commit error in Indiana

2005See also State v. Payne, 280 N.C. 170 , 185 S.E.2d 101, 102 (1971) ("Ordinarily one who causes (or we think joins in causing) the court to commit error is not in a position to repudiate his action and assign it as ground for a new trial."); State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320 , 738 N.E.2d 1178 , 1188 (2000).

1990Where a petitioner for post-conviction relief pleaded guilty then, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient, Burse v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 1383, 1385 , and "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 1385-86 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 210 .) Our standard of review requires we determine whether a defendant received reasonably effective

1990Where a petitioner for post-conviction relief pleaded guilty then, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient, Burse v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 1383, 1385 , and "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 1385-86 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 210 .) Our standard of review requires we determine whether a defendant received reasonably effective

1990Where a petitioner for post-conviction relief pleaded guilty then, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient, Burse v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 1383, 1385 , and "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 1385-86 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 210 .) Our standard of review requires we determine whether a defendant received reasonably effective

1990Where a petitioner for post-conviction relief pleaded guilty then, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient, Burse v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 1383, 1385 , and "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 1385-86 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 210 .) Our standard of review requires we determine whether a defendant received reasonably effective

1986Smith v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1105, 1115-16 ; Marotta v. Iroquois Realty Co. (1980), Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 797, 801 .

1986Smith v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1105, 1115-16 ; Marotta v. Iroquois Realty Co. (1980), Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 797, 801 .

1974We are of the opinion there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict on the charge that the prosecuting witness was placed in fear. *222 The fourth issue for review is: “Did the Court commit error in giving State’s Instruction Number Three over the objection of defense counsel.” Said issue was waived in oral argument, as the issue had been determined by our Supreme Court in the recent case of Fuller v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 376 , 304 N.E.2d 305 , which involved the identical instruction.

1974We are of the opinion there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict on the charge that the prosecuting witness was placed in fear. *222 The fourth issue for review is: “Did the Court commit error in giving State’s Instruction Number Three over the objection of defense counsel.” Said issue was waived in oral argument, as the issue had been determined by our Supreme Court in the recent case of Fuller v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 376 , 304 N.E.2d 305 , which involved the identical instruction.

1974The first question presented is: “Did the Court commit error in allowing the testimony of State’s witness, Odetta Pearman, relative to the identification of the defendant, for the reason that the in-court identification was tainted by improper pre-trial identification procedures.” The second question presented is: “Did the Court commit error in overruling- the defendant’s motion to strike the entire testimony of the State’s witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Middleton, concerning their own in-court identification of the defendant.” Lawson urges that “the practice of showing suspects singly to persons for

1974The first question presented is: “Did the Court commit error in allowing the testimony of State’s witness, Odetta Pearman, relative to the identification of the defendant, for the reason that the in-court identification was tainted by improper pre-trial identification procedures.” The second question presented is: “Did the Court commit error in overruling- the defendant’s motion to strike the entire testimony of the State’s witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Middleton, concerning their own in-court identification of the defendant.” Lawson urges that “the practice of showing suspects singly to persons for

1974The first question presented is: “Did the Court commit error in allowing the testimony of State’s witness, Odetta Pearman, relative to the identification of the defendant, for the reason that the in-court identification was tainted by improper pre-trial identification procedures.” The second question presented is: “Did the Court commit error in overruling- the defendant’s motion to strike the entire testimony of the State’s witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Middleton, concerning their own in-court identification of the defendant.” Lawson urges that “the practice of showing suspects singly to persons for

1974The first question presented is: “Did the Court commit error in allowing the testimony of State’s witness, Odetta Pearman, relative to the identification of the defendant, for the reason that the in-court identification was tainted by improper pre-trial identification procedures.” The second question presented is: “Did the Court commit error in overruling- the defendant’s motion to strike the entire testimony of the State’s witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Middleton, concerning their own in-court identification of the defendant.” Lawson urges that “the practice of showing suspects singly to persons for

1974He urges error further in that it was unduly suggestive that the police department told Mrs. Pearman about the progress of the investigation and that they had a suspect before she made her identification of Lawson. *219 Lawson further contends that inasmuch as the court allowed the in-court identification, which he insists is contrary to the holding in United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 , that the trial court committed reversible error.

1974He urges error further in that it was unduly suggestive that the police department told Mrs. Pearman about the progress of the investigation and that they had a suspect before she made her identification of Lawson. *219 Lawson further contends that inasmuch as the court allowed the in-court identification, which he insists is contrary to the holding in United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 , that the trial court committed reversible error.