accuracy test in New York

1988It has been held that "failure to establish 'the accuracy of the standard as a reliable norm’ means that a proper foundation was not laid for the expert testimony that a substance was cocaine, and thus such evidence is incompetent and not admissible at trial (see, e.g., People v Miller, 57 AD2d 668 ; People v Branton, 67 AD2d 664 )” (People v Wicks, 122 AD2d 239 , lv denied 68 NY2d 1005 ).

1986There is case law holding that failure to establish "the accuracy of the standard as a reliable norm” means that a proper foundation was not laid for the expert testimony that a substance was cocaine, and thus such evidence is incompetent and not admissible at trial (see, e.g., People v Miller, 57 AD2d 668 ; People v Branton, 67 AD2d 664 ).

2023Where an expert opines that a particular substance is a narcotic drug, for example, heroin or cocaine, and the opinion is based on the results of certain tests in which the substance was compared with a "known" standard, the People must establish the accuracy of the standard as a reliable norm ( People v Campbell , 185 AD3d 717, 719 ; see People v Rayford , 80 AD3d 780, 781 ; People v Wicks , 122 AD2d 239 ).

1988It has been held that "failure to establish 'the accuracy of the standard as a reliable norm’ means that a proper foundation was not laid for the expert testimony that a substance was cocaine, and thus such evidence is incompetent and not admissible at trial (see, e.g., People v Miller, 57 AD2d 668 ; People v Branton, 67 AD2d 664 )” (People v Wicks, 122 AD2d 239 , lv denied 68 NY2d 1005 ).

2015(People v Freeland, 68 NY2d 699 [1986].) In order to introduce the results of a breathalyzer test, the People are required to “introduce evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably conclude . . . that the testing device was in proper working order at the time the test was administered to the defendant.” (Id. at 700.) A defendant may attack the accuracy of test results by demonstrating either that the proper operating procedures were not followed or the machine was not operating properly.

1989Although the machine may be accurate to show alcohol toxicity or possible drug interactions for general purposes, there is no proof that it is "capable of accurately discerning the critical distinction between a legally permissible blood alcohol content and that which is statutorily proscribed” (People v Freeland, supra, at 701 ).

2014Nothing in the document cast any doubt on the accuracy of the test results showing that 19 ounces of cocaine were recovered, and there is no reasonable possibility that the belated disclosure contributed to the verdict (see People v Vilardi, 76 NY2d 67, 77 [1990]; People v Nelson, 63 AD3d 629, 630 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 861 [2009]).

2014Nothing in the document cast any doubt on the accuracy of the test results showing that 19 ounces of cocaine were recovered, and there is no reasonable possibility that the belated disclosure contributed to the verdict (see People v Vilardi, 76 NY2d 67, 77 [1990]; People v Nelson, 63 AD3d 629, 630 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 861 [2009]).

1998The record supports the finding that neither a mistake in transcribing the subject identification number nor the improper placement of test tubes in the centrifuge (which resulted in retesting), in any way affected the accuracy of the test results (see, Matter of Allen v Police Dept., 240 AD2d 229 ), and there is otherwise no basis in the record to disturb respondents’ determination regarding the accuracy of the tests performed (see, Matter of Bonilla v Kelly, 213 AD2d 264 ).

1995It was within the province of the Commissioner to accept or reject evidence purporting to cast doubt on the accuracy of the test and sequence of events, including petitioner’s claim that he did not supply colored water instead of urine (Matter of Bonilla v Kelly, 213 AD2d 264 ; see, Matter of Dice v Ward, 169 AD2d 461 ).

1990(People v Gonzalez, 127 AD2d 787 .) Concur—Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Ross and Ellerin, JJ.

1990The failure to establish the accuracy of the standard does not render the evidence incompetent (People v Gonzalez, 127 AD2d 787, 788 , lv denied 69 NY2d 1004 ).

1982To be sure, this may involve the expenditure of a substantial sum of money which in many or most instances would be prohibitive, but that is a legislative and an administrative problem, rather than a judicial one.” (Emphasis supplied.) In Clark v Rysedorph ( 281 App Div 121 ) the court affirmed the dismissal of a filiation proceeding where three medical doctors gave uncontradicted testimony as to the exclusionary results of blood-grouping tests (BGT’s) conducted by them.

1979Clark v. Rysedorph, 281 App. Div. 121 , 118 N.Y.S.2d 103 .” The following statutory enactments provide for blood grouping tests: sections 418 and 532 of the Family Court Act; CPLR 3121.

2023Where an expert opines that a particular substance is a narcotic drug, for example, heroin or cocaine, and the opinion is based on the results of certain tests in which the substance was compared with a "known" standard, the People must establish the accuracy of the standard as a reliable norm ( People v Campbell , 185 AD3d 717, 719 ; see People v Rayford , 80 AD3d 780, 781 ; People v Wicks , 122 AD2d 239 ).

2023In the absence of such evidence, a proper foundation has not been laid for the expert's analysis that the substance is the particular narcotic drug, thereby rendering that testimony incompetent and inadmissible ( see People v Campbell , 185 AD3d at 719 ; People De La Rosa , 162 AD2d 698 ; People v Branton , 67 AD2d 664, 664-665 ; People v Miller , 57 AD2d at 669 ).

2021Contrary to defendant's assertion, the People were not required to prove that she was driving erratically ( see generally People v Fiumara , 116 AD3d 421 [2014] , lv denied 23 NY3d 1036 [2014]).

2019In any event, 10 NYCRR 59.5 (d), which "governs the reference standard that applies to the simulator solution, utilized just prior to the actual test performed" ( People v Schuessler , 14 Misc 3d 30 , 32 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006]) states: "(d) The result of an analysis of a reference standard with an alcoholic content greater than or equal to 0.08 percent must agree with the reference standard value within the limits of plus or minus 0.01 percent weight per volume, or such limits as set by the commissioner . . ." The calibrations serve to ensure that the breath test instru

2019The District Court properly overruled defendant's Confrontation Clause objection to the calibration document produced by the Forensic Investigation Center ( see People v Pealer , 20 NY3d 447 , 456 [2013]), which had been certified by the state analyst to verify that calibration and maintenance tests performed on defendant's instrument, insofar as they involve the simulator solution, sufficed to ensure that the instrument was functioning properly at the time of defendant's test.

2010Any discrepancies on the urinalysis testing worksheet were adequately explained by the correction officer who tested the sample and verified the accuracy of the test results (see Matter of Victor v Goord, 309 AD2d 1026, 1026-1027 [2003]; Matter of Uttinger v Goord, 284 AD2d 826 [2001]).

2007Such inconsistency and unpredictability in the application of the Roberts general reliability tests were among the reasons that the Court in Crawford was emphatic that “simply reweighing the ‘reliability factors’ under Roberts . . . would perpetuate, not avoid, what the Sixth Amendment condemns.” (Crawford, 541 US at 67 .) Because the approach taken by the court in Vasquez to probing the accuracy requirement of Teague's second exception is mired in the inconsistencies and paradigmatic limitations of the rejected Roberts rubric, therefore, it cannot provide the basis for a determination of the

2007(See, e.g., People v Vasquez, supra, 7 Misc 3d at 782 , citing Schriro v Summerlin, supra, 542 US 348, 356 [2004], citing Teague, 489 US at 312-313 .) In Vasquez , another court of coordinate jurisdiction, in a most scholarly review of the issue, concluded that the retroactivity of Crawford must depend on the answer to the following question regarding its role in promoting the accuracy of the trial process, namely: whether a judicial determination conducted pursuant to Roberts so seriously diminished accuracy that it constituted an impermissibly large risk that an innocent person would be conv

2007(See, e.g., People v Vasquez, supra, 7 Misc 3d at 782 , citing Schriro v Summerlin, supra, 542 US 348, 356 [2004], citing Teague, 489 US at 312-313 .) In Vasquez , another court of coordinate jurisdiction, in a most scholarly review of the issue, concluded that the retroactivity of Crawford must depend on the answer to the following question regarding its role in promoting the accuracy of the trial process, namely: whether a judicial determination conducted pursuant to Roberts so seriously diminished accuracy that it constituted an impermissibly large risk that an innocent person would be conv

2007(People v Brown, 235 AD2d 344 [1st Dept 1997].) Another argument advanced against according the Crawford rule watershed status is that it cannot satisfy the recent articulation in Schriro of the accuracy requirement of Teague’s second exception’s accuracy requirement, that the absence of cross-examination so seriously diminishes the accuracy of the process that there is an impermissibly large risk of punishing the innocent.

2006There was no evidence that the officer failed to observe any event that would have undermined the accuracy of the test results, and, in any event, proof of the requisite “continuous observation” is not a predicate condition for the test results’ admission; rather, it “goes only to the weight to be afforded the test result” (People v Terrance, 120 AD2d 805 , 807 [1986]; People v Jones, 10 Misc 3d 413, 417 [Dutchess County Ct 2005] [same]).

2006Thus, the observation requirement is not strictly construed: “Neither the statute, the regulations nor the exercise of reason call for [a] constant vigil” (People v Williams, 96 AD2d 972, 973 [1983], revd on other grounds 62 NY2d 765 [1984]; see also People v McDonough, 132 AD2d 997, 998 [1987] [although “arresting officer testified that he was doing some paperwork at the time,” continuous observation rule was satisfied as he was nevertheless able to observe whether defendant “did anything with his hands, belched, or regurgitated”]).