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5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rogalski v. Upper Chichester Townshipgreen2 sentences2010Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128 , 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975) (holding a design restriction ordinance invalid where the principal purpose of the ordinance was to achieve a particular aesthetic appearance instead of protecting property values or other legitimate function of the police power); see City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646 , 139 So.2d 660, 664 (1962) (concluding a rezoning decision was invalid where the proposal to rezone was due to “aesthetic or group caprice,” not a public health, safety, moral or general welfare reason); see also Coscan Wash., Inc. 2010Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128 , 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975) (holding a design restriction ordinance invalid where the principal purpose of the ordinance was to achieve a particular aesthetic appearance instead of protecting property values or other legitimate function of the police power); see City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646 , 139 So.2d 660, 664 (1962) (concluding a rezoning decision was invalid where the proposal to rezone was due to “aesthetic or group caprice,” not a public health, safety, moral or general welfare reason); see also Coscan Wash., Inc. | 2 | 2 |
Board of Supervisors v. Rowegreen2 sentences2010Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128 , 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975) (holding a design restriction ordinance invalid where the principal purpose of the ordinance was to achieve a particular aesthetic appearance instead of protecting property values or other legitimate function of the police power); see City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646 , 139 So.2d 660, 664 (1962) (concluding a rezoning decision was invalid where the proposal to rezone was due to “aesthetic or group caprice,” not a public health, safety, moral or general welfare reason); see also Coscan Wash., Inc. 2010Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128 , 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975) (holding a design restriction ordinance invalid where the principal purpose of the ordinance was to achieve a particular aesthetic appearance instead of protecting property values or other legitimate function of the police power); see City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646 , 139 So.2d 660, 664 (1962) (concluding a rezoning decision was invalid where the proposal to rezone was due to “aesthetic or group caprice,” not a public health, safety, moral or general welfare reason); see also Coscan Wash., Inc. | 2 | 2 |
City of Jackson v. Bridgesgreen2 sentences2010Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128 , 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975) (holding a design restriction ordinance invalid where the principal purpose of the ordinance was to achieve a particular aesthetic appearance instead of protecting property values or other legitimate function of the police power); see City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646 , 139 So.2d 660, 664 (1962) (concluding a rezoning decision was invalid where the proposal to rezone was due to “aesthetic or group caprice,” not a public health, safety, moral or general welfare reason); see also Coscan Wash., Inc. 2010Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128 , 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975) (holding a design restriction ordinance invalid where the principal purpose of the ordinance was to achieve a particular aesthetic appearance instead of protecting property values or other legitimate function of the police power); see City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646 , 139 So.2d 660, 664 (1962) (concluding a rezoning decision was invalid where the proposal to rezone was due to “aesthetic or group caprice,” not a public health, safety, moral or general welfare reason); see also Coscan Wash., Inc. | 2 | 2 |
Coscan Washington, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commissiongreen2 sentences2010Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128 , 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975) (holding a design restriction ordinance invalid where the principal purpose of the ordinance was to achieve a particular aesthetic appearance instead of protecting property values or other legitimate function of the police power); see City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646 , 139 So.2d 660, 664 (1962) (concluding a rezoning decision was invalid where the proposal to rezone was due to “aesthetic or group caprice,” not a public health, safety, moral or general welfare reason); see also Coscan Wash., Inc. 2010Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128 , 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975) (holding a design restriction ordinance invalid where the principal purpose of the ordinance was to achieve a particular aesthetic appearance instead of protecting property values or other legitimate function of the police power); see City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646 , 139 So.2d 660, 664 (1962) (concluding a rezoning decision was invalid where the proposal to rezone was due to “aesthetic or group caprice,” not a public health, safety, moral or general welfare reason); see also Coscan Wash., Inc. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gerstein v. Pugh
green
2 sentences2003Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120-22 , 95 S.Ct. 854 (footnotes and citations omitted). 2003Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120-22 , 95 S.Ct. 854 (footnotes and citations omitted). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1998In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that "an accused, ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." (Emphasis added). 1998In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that "an accused, ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." (Emphasis added). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Simmons v. United States
green
2 sentences1969Instead, we hold that each case must be considered on its own facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 390 U.S. at 384 , 88 S.Ct. at 971 . 1969Instead, we hold that each case must be considered on its own facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 390 U.S. at 384 , 88 S.Ct. at 971 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.