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18 canonical passages across 13 cases, quoted by 7,338 opinions in total. These passages cluster together because the same opinions keep quoting them side by side: they state parts of one doctrine. The anchor passage is from Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc..
| # | Case | Flag | Canonical passage | Citers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Anchor | red | “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” | 2,345 |
| 2 | Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | red | “if the intent of congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of congress.” | 1,905 |
| 3 | Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. | red | “whether congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” | 1,397 |
| 4 | Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. | green | “if the agency has relied on factors which congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not…” | 523 |
| 5 | United States v. Mead Corp. | green | “administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for chevron deference when it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulga…” | 365 |
| 6 | K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. | green | “in ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” | 318 |
| 7 | National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services | green | “a court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.” | 161 |
| 8 | National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services | green | “if a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency's construction is reasonable, chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.” | 134 |
| 9 | National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services | green | “only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.” | 59 |
| 10 | Timex V.I., Inc. v. United States | green | “to ascertain whether congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, the court employs the 'traditional tools of statutory construction.” | 36 |
| 11 | Negev Phosphates, Ltd. v. United States Department of Commerce | green | “court will sustain the determination if it is reasonable and supported by the record as a whole, including whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence.” | 31 |
| 12 | Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States | green | “a court must defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred another” | 23 |
| 13 | K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. | green | “if the agency regulation is not in conflict with the plain language of the statute, a reviewing court must give deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute.” | 13 |
| 14 | American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission and the United States of America | green | “an agency announcement stating a change in the method ... is not a general statement of policy.” | 8 |
| 15 | ITT World Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission | green | “an agency does not act rationally when it chooses and implements one policy and decides to consider the merits of a potentially inconsistent policy in the very near future,” | 8 |
| 16 | Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. v. United States | green | “the use of different methods of calculation ... does not mean there is a conflict with the statute,” | 6 |
| 17 | Strickland v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services | green | “can congress change the law, simply by directing that it be so in legislative history, without amending the pertinent statutory language?” | 3 |
| 18 | New York v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency | green | “congress could reasonably conclude, for example, that tradeoffs between pollutants are difficult to measure, and thus any significant increase in emissions of any pollutant should be subject to nsr.” | 3 |
A red or yellow flag on a member means the underlying case has negative treatment: for those, check the case page before relying on the passage.