Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
5 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1993–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Woods v. Hallgreen2 sentences2026And OCGA § 9-15-14(b) permits a trial court to award attorney fees if a party brings an action that “lacked substantial justification[,]” “was interposed for delay or harassment,” or “unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct[.]” “[A]n order awarding attorney fees pursuant to [OCGA § 9-15-14] must specifically state whether the award is made under OCGA § 9-15-14(a) or (b),” Woods v. Hall, 315 Ga. App. 93, 97 (2) ( 726 SE2d 596 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted), and it must include “findings 6 of fact that specify the conduct upon which the award is made[,]” Hick 2026And OCGA § 9-15-14(b) permits a trial court to award attorney fees if a party brings an action that “lacked substantial justification[,]” “was interposed for delay or harassment,” or “unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct[.]” “[A]n order awarding attorney fees pursuant to [OCGA § 9-15-14] must specifically state whether the award is made under OCGA § 9-15-14(a) or (b),” Woods v. Hall, 315 Ga. App. 93, 97 (2) ( 726 SE2d 596 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted), and it must include “findings 6 of fact that specify the conduct upon which the award is made[,]” Hick | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Land v. State of Ga., 265 Ga. App. 859 ( 595 SE2d 540 ) (2004); Sanders, supra at 425-426 (2) (regarding Fifth Amendment); Simpson v. Simpson, 233 Ga. 17, 19-20 ( 209 SE2d 611 ) (1974) (permitting unfavorable inference to be drawn in civil cases from a privileged refusal to testify, where witness claims privilege embodied in Georgia statutes — such as former Ga. Code § 38-1205, which provided that no party shall be required to testify as to certain matters; the court’s analysis was not limited to cases in which a party asserts a privilege not to answer questions that have a direct tendency to | 1 | 1 |
Jett v. Stategreen1 sentence2016The burden is on the individual claiming the privilege “to state the general reason for his refusal to answer and to specifically establish that a real danger of incrimination existed with respect to each question.” Jett, supra at 656 (2), citing Petty v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 169 Ga. App. 418 ( 312 SE2d 874 ) (1984) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Simpson v. Simpsongreen2 sentences2016Land v. State of Ga., 265 Ga. App. 859 ( 595 SE2d 540 ) (2004); Sanders, supra at 425-426 (2) (regarding Fifth Amendment); Simpson v. Simpson, 233 Ga. 17, 19-20 ( 209 SE2d 611 ) (1974) (permitting unfavorable inference to be drawn in civil cases from a privileged refusal to testify, where witness claims privilege embodied in Georgia statutes — such as former Ga. Code § 38-1205, which provided that no party shall be required to testify as to certain matters; the court’s analysis was not limited to cases in which a party asserts a privilege not to answer questions that have a direct tendency to 2016Land v. State of Ga., 265 Ga. App. 859 ( 595 SE2d 540 ) (2004); Sanders, supra at 425-426 (2) (regarding Fifth Amendment); Simpson v. Simpson, 233 Ga. 17, 19-20 ( 209 SE2d 611 ) (1974) (permitting unfavorable inference to be drawn in civil cases from a privileged refusal to testify, where witness claims privilege embodied in Georgia statutes — such as former Ga. Code § 38-1205, which provided that no party shall be required to testify as to certain matters; the court’s analysis was not limited to cases in which a party asserts a privilege not to answer questions that have a direct tendency to | 1 | 1 |
Hyre v. Denisegreen1 sentence2003“Inherent in a ruling of the trial court denying attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) is a determination that there does not exist such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or other position.” (Emphasis in original.) Hyre v. Denise, supra at 556 (10) (b). | 1 | 1 |
Haggard v. Board of Regents of University Systemgreen2 sentences1993Haggard v. Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga., 257 Ga. 524, 527 (4) (c) ( 360 SE2d 566 ) (1987). 1993Haggard v. Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga., 257 Ga. 524, 527 (4) (c) ( 360 SE2d 566 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Katherine Hicks v. William Gabor
green
2 sentences2026And OCGA § 9-15-14(b) permits a trial court to award attorney fees if a party brings an action that “lacked substantial justification[,]” “was interposed for delay or harassment,” or “unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct[.]” “[A]n order awarding attorney fees pursuant to [OCGA § 9-15-14] must specifically state whether the award is made under OCGA § 9-15-14(a) or (b),” Woods v. Hall, 315 Ga. App. 93, 97 (2) ( 726 SE2d 596 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted), and it must include “findings 6 of fact that specify the conduct upon which the award is made[,]” Hick 2026And OCGA § 9-15-14(b) permits a trial court to award attorney fees if a party brings an action that “lacked substantial justification[,]” “was interposed for delay or harassment,” or “unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct[.]” “[A]n order awarding attorney fees pursuant to [OCGA § 9-15-14] must specifically state whether the award is made under OCGA § 9-15-14(a) or (b),” Woods v. Hall, 315 Ga. App. 93, 97 (2) ( 726 SE2d 596 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted), and it must include “findings 6 of fact that specify the conduct upon which the award is made[,]” Hick | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Petty v. Chrysler Credit Corporation
neutral
2 sentences2016The burden is on the individual claiming the privilege “to state the general reason for his refusal to answer and to specifically establish that a real danger of incrimination existed with respect to each question.” Jett, supra at 656 (2), citing Petty v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 169 Ga. App. 418 ( 312 SE2d 874 ) (1984) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2016The burden is on the individual claiming the privilege “to state the general reason for his refusal to answer and to specifically establish that a real danger of incrimination existed with respect to each question.” Jett, supra at 656 (2), citing Petty v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 169 Ga. App. 418 ( 312 SE2d 874 ) (1984) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Land v. State
green
2 sentences2016Land v. State of Ga., 265 Ga. App. 859 ( 595 SE2d 540 ) (2004); Sanders, supra at 425-426 (2) (regarding Fifth Amendment); Simpson v. Simpson, 233 Ga. 17, 19-20 ( 209 SE2d 611 ) (1974) (permitting unfavorable inference to be drawn in civil cases from a privileged refusal to testify, where witness claims privilege embodied in Georgia statutes — such as former Ga. Code § 38-1205, which provided that no party shall be required to testify as to certain matters; the court’s analysis was not limited to cases in which a party asserts a privilege not to answer questions that have a direct tendency to 2016Land v. State of Ga., 265 Ga. App. 859 ( 595 SE2d 540 ) (2004); Sanders, supra at 425-426 (2) (regarding Fifth Amendment); Simpson v. Simpson, 233 Ga. 17, 19-20 ( 209 SE2d 611 ) (1974) (permitting unfavorable inference to be drawn in civil cases from a privileged refusal to testify, where witness claims privilege embodied in Georgia statutes — such as former Ga. Code § 38-1205, which provided that no party shall be required to testify as to certain matters; the court’s analysis was not limited to cases in which a party asserts a privilege not to answer questions that have a direct tendency to | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Bircoll v. Rosenthal
green
2 sentences2004Bircoll v. Rosenthal, 267 Ga. App. 431 ( 600 SE2d 388 ) (2004). 2004Bircoll v. Rosenthal, 267 Ga. App. 431 ( 600 SE2d 388 ) (2004). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.