C.F.R. homeSearch C.F.R.
C.F.R.Title 49Part 40—Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing ProgramsSubpart G—Medical Review Officers and the Verification Process

49 C.F.R. § 40.151 (2026)

What are MROs prohibited from doing as part of the verification process?

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 ACTIVE · 2 IN 5Y cited 2003–2026 6citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 6 opinions since 2003, 2 of them in the last five years.

As an MRO, you are prohibited from doing the following as part of the verification process:

(a) You must not consider any evidence (verbal or written information) from any drug tests that are not collected or tested in accordance with this part. For example, if an employee tells you he went to his own physician, provided a urine specimen, sent it to a laboratory, and received a negative test result, you are required to ignore this test result.

(b) It is not your function to make decisions about factual disputes between the employee and the collector concerning matters occurring at the collection site that are not reflected on the CCF (e.g., concerning allegations that the collector left the area or left open collection containers where other people could access them.)

(c) It is not your function to determine whether the employer should have directed that a test occur. For example, if an employee tells you that the employer misidentified her as the subject of a random test, or directed her to take a reasonable suspicion or post-accident test without proper grounds under a DOT agency drug or alcohol regulation, you must inform the employee that you cannot play a role in deciding these issues.

(d) It is not your function to consider explanations of confirmed positive, adulterated, or substituted test results that would not, even if true, constitute a legitimate medical explanation. For example, an employee may tell you that someone slipped amphetamines into her drink at a party, that she unknowingly ingested a marijuana brownie, or that she traveled in a closed car with several people smoking crack. MROs are unlikely to be able to verify the facts of such passive or unknowing ingestion stories. Even if true, such stories do not present a legitimate medical explanation. Consequently, you must not declare a test as negative based on an explanation of this kind.

(e) You must not verify a test negative based on information that a physician recommended that the employee use a drug listed in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act. (e.g., under a state law that purports to authorize such recommendations, such as the “medical marijuana” laws that some states have adopted).

(f) You must not accept an assertion of consumption or other use of a hemp or other non-prescription marijuana-related product as a basis for verifying a marijuana test negative. You also must not accept such an explanation related to consumption of coca teas as a basis for verifying a cocaine test result as negative. Consuming or using such a product is not a legitimate medical explanation.

(g) You must not accept an assertion that there is a legitimate medical explanation for the presence of PCP, 6-AM, MDMA, or MDA in a specimen.

(h) You must not accept, as a legitimate medical explanation for an adulterated specimen, an assertion that soap, bleach, or glutaraldehyde entered a specimen through physiological means. There are no physiological means through which these substances can enter a specimen.

(i) You must not accept, as a legitimate medical explanation for a substituted specimen, an assertion that an employee can produce a urine specimen for which the creatinine level is below the laboratory's limit of detection. There are no physiological means through which a person can produce a urine specimen having this characteristic.

[65 FR 79526, Dec. 19, 2000, as amended at 66 FR 41952, Aug. 9, 2001; 75 FR 49863, Aug. 16, 2010; 88 FR 27646, May 2, 2023]
The 6 cases that cite 49 C.F.R. § 40.151 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENMcBride v. Am. Substance Abuse Professionals, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 419 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
cites § 40.151 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 40.151
“at 29:16-18; see also 49 C.F.R. § 40.151 (2012). After ruling out all Plaintiffs explanations, Dr.”
2
GREENGabbard v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 532 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2008).
cites § 40.151 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 40.151
“EA-5240, 2006 WL 2332760 , at *3 (2006) (addressing a similar explanation and stating that, in view of 49 C.F.R. § 40.151 (d), “it is doubtful whether respondent’s exculpatory claims, even if believed, would establish a legally sufficient defense to operational violations”).”
3
NEUTRALTransp. Workers Union, Local 100 v. New York City Transit Auth., 57 A.D.3d 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2008).
cites § 40.151 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 40.151
“Rather, the award was consistent with the evidence presented, the applicable federal regulations governing drug testing for transit employees (see 49 CFR 40.151, 40.191, 40.193), and the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.”
4
NO FLAGStephens, No. 4:25-cv-00776 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 23, 2026).
cites § 40.151 1×cited by 0 casesunknown
Where it cites § 40.151
“3 49 C.F.R. § 40.151 explicitly states that an MRO cannot “accept an assertion of consumption or other use of a hemp or other non-prescription marijuana-related product as a basis for verifying a marijuana test negative.”
5
NEUTRALMatter of Moran-Ruiz v. Ontario Cnty., 218 A.D.3d 1341 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2023).
cites § 40.151 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 40.151
“That provision of the CBA was derived from the drug policy promulgated by the federal Department of Transportation ( see generally 49 CFR 40.151). Ultimately, petitioner ceased using medical marijuana and was permitted by respondents to return to work.”
6
NO FLAGShipman v. Dep't of Transp., 58 F. App'x 481 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
cites § 40.151 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 40.151
“See 49 C.F.R. § 40.151 (f) (2000). Therefore, Shipman argues, the regulation establishes an “irrebuttable presumption” that violates his substantive due process right to his continued federal employment.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
200320142026

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 2008. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
N.Y. App. Div.2E.D. Ark.16th Cir.1Fed. Cir.1E.D. Pa.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

C.F.R. Home  |  Search C.F.R.  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com