appealing party challenge in Texas

2012CU Lloyd’s v. Feldman, 977 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1998); Spradlin, 100 S.W.3d at 377 .

2011CU Lloyd’s v. Feldman , 977 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1998); Spradlin v. State , 100 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2018Star– Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995).

2014Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995).

2018"Because a restricted appeal affords the same scope of review as an ordinary appeal, the appealing party may challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the order rendered." Steele at 3 (citing Miles v. Peacock, 229 S.W.3d 384, 387 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing Norman Commc'ns v. Texas Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269,270 (Tex.1997)).

2009See Miles v. Peacock , 229 S.W.3d 384, 387 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing Norman Commc'ns v. Texas Eastman Co. , 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997)).

2018"Because a restricted appeal affords the same scope of review as an ordinary appeal, the appealing party may challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the order rendered." Steele at 3 (citing Miles v. Peacock, 229 S.W.3d 384, 387 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing Norman Commc'ns v. Texas Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269,270 (Tex.1997)).

2009See Miles v. Peacock , 229 S.W.3d 384, 387 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing Norman Commc'ns v. Texas Eastman Co. , 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997)).

2010See Pharo v. Chambers County , 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1996) (where no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed after a bench trial, the trial court's judgment implies all findings of fact necessary to support it); see also BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002) (if a reporter's record is filed, the implied findings are not conclusive, and the appealing party may challenge them on legal and factual sufficiency grounds).

2010See Pharo v. Chambers County, 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.1996) (where no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed after a bench trial, the trial court’s judgment implies all findings of fact necessary to support it); see also BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex.2002) (if a reporter’s record is filed, the implied findings are not conclusive, and the appealing party may challenge them on legal and factual sufficiency grounds).

2010See Pharo v. Chambers County , 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1996) (where no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed after a bench trial, the trial court's judgment implies all findings of fact necessary to support it); see also BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002) (if a reporter's record is filed, the implied findings are not conclusive, and the appealing party may challenge them on legal and factual sufficiency grounds).

2010See Pharo v. Chambers County, 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.1996) (where no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed after a bench trial, the trial court’s judgment implies all findings of fact necessary to support it); see also BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex.2002) (if a reporter’s record is filed, the implied findings are not conclusive, and the appealing party may challenge them on legal and factual sufficiency grounds).

2009Malooly , 461 S.W.2d at 121 ; Krueger , 155 S.W.3d at 621 .

2009Malooly, 461 S.W.2d at 121 ; Krueger, 155 S.W.3d at 621 .

2010Therefore, it is incumbent upon an appealing party to challenge and negate all possible grounds on which summary judgment could have been granted, properly or improperly. [7] See Chappell Hill , 257 S.W.3d at 324 ; Bailey , 27 S.W.3d at 717 ; Janis v. Melvin Simon Assocs., Inc. , 2 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) (“Because the trial court granted summary judgment, properly or improperly , on a ground which Janis did not challenge on appeal[,] we affirm that portion of the summary judgment . . . .”) (emphasis added).

2010See Chappell Hill Bank, 257 S.W.3d at 324 ; De Laurentis v. United Servs.

2008See Star-Telegram, Inc. , 915 S.W.2d at 473 ; see also Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier , 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970) (affirming summary judgment because "it may have been based on a ground not specifically challenged" on appeal and "there was no general assignment that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.") (supporting citations omitted); Vawter v. Garvey , 786 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tex. 1990) (proscribing reversal of summary judgment without properly assigned error); Wilchester W.

2007Ellis , 68 S.W.3d at 898 ; see also Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier , 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970) (affirming summary judgment because "it may have been based on a ground not specifically challenged" on appeal and "there was no general assignment that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.") (supporting citations omitted); Vawter v. Garvey , 786 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tex. 1990) (proscribing reversal of summary judgment without properly assigned error) Discussion Shields's issues on appeal do not include a broad issue in which he contends, generally, that the trial court erred by rende

2012CU Lloyd’s v. Feldman, 977 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1998); Spradlin, 100 S.W.3d at 377 .

2011CU Lloyd’s v. Feldman , 977 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1998); Spradlin v. State , 100 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2024See Duaz v. Valdez, 571 S.W.3d 795, 805 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“If the trial court does not specify the basis for granting a summary judgment, the appealing party must challenge all the grounds that support the judgment. . . . [W]e will affirm the summary judgment as to a particular claim if an appellant does not present argument challenging all grounds on which the summary judgment should have been granted.”).

2019See id. (holding that appellate courts may review trial-court orders compelling arbitration on appeal from a final judgment rendered on an arbitration award); Ewing v. Act Catastrophe–Texas L.C., 375 S.W.3d 545 , 552-53 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th 12 Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (noting that no party had moved to compel or stay arbitration and that there was no order as to such relief that could be reviewed on appeal of a final judgment rendered on an arbitration award).

2018"In family law cases, the traditional sufficiency standards of review overlap with the abuse- of-discretion standard of review; therefore, legal and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion." Steele at 3 (citing Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)).

2013Humphries v. Advanced Print Media, 339 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681 .

2011See Johnson v. Coggeshall, 578 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1979, no writ).

2010Therefore, it is incumbent upon an appealing party to challenge and negate all possible grounds on which summary judgment could have been granted, properly or improperly. [7] See Chappell Hill , 257 S.W.3d at 324 ; Bailey , 27 S.W.3d at 717 ; Janis v. Melvin Simon Assocs., Inc. , 2 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) (“Because the trial court granted summary judgment, properly or improperly , on a ground which Janis did not challenge on appeal[,] we affirm that portion of the summary judgment . . . .”) (emphasis added).

1999James v. Hudgins, 876 S.W.2d 418, 424 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1994, writ denied) (op. on reh’g) (interpreting former rule 84).