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C.F.R.Title 28Chapter I—Department of JusticePart 2—Parole, Release, Supervision and Recommitment of Prisoners, Youth Offenders, And Juvenile DelinquentsSubpart C—District of Columbia Code: Prisoners and Parolees

28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2026)

Probable cause hearing and determination

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 2001–2021 29citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 29 opinions since 2001, 2 of them in the last five years.

(a) Hearing. A parolee who is retaken and held in custody in the District of Columbia on a warrant issued by the Commission, and who has not been convicted of a new crime, shall be given a probable cause hearing by an examiner of the Commission no later than five days from the date of such retaking. A parolee who is retaken and held in custody outside the District of Columbia, but within the Washington DC metropolitan area, and who has not been convicted of a new crime, shall be given a probable cause hearing by an examiner of the Commission within five days of the parolee's arrival at a facility where probable cause hearings are conducted. The purpose of a probable cause hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the parolee has violated parole as charged, and if so, whether a local or institutional revocation hearing should be conducted. If the examiner finds probable cause, the examiner shall schedule a final revocation hearing to be held within 65 days of such parolee's arrest.

(b) Notice and opportunity to postpone hearing. Prior to the commencement of each docket of probable cause hearings in the District of Columbia, a list of the parolees who are scheduled for probable cause hearings, together with a copy of the warrant application for each parolee, shall be sent to the D.C. Public Defender Service. At or before the probable cause hearing, the parolee (or the parolee's attorney) may submit a written request that the hearing be postponed for any period up to thirty days, and the Commission shall ordinarily grant such requests. Prior to the commencement of the probable cause hearing, the examiner shall advise the parolee that the parolee may accept representation by the attorney from the D.C. Public Defender Service who is assigned to that docket, waive the assistance of an attorney at the probable cause hearing, or have the probable cause hearing postponed in order to obtain another attorney and/or witnesses on his behalf. In addition, the parolee may request the Commission to require the attendance of adverse witnesses (i.e., witnesses who have given information upon which revocation may be based) at a postponed probable cause hearing. Such adverse witnesses may be required to attend either a postponed probable cause hearing, or a combined postponed probable cause and local revocation hearing, provided the parolee meets the requirements of § 2.102(a) for a local revocation hearing. The parolee shall also be given notice of the time and place of any postponed probable cause hearing.

(c) Review of the charges. At the beginning of the probable cause hearing, the examiner shall ascertain that the notice required by § 2.99 (b) has been given to the parolee. The examiner shall then review the violation charges with the parolee and shall apprise the parolee of the evidence that has been submitted in support of the charges. The examiner shall ascertain whether the parolee admits or denies each charge listed on the warrant application (or other notice of charges), and shall offer the parolee an opportunity to rebut or explain the allegations contained in the evidence giving rise to each charge. The examiner shall also receive the statements of any witnesses and documentary evidence that may be presented by the parolee. At a postponed probable cause hearing, the examiner shall also permit the parolee to confront and cross-examine any adverse witnesses in attendance, unless good cause is found for not allowing confrontation. Whenever a probable cause hearing is postponed to secure the appearance of adverse witnesses, the Commission will ordinarily order a combined probable cause and local revocation hearing as provided in paragraph (i) of this section.

(d) Probable cause determination. At the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, the examiner shall determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the parolee has violated parole as charged, and shall so inform the parolee. The examiner shall then take either of the following actions:

(1) If the examiner determines that no probable cause exists for any violation charge, the examiner shall order that the parolee be released from the custody of the warrant and either reinstated to parole, or discharged from supervision if the parolee's sentence has expired.

(2) If the hearing examiner determines that probable cause exists on any violation charge, and the parolee has requested (and is eligible for) a local revocation hearing in the District of Columbia as provided by § 2.102 (a), the examiner shall schedule a local revocation hearing for a date that is within 65 days of the parolee's arrest. After the probable cause hearing, the parolee (or the parolee's attorney) may submit a written request for a postponement. Such postponements will normally be granted if the request is received no later than fifteen days before the date of the revocation hearing. A request for a postponement that is received by the Commission less than fifteen days before the scheduled date of the revocation hearing will be granted only for a compelling reason. The parolee (or the parolee's attorney) may also request, in writing, a hearing date that is earlier than the date scheduled by the examiner, and the Commission will accommodate such request if practicable.

(e) Institutional revocation hearing. If the parolee is not eligible for a local revocation hearing as provided by § 2.102 (a), or has requested to be transferred to an institution for his revocation hearing, the Commission will request the Bureau of Prisons to designate the parolee to an appropriate institution, and an institutional revocation hearing shall be scheduled for a date that is within ninety days of the parolee's retaking.

(f) Digest of the probable cause hearing. At the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, the examiner shall prepare a digest summarizing the evidence presented at the hearing, the responses of the parolee, and the examiner's findings as to probable cause.

(g) Release notwithstanding probable cause. Notwithstanding a finding of probable cause, the Commission may order the parolee's reinstatement to supervision or release pending further proceedings, if it determines that:

(1) Continuation of revocation proceedings is not warranted despite the finding of probable cause; or

(2) Incarceration pending further revocation proceedings is not warranted by the frequency or seriousness of the alleged violation(s), and the parolee is neither likely to fail to appear for further proceedings, nor is a danger to himself or others.

(h) Conviction as probable cause. Conviction of any crime committed subsequent to release by a parolee shall constitute probable cause for the purposes of this section, and no probable cause hearing shall be conducted unless a hearing is needed to consider additional violation charges that may be determinative of the Commission's decision whether to revoke parole.

(i) Combined probable cause and local revocation hearing. A postponed probable cause hearing may be conducted as a combined probable cause and local revocation hearing, provided such hearing is conducted within 65 days of the parolee's arrest and the parolee has been notified that the postponed probable cause hearing will constitute his final revocation hearing. The Commission's policy is to conduct a combined probable cause and local revocation hearing whenever adverse witnesses are required to appear and give testimony with respect to contested charges.

(j) Late received charges. If the Commission is notified of an additional charge after probable cause has been found to proceed with a revocation hearing, the Commission may:

(1) Remand the case for a supplemental probable cause hearing if the new charge may be contested by the parolee and possibly result in the appearance of witness(es) at the revocation hearing;

(2) Notify the parolee that the additional charge will be considered at the revocation hearing without conducting a supplemental probable cause hearing; or

(3) Determine that the new charge shall not be considered at the revocation hearing.

[67 FR 2569, Jan. 18, 2002, as amended at 68 FR 3390, Jan. 24, 2003]
The 20 cases that cite 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENLong v. Gaines, 167 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C. 2001).
cites § 2.101 4×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“• 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (a): A parolee who is retaken on a warrant issued by the Commission shall promptly be offered a preliminary interview.”
2
GREENEpps v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 575 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D.D.C. 2008).
cites § 2.101 2×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“Epps; and (2) his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was not given a probable cause hearing within five days of his arrest in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (a) because CSO James, who knew that Mr.”
The case’s holding
A superior official is not liable under Bivens for the constitutional torts of subordinates, and the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for constitutional torts.
Later courts cite it for
“a superior official cannot be held liable under section 1983 or bivens for the constitutional torts of employees under him or her; the common law theory of respondeat superior does not pertain to the federal government in this context.” · 7 citing courts
3
GREENPate v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 2004).
cites § 2.101 3×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“tates moved for summary judgment under three theories: (1) that Pate’s claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the resolution of a prior class *66 action suit in which Pate was a party; (2) that it is shielded from suit pursuant to the FTCA in this…”
Later courts cite it for
“a private person could not be sued under district of columbia law for failing to adhere to a legal requirement imposed on a federal agency.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENAsh, Wilbur v. Reilly, Edward F., 431 F.3d 826 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“” 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (b). 2 . The Court has granted certiorari in two cases to determine the meaning of "testimonial.”
The case’s holding
A parole revocation resting on reliable hearsay, with the adverse witness absent, violates due process only if totally lacking in evidentiary support or fundamentally unfair; Crawford does not apply.
Later courts cite it for
“either so lacking in evidentiary support or were so irrational as to be fundamentally unfair.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENHill v. Johnston, 750 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2010).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“July 13, 2006) (finding that, although the petitioner’s ten months in custody without receiving a revocation hearing violated 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (e) and “was likely unreasonable under Morrissey , .”
Later courts cite it for
“is a writ of mandamus to compel the uspc's compliance ... not a writ of habeas corpus to compel release ... or to extinguish the remainder of the sentence” · 6 citing courts
6
GREENNelson v. Williams, 750 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2010).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (e). 6 . The District of Columbia Board of Parole adopted “guidelines and a numerical scoring system .”
Later courts cite it for
“cannot now relitigate an issue that has been 'actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction because its determination is conclusive” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENOwens v. Gaines, 219 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“The government cited 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (j) for the authority to supplement a warrant.”
Later courts cite it for
“issue a warrant for the apprehension and return of the offender to custody,” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENStoddard v. Wynn, 68 F. Supp. 3d 104 (D.D.C. 2014).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“If a federal employee is sued for an act done while acting within the scope of his employment, the United States may file a certification and substitute itself as the proper defendant.”
Later courts cite it for
“the party claiming subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that such jurisdiction exists.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENStoddard v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 900 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2012).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“Alternatively, to the extent Plaintiffs FTCA claim arises from Defendants’ alleged violation of 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 , which he cites, see Am.”
Later courts cite it for
“the plaintiff bears the burden of proving exhaustion, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing an ftca lawsuit.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENSparks v. Gaines, 144 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2001).
cites § 2.101 3×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“2d 484 (1972), and 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.101 - 105, which it did not provide in this case.”
11
GREENMcNair v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 253 F. Supp. 3d 280 (D.D.C. 2017).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“shall be given a probable cause hearing by an examiner of the Commission no later than five days from the date of such retaking.”
Later courts cite it for
“now that petitioner has had both a probable cause hearing and a revocation hearing, he is not entitled to mandamus relief.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENAsh v. Reilly, 433 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2006).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“” 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (b). According to Respondents, Simms is not an adverse witness because Simms was not the source of the hearsay on which the Commission relied.”
Later courts cite it for
“whether the commission impermissibly denied a parolee the right to confront adverse witnesses depends on the parolee's need for confrontation as weighed against the commission's reasons for not producing adverse witnesses.” · 1 citing court
13
GREENFludd v. Mitchell, 181 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.D.C. 2016).
cites § 2.101 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 2.101
“Code offenders to a probable-cause hearing within 5 days of their arrest and a revocation hearing within 65 days, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.101 (a), 2.102(f), Fludd did not receive his hearings until 54 days and 76 days, respectively, following his arrest.”
14
GREENStoddard v. Wynn, 168 F. Supp. 3d 124 (D.D.C. 2016).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“See 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (requiring such a hearing within 65 days).”
15
GREENProctor v. Wainwright, 828 F. Supp. 2d 215 (D.D.C. 2011).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“July 13, 2006) (finding that, al though ten months in custody without receiving a revocation hearing violated 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (e) and “was likely unreasonable .”
Later courts cite it for
“more importantly, petitioner waived his right to a revocation hearing by accepting the uspc's expedited revocation proposal, and thus his claim is rendered moot.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENDarden v. U. S. Parole Comm'n, 61 F. Supp. 3d 68 (D.D.C. 2014).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“” 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (a). 4 . For example, petitioner notes that no sanction had been imposed prior to the Alleged Violation(s) Report, see Pet.”
17
GREENSweeney v. United States Parole Comm'n, 189 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D.D.C. 2016).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 2.101
“” 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (a). . In a supplemental pleading [Dkt.”
18
NO FLAGHill v. Johnson, No. 2020-1420 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2021).
cites § 2.101 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“Furthermore, the Commission’s regulations, as set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 et seq, require that a probable cause hearing no later than five days after a parolee is retaken and held in custody on a warrant issued by the Commission, if he has not yet been convicted of a new…”
19
NO FLAGQuick v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 646 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2009).
cites § 2.101 3×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“§ 2241 , arguing that he was denied both a probable cause hearing under 28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (a) and a revocation hearing under 28 C.”
20
NO FLAGSmoot v. United States Parole Comm'r, No. 2016-0462 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2016).
cites § 2.101 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 2.101
“28 C.F.R. § 2.101 (a). Upon the determination that “there is probable cause to believe that the parolee has violated parole as charged,” id.”

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Citing cases by year
200120112021

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D.D.C.28D.C. Cir.1
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