proceedings “where a supplementary petition charges acts which, if they were charged in an original petition, would require these protections and would constitute a crime if committed by an adult [citation], and the disposition results in a substantially more restrictive punishment.” (In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 277 ]; cited with approval in In re Authur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 240 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 545 P.2d 1345 ].) *1437 The right to counsel in an adult criminal trial “ ‘is not a right confined to repres | 1 | 1 |
In Re GAULTred2 sentences1996(In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Two years later, the California Supreme Court, while recognizing the “ ‘humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system,’ ” stated that “certain basic rules of due process must be observed. . . .” (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 455-456 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ].) These fundamental rights of due process have been expanded to encompass the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]) and to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 1 1996(In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Two years later, the California Supreme Court, while recognizing the “ ‘humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system,’ ” stated that “certain basic rules of due process must be observed. . . .” (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 455-456 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ].) These fundamental rights of due process have been expanded to encompass the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]) and to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 1 | 1 | 1 |
Fischer v. Francis W.green2 sentences1996The due process guarantees have been expanded to proceedings “where a supplementary petition charges acts which, if they were charged in an original petition, would require these protections and would constitute a crime if committed by an adult [citation], and the disposition results in a substantially more restrictive punishment.” (In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 277 ]; cited with approval in In re Authur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 240 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 545 P.2d 1345 ].) *1437 The right to counsel in an adult criminal trial “ ‘is not a right confined to repres 1996The due process guarantees have been expanded to proceedings “where a supplementary petition charges acts which, if they were charged in an original petition, would require these protections and would constitute a crime if committed by an adult [citation], and the disposition results in a substantially more restrictive punishment.” (In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 277 ]; cited with approval in In re Authur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 240 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 545 P.2d 1345 ].) *1437 The right to counsel in an adult criminal trial “ ‘is not a right confined to repres | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Callahan v. Robert T.
green
2 sentences1996(In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Two years later, the California Supreme Court, while recognizing the “ ‘humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system,’ ” stated that “certain basic rules of due process must be observed. . . .” (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 455-456 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ].) These fundamental rights of due process have been expanded to encompass the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]) and to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 1 1996(In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Two years later, the California Supreme Court, while recognizing the “ ‘humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system,’ ” stated that “certain basic rules of due process must be observed. . . .” (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 455-456 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ].) These fundamental rights of due process have been expanded to encompass the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]) and to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 1 | 3 | 1974–1996 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1996(In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Two years later, the California Supreme Court, while recognizing the “ ‘humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system,’ ” stated that “certain basic rules of due process must be observed. . . .” (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 455-456 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ].) These fundamental rights of due process have been expanded to encompass the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]) and to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 1 1996(In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13 [ 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 538 ].) Two years later, the California Supreme Court, while recognizing the “ ‘humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court system,’ ” stated that “certain basic rules of due process must be observed. . . .” (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 455-456 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ].) These fundamental rights of due process have been expanded to encompass the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 990 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]) and to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 1 | 3 | 1974–1996 |
In Re Tahl
yellow
2 sentences1974Code, § 702.5), that he is entitled to the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T., supra, 8 Cal.App.3d 990 ), to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; In re Roderick P., supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 810 ) and, prior to an admission, to be advised of his Boykin-Tahl rights (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]). 1974Code, § 702.5), that he is entitled to the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T., supra, 8 Cal.App.3d 990 ), to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; In re Roderick P., supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 810 ) and, prior to an admission, to be advised of his Boykin-Tahl rights (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]). | 2 | 1974–1974 |
Boykin v. Alabama
red
2 sentences1974Code, § 702.5), that he is entitled to the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T., supra, 8 Cal.App.3d 990 ), to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; In re Roderick P., supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 810 ) and, prior to an admission, to be advised of his Boykin-Tahl rights (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]). 1974Code, § 702.5), that he is entitled to the benefits of the exclusionary rule (In re Robert T., supra, 8 Cal.App.3d 990 ), to the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; In re Roderick P., supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 810 ) and, prior to an admission, to be advised of his Boykin-Tahl rights (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]). | 2 | 1974–1974 |
Moore v. Michigan
green
2 sentences1996The due process guarantees have been expanded to proceedings “where a supplementary petition charges acts which, if they were charged in an original petition, would require these protections and would constitute a crime if committed by an adult [citation], and the disposition results in a substantially more restrictive punishment.” (In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 277 ]; cited with approval in In re Authur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 240 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 545 P.2d 1345 ].) *1437 The right to counsel in an adult criminal trial “ ‘is not a right confined to repres 1996The due process guarantees have been expanded to proceedings “where a supplementary petition charges acts which, if they were charged in an original petition, would require these protections and would constitute a crime if committed by an adult [citation], and the disposition results in a substantially more restrictive punishment.” (In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 277 ]; cited with approval in In re Authur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 240 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 545 P.2d 1345 ].) *1437 The right to counsel in an adult criminal trial “ ‘is not a right confined to repres | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Kent v. United States
green
2 sentences1996The due process guarantees have been expanded to proceedings “where a supplementary petition charges acts which, if they were charged in an original petition, would require these protections and would constitute a crime if committed by an adult [citation], and the disposition results in a substantially more restrictive punishment.” (In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 277 ]; cited with approval in In re Authur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 240 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 545 P.2d 1345 ].) *1437 The right to counsel in an adult criminal trial “ ‘is not a right confined to repres 1996The due process guarantees have been expanded to proceedings “where a supplementary petition charges acts which, if they were charged in an original petition, would require these protections and would constitute a crime if committed by an adult [citation], and the disposition results in a substantially more restrictive punishment.” (In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 277 ]; cited with approval in In re Authur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 240 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 545 P.2d 1345 ].) *1437 The right to counsel in an adult criminal trial “ ‘is not a right confined to repres | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.