12 C.F.R. § 202.7

Rules concerning extensions of credit

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(a) Individual accounts. A creditor shall not refuse to grant an individual account to a creditworthy applicant on the basis of sex, marital status, or any other prohibited basis.

(b) Designation of name. A creditor shall not refuse to allow an applicant to open or maintain an account in a birth-given first name and a surname that is the applicant's birth-given surname, the spouse's surname, or a combined surname.

(c) Action concerning existing open-end accounts—(1) Limitations. In the absence of evidence of the applicant's inability or unwillingness to repay, a creditor shall not take any of the following actions regarding an applicant who is contractually liable on an existing open-end account on the basis of the applicant's reaching a certain age or retiring or on the basis of a change in the applicant's name or marital status:

(i) Require a reapplication, except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section;

(ii) Change the terms of the account; or

(iii) Terminate the account.

(2) Requiring reapplication. A creditor may require a reapplication for an open-end account on the basis of a change in the marital status of an applicant who is contractually liable if the credit granted was based in whole or in part on income of the applicant's spouse and if information available to the creditor indicates that the applicant's income may not support the amount of credit currently available.

(d) Signature of spouse or other person—(1) Rule for qualified applicant. Except as provided in this paragraph, a creditor shall not require the signature of an applicant's spouse or other person, other than a joint applicant, on any credit instrument if the applicant qualifies under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness for the amount and terms of the credit requested. A creditor shall not deem the submission of a joint financial statement or other evidence of jointly held assets as an application for joint credit.

(2) Unsecured credit. If an applicant requests unsecured credit and relies in part upon property that the applicant owns jointly with another person to satisfy the creditor's standards of creditworthiness, the creditor may require the signature of the other person only on the instrument(s) necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary, under the law of the state in which the property is located, to enable the creditor to reach the property being relied upon in the event of the death or default of the applicant.

(3) Unsecured credit—community property states. If a married applicant requests unsecured credit and resides in a community property state, or if the applicant is relying on property located in such a state, a creditor may require the signature of the spouse on any instrument necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary, under applicable state law to make the community property available to satisfy the debt in the event of default if:

(i) Applicable state law denies the applicant power to manage or control sufficient community property to qualify for the credit requested under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness; and

(ii) The applicant does not have sufficient separate property to qualify for the credit requested without regard to community property.

(4) Secured credit. If an applicant requests secured credit, a creditor may require the signature of the applicant's spouse or other person on any instrument necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary, under applicable state law to make the property being offered as security available to satisfy the debt in the event of default, for example, an instrument to create a valid lien, pass clear title, waive inchoate rights, or assign earnings.

(5) Additional parties. If, under a creditor's standards of creditworthiness, the personal liability of an additional party is necessary to support the credit requested, a creditor may request a cosigner, guarantor, endorser, or similar party. The applicant's spouse may serve as an additional party, but the creditor shall not require that the spouse be the additional party.

(6) Rights of additional parties. A creditor shall not impose requirements upon an additional party that the creditor is prohibited from imposing upon an applicant under this section.

(e) Insurance. A creditor shall not refuse to extend credit and shall not terminate an account because credit life, health, accident, disability, or other credit-related insurance is not available on the basis of the applicant's age.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 132 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1980–2025 · leading case: RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2014).

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RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Grp., LLC, 754 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2014). · cites it 8× “See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (d), 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7 (d).”

Sw. Pennsylvania Reg'l Council, Inc. v. Gentile, 776 A.2d 276 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). · cites it 10× “3d at 699 , citing, Official Staff Interpretation to 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (d)(1); see also, Riggs Nat'l Bank v.”

Terry Klotz v. Celentano Stadtmauer & Wale, 991 F.3d 458 (3rd Cir. 2021). · cites it 2× “” 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (d)(1) (2021). Klotz argues that the doctrine of necessaries conflicts with the spousal-signature prohibition found at 12 C.”

Farris v. Jefferson Bank (In Re Farris), 194 B.R. 931 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996). · cites it 9× “8 We will focus initially upon the general rule, which provides: (d) Signature of spouse or other person— (1) Rule for qualified applicant.”

Charlotte Mays v. Buckeye Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. & Frederick B. Parker, 277 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2002). · cites it 3× “Plaintiff also claims that Defendants’ actions violated three portions of 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 : § 202.7(a)’s prohibiting creditors from denying individual credit accounts on the basis of marital status; § 202.”

Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2019). · cites it 2× “Included within Regulation B is the Spousal Guaranty Rule, which generally prohibits creditors from treating married people differently by requiring spouses to assume liability for each other’s debt obligations.”

Still v. Cunningham, 94 P.3d 1104 (Alaska 2004). · cites it 4× “Federal regulations concerning the signature of a spouse or other person for extensions of credit are found at 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (d). The regulations are intended to assure that qualified applicants are able to obtain credit in their own names.”

BayBank v. Bornhofft, 694 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1998). · cites it 6× “” 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (d)(1). The usual application of § 202.”

Bank of the West v. Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa 2010). · cites it 3× “7(d) bars a creditor from requiring the signature of a guarantor’s spouse just as it bars a creditor from requiring the signature of an applicant’s spouse).”

Kellie Ballard v. Bank of Am., N.A., 734 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013). · cites it 4× “” 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (d)(4). These provisions ensure that a lender can acquire collateral co- 6 owned by the borrower’s spouse in the event that the borrower defaults.”

Paulson v. Centier Bank, 704 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 3× “Unavailability of 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 as a Defense (Conclusions # 13, 14) The Paulsons further allege that the following conclusions were in error: 13.”

Rodgers v. First Union Nat. Bank of Georgia, 470 S.E.2d 246 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “and 12 CFR § 202.7 (d). 1. Rodgers contends the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment because the guarantor contract was void, First Union illegally took control of the development project prior to foreclosure and First Union “chilled the market” causing the…”

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— 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d) — 3 cases

Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2019). “Included within Regulation B is the Spousal Guaranty Rule, which generally prohibits creditors from treating married people differently by requiring spouses to assume liability for each other’s debt obligations.”

Comerica Bank v. Esposito, Frank, 215 F. App'x 506 (7th Cir. 2007).

Bolduc v. Beal Bank SSB (1st Cir. 1999).

— 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1) — 10 cases

Sw. Pennsylvania Reg'l Council, Inc. v. Gentile, 776 A.2d 276 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). “3d at 699 , citing, Official Staff Interpretation to 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (d)(1); see also, Riggs Nat'l Bank v.”

Am. S. Ins. v. Halbert, J., 203 A.3d 223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019).

Cragin v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 379 (D. Nev. 1980).

Integra Bank/Pittsburgh v. Freeman, 839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

Gonzalez v. NAFH Nat'l Bank, 93 So. 3d 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

— 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(2) — 1 case

— 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(4) — 1 case

United States v. Broussard (5th Cir. 1996).

— 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5) — 5 cases

United States v. Betty Jo Meadors, 753 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1985).

Mundaca Inv. Corp. v. Emery, 674 A.2d 923 (Me. 1996).

Ford City Bank v. Goldman, 424 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).

Comerica Bank v. Pars Ice Cream Co. Inc (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).

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