accuracy requirement (Minnesota) · Go Syfert
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accuracy requirement in Minnesota

74 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 8 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (18)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Trottgreen
minn · 1983 · cited in 20 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 1989–2024
2 sentences

2024“The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983).

2017“The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). 2 A defendant “may plead guilty to an offense, even though the defendant maintains his or her innocence, if the defendant reasonably believes, and the record establishes, the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 , 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970)). “[C]areful scrutiny of t

1520
State v. Theisgreen
minn · 2007 · cited in 19 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2014–2026
2 sentences

2026We clarified the accuracy requirement for an Alford plea in State v. Theis, holding that an Alford plea must be supported by both a “strong factual basis and the defendant’s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction[.]” 742 N.W.2d at 649 .

2024Cf. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2007) (explaining, in the context of an Alford plea, “[t]he allegations of the complaint in this case also do not satisfy . . . the accuracy requirement” because the defendant “did nothing at the plea hearing to affirm that the evidence supporting these allegations would lead a jury to find him guilty”).

819
State v. Eckergreen
minn · 1994 · cited in 13 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2002–2026
2 sentences

2009The accuracy requirement is intended to protect “the defendant from pleading guilty to a charge more serious than he or she could be convicted of were the defendant to go to trial.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn.1994).

2007In our analysis, we stated that a proper factual basis must be established to satisfy the accuracy requirement for a valid plea, but that the district court need not interrogate the defendant to establish the factual basis “if defense counsel and the prosecutor have established an adequate factual basis.” Id. at 716 . 3 We also advised that the record should explicitly indicate that the defendant is entering an Alford plea, and again reaffirmed that the court should inquire into the defendant’s decision to plead guilty despite maintaining his innocence.

813
Lussier v. Stategreen
minn · 2012 · cited in 9 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2014–2015
2 sentences

2015“The purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2015See, e.g., Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. 2012) (“We have previously observed that the typical way a district court satisfies the accuracy requirement is by asking the defendant to express in his own words what happened.

89
State v. Iversongreen
minn · 2003 · cited in 5 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2014–2026
2 sentences

2026For a guilty plea to be accurate, it must be supported by a proper factual basis, with “sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which [the defendant] desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349-50 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).

2025In other words, the accuracy requirement ensures that a defendant is, in fact, substantively culpable for the crime of conviction. 5 5 In a few of our decisions, we have framed the factual basis requirement as demanding “evidence that the defendant’s conduct meets all elements of the offense to which he is pleading guilty.” See, e.g., Bonnell v. State, 984 N.W.2d 224 , 227 (Minn. 2022) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003) (stating that “[t]he factual basis of a plea is inadequate when the defendant makes statements that negate an essential element of the

55
State v. Raleighgreen
minn · 2010 · cited in 17 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2012–2026
2 sentences

2026“The accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which [the defendant] could be convicted if [the defendant] insisted on [the] right to trial.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 .

2026“The accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.” Id.

317
Alanis v. Stategreen
minn · 1998 · cited in 3 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2003–2014
2 sentences

2014Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998), abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).

2009“The accuracy requirement protects the defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he or she could be properly convicted of at trial.” Id.

23
Carey v. Stategreen
minnctapp · 2009 · cited in 2 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2014–2015
2 sentences

2015See State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988) (stating that the factual basis requirement “protects a defendant from pleading guilty to an offense more serious than defendant’s conduct warrants”); Carey v. State, 765 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2009) (“The accuracy requirement protects the defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he or she could be properly convicted of at trial.” (quotation omitted)).

2014“The accuracy requirement protects the defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he or she could be properly convicted of at trial.” Carey v. State, 765 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2009).

22
State of Minnesota v. Kevin Trent Johnsongreen
minnctapp · 2015 · cited in 2 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015See State v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 216 (Minn. App. 2015). 9 Third, appellant argues that his Alford plea was undermined by the fact that he was only asked leading questions at the plea hearing, and that the district court did not ask him any questions.

2015Appellant clearly understood that the result of his plea was a conviction of an offense less serious than those he originally faced.1 We have held that if the district court has “assure[d] itself that the accuracy standard is satisfied” the district court need not make an explicit finding to that effect on the record “as a routine matter.” State v. Johnson, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2015 WL 4379808, at *4 (Minn. App. June 29, 2015).

22
North Carolina v. Alfordgreen
scotus · 1970 · cited in 3 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2017–2026
2 sentences

2025He argued that the factual basis he provided for the substantive offense of kidnapping to facilitate a felony second-degree controlled substance crime was insufficient to satisfy the accuracy requirement of a valid plea because Stacy is in Isanti plea” and the defendant clearly expressed his desire to enter the plea based on his belief that the State’s evidence would be sufficient to convict him. 400 U.S. at 38 .

2017“The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). 2 A defendant “may plead guilty to an offense, even though the defendant maintains his or her innocence, if the defendant reasonably believes, and the record establishes, the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 , 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970)). “[C]areful scrutiny of t

13
State v. Goulettegreen
minn · 1977 · cited in 2 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2013–2014
2 sentences

2014Independent Analysis of Factual Basis by District Court To ensure that an Alford plea meets the accuracy requirement of a valid plea, the district court must analyze the factual basis offered for the plea and reasonably and “independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of innocence.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647 , 649 (citing Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 758, 760 ).

2013Relying on Alford , the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the use of so-called “Alford pleas” in State v. Goulette, holding that an Alford plea satisfies the accuracy requirement “if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty....” 258 N.W.2d at 760 .

12
Munger v. Stategreen
minn · 2008 · cited in 1 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Therefore, “[t]he factual basis must establish sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). 2 Beng pleaded guilty to violating an OFP that prohibited him from contacting P.G. or her children “in person, by telephone, by letter, by third party, over the internet and/or through social media (i.e., Facebook, Twitter, etc.) or by any electronic means, such as pager, cell phone, e-mail, text message, etc.” At the plea hearing, Beng

11
State v. Russellgreen
minn · 1975 · cited in 1 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 ; State v. Russell, 306 Minn. 274, 274 , 236 N.W.2d 612, 613 (1975) (stating that district court may not accept guilty plea “unless it is first satisfied that, among other things, the plea is supported by an adequate factual basis”).

2015See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 ; State v. Russell, 306 Minn. 274, 274 , 236 N.W.2d 612, 613 (1975) (stating that district court may not accept guilty plea “unless it is first satisfied that, among other things, the plea is supported by an adequate factual basis”).

11
Barnslater v. Stategreen
minnctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Accuracy requires that the plea is supported by a proper factual basis in the record “showing that the defendant's conduct meets all elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.” Barnslater v. State, 805 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. App. 2011).

11
State v. Medranogreen
minn · 2008 · cited in 1 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015See Medrano, 751 N.W.2d at 111 (explaining that the validity of the Miranda warning does not turn on the accuracy of the warning under applicable state law; rather, the suspect's right to counsel may not be linked to a future time after the interrogation is completed).

11
State v. Warrengreen
minn · 1988 · cited in 1 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015See State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988) (stating that the factual basis requirement “protects a defendant from pleading guilty to an offense more serious than defendant’s conduct warrants”); Carey v. State, 765 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2009) (“The accuracy requirement protects the defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he or she could be properly convicted of at trial.” (quotation omitted)).

11
Beaman v. Stategreen
minn · 1974 · cited in 1 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007The accuracy requirement is “to ensure that the defendant is guilty of a crime at least as serious as that to which he is entering his plea.” Beaman v. State, 301 Minn. 180, 183 , 221 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1974); see also Lundin v. State, 430 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Minn.App.1988) (noting that we do not reverse if “the record supports the conclusion that the defendant committed an offense at least as serious as the crime to which he is pleading guilty”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 21, 1988).

2007The accuracy requirement is “to ensure that the defendant is guilty of a crime at least as serious as that to which he is entering his plea.” Beaman v. State, 301 Minn. 180, 183 , 221 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1974); see also Lundin v. State, 430 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Minn.App.1988) (noting that we do not reverse if “the record supports the conclusion that the defendant committed an offense at least as serious as the crime to which he is pleading guilty”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 21, 1988).

11
Lundin v. Stategreen
minnctapp · 1988 · cited in 1 Minnesota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007The accuracy requirement is “to ensure that the defendant is guilty of a crime at least as serious as that to which he is entering his plea.” Beaman v. State, 301 Minn. 180, 183 , 221 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1974); see also Lundin v. State, 430 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Minn.App.1988) (noting that we do not reverse if “the record supports the conclusion that the defendant committed an offense at least as serious as the crime to which he is pleading guilty”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 21, 1988).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Padilla v. Kentucky green
scotus · 2010
2 sentences

2014Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998), abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).

2014Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998), abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).

12014–2014
State v. Dille green
minn · 1977
1 sentence

1994The district court reasonably could have concluded that the “test itself was reliable and that its administration in the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure reliability.” Dille, 258 N.W.2d at 567 . 2.

11994–1994
Strand v. Village of Watson green
minn · 1955
2 sentences

1979In Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414 , 72 N.W.2d 609 (1955), addressing whether plaintiff was required to prove that the driver (urinalysis showed .27 percent alcohol by weight) who caused plaintiff’s injury was obviously intoxicated, as provided by § 340.14, or was merely required to prove that the driver was intoxicated, as provided by the village ordinance, this court held that the language of § 340.14 was controlling, and stated: “Where the legislature has created a right to a cause of action which did not exist at common law and has provided the yardstick by which that right shou

1979In Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414 , 72 N.W.2d 609 (1955), addressing whether plaintiff was required to prove that the driver (urinalysis showed .27 percent alcohol by weight) who caused plaintiff’s injury was obviously intoxicated, as provided by § 340.14, or was merely required to prove that the driver was intoxicated, as provided by the village ordinance, this court held that the language of § 340.14 was controlling, and stated: “Where the legislature has created a right to a cause of action which did not exist at common law and has provided the yardstick by which that right shou

11979–1979

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MN § Minn. Stat. § 480A.08 (44) MN § Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (12) MN § Minn. Stat. § 590.04 (10) MN § Minn. Stat. § 609.341 (7) MN § Minn. Stat. § 609.342 (7) MN § Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (6) MN § Minn. Stat. § 609.02 (6) MN § Minn. Stat. § 609.343 (6) MN § Minn. Stat. § 609.222 (5) MN § Minn. Stat. § 609.582 (5) MN § Minn. Stat. § 624.713 (5) MN § Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

MN 74 (1979–2026) OH 49 (1975–2024) NY 43 (1901–2023) CA 31 (1959–2025) IL 24 (1910–2023) IA 20 (1970–2024) MO 17 (1965–2023) FL 16 (1958–2018) WA 15 (1975–2024) NM 12 (1983–2019) NJ 10 (1975–2022) VA 9 (1967–2025) IN 9 (1900–2014) ND 9 (1981–2008) MS 9 (1988–2020) TN 9 (1949–2018) TX 8 (1983–2024) ID 8 (1991–2017) MD 8 (1986–2024) UT 7 (1980–2023) MA 7 (1974–2009) MI 7 (1977–2020) OR 7 (1979–2012) PA 6 (1955–2011) NE 6 (1907–2017) KS 5 (1926–2024) LA 5 (1984–1990) HI 5 (1999–2021) AZ 5 (1954–2016) VT 5 (1982–2023) GA 4 (1990–2012) DC 4 (2020–2023) KY 4 (1970–2008) NC 4 (1973–2022) AL 4 (1986–2003) WY 4 (2002–2007) WI 4 (1909–2022) MT 3 (2003–2008) OK 3 (1969–2004) WV 3 (1979–1988) CO 3 (1980–1990) RI 3 (1996–2005) DE 3 (1972–2017) SD 2 (1975–2002) CT 2 (1989–2001) ME 2 (2011–2019)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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