Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 (2026)

General limitation of actions - two years

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:

(a) Tort actions, including but not limited to actions for negligence, trespass, malicious abuse of process, malicious prosecution, outrageous conduct, interference with relationships, and tortious breach of contract; except that this paragraph (a) does not apply to any tort action arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle as set forth in section 13-80-101 (1)(n);

(b) All actions for strict liability, absolute liability, or failure to instruct or warn;

(d) All actions for wrongful death, except as described in subsection (2) of this section;

(e) Repealed.

(f) All actions against any public or governmental entity or any employee of a public or governmental entity for which insurance coverage is provided pursuant to article 14 of title 24, C.R.S.;

(g) All actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal statute;

(h) All actions against any public or governmental entity or any employee of a public or governmental entity, except as otherwise provided in this section or section 13-80-103;

(i) All other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided;

(j) All actions brought under section 42-6-204, C.R.S.;

(k) All actions brought under section 13-21-109 (2).

(2) A civil action for a wrongful death against a defendant who committed vehicular homicide, as described in section 18-3-106, C.R.S., and, as part of the same criminal episode, committed the offense of leaving the scene of an accident that resulted in the death of a person, as described in section 42-4-1601 (2)(c), C.R.S., regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter.

Source: L. 86: Entire article R&RE, p. 696, § 1, effective July 1; (1)(j) added, p. 707, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (1)(b) amended and (1)(e) repealed, pp. 567, 569, §§ 2, 8, effective July 1. L. 88: (1)(c) amended, p. 627, § 2, effective July 1. L. 89: (1)(k) added, p. 757, § 4, effective July 1. L. 94: (1)(a) amended, p. 2824, § 2, effective July 1; (1)(j) amended, p. 2549, § 33, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2014: IP(1) and (1)(d) amended and (2) added, (SB 14-213), ch. 344, p. 1536, § 3, effective July 1.

Editor's note: The provisions of this section are similar to provisions of several former sections as they existed prior to 1986. For a detailed comparison, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 290 cases (76 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1994).

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Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1994). · cites it 50× “1992), we recognized that section 13-80-101(1)(j) is more specific than section 13-80-102(1)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987), which generally applies to torts.”

Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1992). · cites it 32× “We agree with the court of appeals that section 13-80-101, which is more specifically applicable than section 13-80-102, is the appropriate statute of limitations to apply.”

Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1991). · cites it 29× “Delgado answered, citing the two-year statute of limitations under section 13-80-102(l)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987), as a bar to Dove’s negligence claim.”

Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1995). · cites it 24× “In its petition for certiorari the RTD alleged generally that § 13-80-102(1) applied to this case, but the petition and the briefs filed herein by the parties and the amici discuss only whether the no-fault limitations statute or the government entity limitations statute…”

v. Zag Built LLC —, 2018 COA 66 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 5× “2017, states that claims under the Act are subject to the statute of limitations found in section 13-80-102, C.R.S. 2017; and (3) under section 13-80-102, the appropriate statute of limitations for this 3 case was, therefore, two years.”

In re Goodman v. Heritage Builders, 2017 CO 13 (Colo. 2017). · cites it 10× “We hold that such claims are timely, irrespective of both the two-year statute of limitations in section 13-80-102, C.R.S. (2016), and the six-year statute of repose in section 13-80-104(l)(a), so long as they are brought at any time before the ninety-day timeframe outlined in…”

Peña v. Am. Fam., 2018 COA 56 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 3× “2014) (applying the two year limitations period of section 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017, for actions brought under section 10-3-1115).”

Full Draw Prods. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D. Colo. 2000). · cites it 23× “Idaho Norland determined that Colorado’s then-existing one year statute of limitations for slander and libel claims, Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102 (1973), did not apply to a claim for trade libel.”

Skyland Metro. Dist. v. Mountain West Enter., LLC, 184 P.3d 106 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 7× “Accrual of Claims Under § 13-80-102(1)(b) The developers contend that, even assuming their counterclaims are not compulsory, the trial court erred in determining that their cause of action acerued when the districts imposed ASF charges.”

Escobar v. Reid, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (D. Colo. 2009). · cites it 10× “Statute of Limitations Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs first four claims for relief are barred by the applicable Colorado statute of limitations, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102. First Motion for Summary Judgment [# 177] at 4.”

Samuel Perez v. By the Rockies, LLC, & Duane Layton, 2023 COA 109 (Colo. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2× “3 3 At oral arguments and for the first time, By the Rockies asserted that the two-year limitations period in section 13-80-102(1)(i), C.R.S. 2023, applies to Perez’s claim.”

Sterenbuch v. Goss, 266 P.3d 428 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 3× “As the majority correctly notes, the applicable statute of limitations for a general tort action requires commencement of a suit "within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter," section 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S.2011; see Build It & They Will Drink, Inc.”

Show all 290 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1) — 27 cases

CLPF-Parkridge One, L.P. v. Harwell Investments, Inc., 105 P.3d 658 (Colo. 2005).

Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050 (Colo. 2004).

Comstock v. Collier, 737 P.2d 845 (Colo. 1987).

Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1995). “In its petition for certiorari the RTD alleged generally that § 13-80-102(1) applied to this case, but the petition and the briefs filed herein by the parties and the amici discuss only whether the no-fault limitations statute or the government entity limitations statute…”

Kuhn v. State Ex Rel. Dep't of Revenue, 897 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1995).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a) — 42 cases

Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1992). “We agree with the court of appeals that section 13-80-101, which is more specifically applicable than section 13-80-102, is the appropriate statute of limitations to apply.”

Peña v. Am. Fam., 2018 COA 56 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018). “2014) (applying the two year limitations period of section 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017, for actions brought under section 10-3-1115).”

Sterenbuch v. Goss, 266 P.3d 428 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011). “As the majority correctly notes, the applicable statute of limitations for a general tort action requires commencement of a suit "within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter," section 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S.2011; see Build It & They Will Drink, Inc.”

In re the Interest of Black, 2018 COA 7 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).

City & Cnty. of Denver v. Gonzales, 17 P.3d 137 (Colo. 2001).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(b) — 3 cases

Buckley Powder Co. v. State, 70 P.3d 547 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1987).

Skyland Metro. Dist. v. Mountain West Enter., LLC, 184 P.3d 106 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). “Accrual of Claims Under § 13-80-102(1)(b) The developers contend that, even assuming their counterclaims are not compulsory, the trial court erred in determining that their cause of action acerued when the districts imposed ASF charges.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(c) — 1 case

Koch v. Sadler, 759 P.2d 792 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(d) — 2 cases

Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 287 P.3d 112 (Colo. 2012).

Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(f) — 1 case

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(g) — 10 cases

Dodson v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Colo. 2012).

Nieto v. State, 952 P.2d 834 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).

Hull v. Colorado Bd. of Governors of the Colorado State Univ. Sys., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Colo. 2011).

Hull v. Colorado Bd. of Governors of Colorado, 805 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Colo. 2011).

Allen v. Exec. Dir. of Colorado Dep't of Corr. (D. Colo. 2020).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(h) — 6 cases

Garcia v. Harms, 410 P.3d 561 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).

Arvia v. Black, 722 F. Supp. 644 (D. Colo. 1989).

Skyland Metro. Dist. v. Mountain West Enter., 184 P.3d 106 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i) — 16 cases

Samuel Perez v. By the Rockies, LLC, & Duane Layton, 2023 COA 109 (Colo. Ct. App. 2023). “3 3 At oral arguments and for the first time, By the Rockies asserted that the two-year limitations period in section 13-80-102(1)(i), C.R.S. 2023, applies to Perez’s claim.”

Stump v. Gates, 777 F. Supp. 808 (D. Colo. 1991).

Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1994). “1992), we recognized that section 13-80-101(1)(j) is more specific than section 13-80-102(1)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987), which generally applies to torts.”

Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., 2018 CO 15 (Colo. 2018).

In Re the Marriage of Smith, 7 P.3d 1012 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(2) — 1 case

Wilkins v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., SI (D. Colo. 2022).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(6) — 1 case

Montoya v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 506 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Colo. 2007).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(a) — 4 cases

Full Draw Prods. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D. Colo. 2000). “Idaho Norland determined that Colorado’s then-existing one year statute of limitations for slander and libel claims, Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102 (1973), did not apply to a claim for trade libel.”

Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1994). “1992), we recognized that section 13-80-101(1)(j) is more specific than section 13-80-102(1)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987), which generally applies to torts.”

Williams v. Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 361 P.3d 1075 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).

Commissiong v. Ctr. at Lincoln, LLC, The (D. Colo. 2025).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(c) — 1 case

Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1994). “1992), we recognized that section 13-80-101(1)(j) is more specific than section 13-80-102(1)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987), which generally applies to torts.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(f) — 1 case

Khalsa v. Colorado Mountain Coll., Police Academy (D. Colo. 2022).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(g) — 8 cases

Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 758 (D. Colo. 1990).

Whitington v. Sokol, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D. Colo. 2007).

Dodge v. Shoemaker, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (D. Colo. 2010).

Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 916 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Colo. 2012).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(h) — 2 cases

Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1994). “1992), we recognized that section 13-80-101(1)(j) is more specific than section 13-80-102(1)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987), which generally applies to torts.”

Delta Sales Yard v. Patten, 892 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1995).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(i) — 1 case

Balle-Tun v. Zeng & Wong, Inc. (D. Colo. 2022).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(I) — 1 case

Grubka v. WebAccess Int'l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (D. Colo. 2006).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(a) — 45 cases

Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1991). “Delgado answered, citing the two-year statute of limitations under section 13-80-102(l)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987), as a bar to Dove’s negligence claim.”

Shootman v. Dep't of Transp., 926 P.2d 1200 (Colo. 1996).

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman, 911 P.2d 1094 (Colo. 1996).

Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1994). “1992), we recognized that section 13-80-101(1)(j) is more specific than section 13-80-102(1)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987), which generally applies to torts.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(c) — 3 cases

State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1990).

Moore v. Grossman, 824 P.2d 7 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).

Hane by & Through Jabalera v. Tubman, 899 P.2d 332 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(d) — 2 cases

Aberkalns v. Blake, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Colo. 2009).

Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(f) — 3 cases

Kuhn v. State Ex Rel. Dep't of Revenue, 897 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1995).

Gallegos v. City of Monte Vista, 976 P.2d 299 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(g) — 11 cases

Escobar v. Reid, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (D. Colo. 2009). “Statute of Limitations Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs first four claims for relief are barred by the applicable Colorado statute of limitations, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-102. First Motion for Summary Judgment [# 177] at 4.”

Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1991).

McDonald v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Colo. 2015).

Louis F. Arnold v. Duchesne Cnty., Merv Taylor, Jerry Foote, & Clair Poulson, 26 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1994).

Bauer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 642 F. App'x 920 (10th Cir. 2016).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(h) — 9 cases

Fishburn v. City of Colorado Springs, 919 P.2d 847 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1996).

Bad Boys of Cripple Creek Mining Co. v. City of Cripple Creek, 996 P.2d 792 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

Delta Sales Yard v. Patten, 892 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1995).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(l)(i) — 8 cases

Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1994). “1992), we recognized that section 13-80-101(1)(j) is more specific than section 13-80-102(1)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987), which generally applies to torts.”

Harrison v. Pinnacol Assurance, 107 P.3d 969 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).

Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Refco Grp., Ltd., 989 F. Supp. 1052 (D. Colo. 1997).

William M. Rogers v. Joseph P. Nacchio, 241 F. App'x 602 (11th Cir. 2007).

Riel v. Reed, 760 F. Supp. 852 (D. Colo. 1991).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.