C.F.R. » Title 12 » CHAPTER II—FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM › SUBCHAPTER A—BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM › PART 202—EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT (REGULATION B)

12 C.F.R. § 202.6

Rules concerning evaluation of applications

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(a) General rule concerning use of information. Except as otherwise provided in the Act and this regulation, a creditor may consider any information obtained, so long as the information is not used to discriminate against an applicant on a prohibited basis. 2

2 The legislative history of the Act indicates that the Congress intended an “effects test” concept, as outlined in the employment field by the Supreme Court in the cases of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), to be applicable to a creditor's determination of creditworthiness.

(b) Specific rules concerning use of information. (1) Except as provided in the Act and this regulation, a creditor shall not take a prohibited basis into account in any system of evaluating the creditworthiness of applicants.

(2) Age, receipt of public assistance. (i) Except as permitted in this paragraph, a creditor shall not take into account an applicant's age (provided that the applicant has the capacity to enter into a binding contract) or whether an applicant's income derives from any public assistance program.

(ii) In an empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound, credit scoring system, a creditor may use an applicant's age as a predictive variable, provided that the age of an elderly applicant is not assigned a negative factor or value.

(iii) In a judgmental system of evaluating creditworthiness, a creditor may consider an applicant's age or whether an applicant's income derives from any public assistance program only for the purpose of determining a pertinent element of creditworthiness.

(iv) In any system of evaluating creditworthiness, a creditor may consider the age of an elderly applicant when such age is used to favor the elderly applicant in extending credit.

(3) Childbearing, childrearing. In evaluating creditworthiness, a creditor shall not make assumptions or use aggregate statistics relating to the likelihood that any category of persons will bear or rear children or will, for that reason, receive diminished or interrupted income in the future.

(4) Telephone listing. A creditor shall not take into account whether there is a telephone listing in the name of an applicant for consumer credit but may take into account whether there is a telephone in the applicant's residence.

(5) Income. A creditor shall not discount or exclude from consideration the income of an applicant or the spouse of an applicant because of a prohibited basis or because the income is derived from part-time employment or is an annuity, pension, or other retirement benefit; a creditor may consider the amount and probable continuance of any income in evaluating an applicant's creditworthiness. When an applicant relies on alimony, child support, or separate maintenance payments in applying for credit, the creditor shall consider such payments as income to the extent that they are likely to be consistently made.

(6) Credit history. To the extent that a creditor considers credit history in evaluating the creditworthiness of similarly qualified applicants for a similar type and amount of credit, in evaluating an applicant's creditworthiness a creditor shall consider:

(i) The credit history, when available, of accounts designated as accounts that the applicant and the applicant's spouse are permitted to use or for which both are contractually liable;

(ii) On the applicant's request, any information the applicant may present that tends to indicate the credit history being considered by the creditor does not accurately reflect the applicant's creditworthiness; and

(iii) On the applicant's request, the credit history, when available, of any account reported in the name of the applicant's spouse or former spouse that the applicant can demonstrate accurately reflects the applicant's creditworthiness.

(7) Immigration status. A creditor may consider the applicant's immigration status or status as a permanent resident of the United States, and any additional information that may be necessary to ascertain the creditor's rights and remedies regarding repayment.

(8) Marital status. Except as otherwise permitted or required by law, a creditor shall evaluate married and unmarried applicants by the same standards; and in evaluating joint applicants, a creditor shall not treat applicants differently based on the existence, absence, or likelihood of a marital relationship between the parties.

(9) Race, color, religion, national origin, sex. Except as otherwise permitted or required by law, a creditor shall not consider race, color, religion, national origin, or sex (or an applicant's or other person's decision not to provide the information) in any aspect of a credit transaction.

(c) State property laws. A creditor's consideration or application of state property laws directly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness does not constitute unlawful discrimination for the purposes of the Act or this regulation.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1979–2025 · leading case: Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1991).
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Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1991). · cites it 2× “whether the applicant's income derives from any public assistance program if such inquiry is for the purpose of determining the amount and probable continuance of income levels, credit history, or other pertinent element of credit worthiness as provided in regulations of the…”
Elodie Jochum, Wife Of/& Carmelo F. Pagano v. Pico Credit Corp. of Westbank, Inc., 730 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1984). · cites it 2× “2 (c)(2)(iii), and (3) it further contends that the plaintiffs’ suit under the Act is precluded by 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 (c) as authorized by state law.”
Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2008). · cites it 2× “2002 WL 88431 , at *4 (citing, inter alia, 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 n. 2). 13 Both Jones and Smith provide strong support for Plaintiffs’ position.”
Powell v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 481 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). “See 12 C.F.R. 202.6(b)(5)(6). Moreover, the regulations explicitly permit lenders to utilize third-party credit rating organizations.”
Lois J. Haynes, for Herself & All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. Bank of Wedowee, a State Bank, 634 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1981). · cites it 2× “12 CFR § 202.6 (b) n.8. If in ascertaining its rights and remedies the bank could look to appellant’s marital status and the source of her income, it also could look to funds she held at the bank since those funds would play a role in determining her ability to repay.”
Sayers v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F. Supp. 835 (W.D. Mo. 1981). “12 C.F.R. § 202.6 (a) note 7. See also, Cragin v.”
Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980). “The question of what a plaintiff must show under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to make out a prima facie case is a more subtle one.”
Moline v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 956 (N.D. Ill. 2003). “10(a); 12 C.F.R. Part 202.6(b)(6). We agree. By including the past-due FMCC account on Moline’s credit report, Experian acted' in accordance with federal regulations.”
A.B. & S. Auto Serv., Inc. v. South Shore Bank of Chicago, 962 F. Supp. 1056 (N.D. Ill. 1997). “12 C.F.R. § 202.6 (a) (West 1997). 8 . The Cheny court assumed that the plaintiff did not make a statistical comparison based on the actual applicant pool because of the specific prescription in the ECOA against creditors inquiring into the race, sex, or marital status of an…”
United States v. Am. Future Sys., Inc., 571 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1983). “See also 12 C.F.R. § 202.6 (b). Even then, the system must be demonstrably and statistically sound in accordance with regulations of the Board and, most importantly, in the operation of any such system, the age of an elderly applicant may not be assigned a negative factor or…”
Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 196 F.R.D. 315 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). “Despite this reference to creditworthiness, the court does not believe that a distinction was being made such that the effects test is not appropriate with respect to the terms of the credit given to a consumer and all aspects of a credit transaction.”
In re Tapang, 540 B.R. 701 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2015). “12 C.F.R. § 202.6 (b)(2)(h) (“In an empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound, credit scoring system, a creditor may use an applicant’s age as a predictive variable, provided that the age of an elderly applicant is not assigned a negative factor or value.”
Show all 18 citing cases →
— 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) — 1 case
Vander Missen v. Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 481 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
— 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(5) — 1 case
Sallion v. SunTrust Bank, Atlanta, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
— 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(5)(6) — 1 case
Powell v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 481 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). “See 12 C.F.R. 202.6(b)(5)(6). Moreover, the regulations explicitly permit lenders to utilize third-party credit rating organizations.”
— 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(6) — 1 case
Moline v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 956 (N.D. Ill. 2003). “10(a); 12 C.F.R. Part 202.6(b)(6). We agree. By including the past-due FMCC account on Moline’s credit report, Experian acted' in accordance with federal regulations.”
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