(1) Where it appears that the effective administration of criminal justice will thereby be served, the district attorney may engage in plea discussions for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement. The district attorney should engage in plea discussions or reach plea agreements with the defendant only through or in the presence of defense counsel except where the defendant is not eligible for appointment of counsel because the defendant is not indigent or the charged offense does not include a possible sentence of incarceration or because the defendant refuses appointment of counsel and has not retained counsel.
(2) The district attorney may agree to one or more of the following, depending upon the circumstances of the individual case: (a) To make or not to oppose favorable recommendations concerning the sentence to be imposed if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest); (b) To seek or not to oppose the dismissal of an offense charged if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to another offense reasonably related to the defendant's conduct; (c) To seek or not to oppose the dismissal of other charges or not to prosecute other potential charges against the defendant if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest); (d) To consent to diversion, as provided in section 18-1.3-101, C.R.S.; (e) To consent to deferred sentencing, as provided in section 18-1.3-102, C.R.S.; (f) To consent to an assessment for suitability for participation in restorative justice practices, including victim-offender conferences.
(3) Defendants whose situations are similar should be afforded similar opportunities for plea agreement.
(4) Repealed.
(5) Any plea agreement in a case involving a plea to a violation of article 18 of title 18, C.R.S., may not require a waiver by the defendant of the right to petition to have the defendant's criminal conviction records sealed pursuant to part 3 of article 72 of title 24, C.R.S.
Source: L. 72: R&RE, p. 223, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-7-301. L. 75: IP(2) amended and (2)(d) and (2)(e) added, p. 609, § 1, effective March 12. L. 92: (1) amended and (4) added, p. 465, § 2, effective July 1. L. 93: (4) amended, p. 1285, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2002: (2)(d) and
(2)(e) amended, p. 1491, § 135, effective October 1. L. 2013: (2)(d) amended, (HB 13-1156), ch. 336, p. 1957, § 4, effective August 7; (5) added, (SB 13-250), ch. 333, p. 1925, § 32, effective October 1; (1) amended and (4) repealed, (HB 13-1210), ch. 306, p. 1622, § 1, effective January 1, 2014. L. 2017: (2)(f) added, (HB 17-1039), ch. 58, p. 183, § 3, effective August 9.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsections (2)(d) and (2)(e), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. 16-7-302. Responsibilities of the trial judge with respect to plea discussions and agreements. (1) The trial judge shall not participate in plea discussions.
(2) If a tentative plea agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) in the expectation that other charges before that court will be dismissed or that sentence concessions will be granted, the trial judge may, upon request of the parties, permit the disclosure to him of the tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea. He may then indicate to the district attorney and defense counsel or defendant whether he will concur in the proposed disposition if the information in the presentence report is consistent with the representations made to him. If the trial judge concurs but later decides that the final disposition should not include the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement, he shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest).
(3) Notwithstanding the reaching of a plea agreement between the district attorney and defense counsel or defendant, the judge in every case should exercise an independent judgment in deciding whether to grant charge and sentence concessions.
Source: L. 72: R&RE, p. 223, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-7-302.
Notes of Decisions
In re the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. James Lee Just., 524 P.3d 1178 (Colo. 2023).
· cites it 20× “" § 16-7-301 (1) , C.R.S. ( 2022 ) . ¶8 Justice countered that the mediation order rested on firm ground because it neither mandated an offer nor dictated the parameters of any offer the People might extend.”
People v. Ray, 560 P.2d 74 (Colo. 1977).
· cites it 6× “Section 16-7-301, C.R.S.1973. Pursuant to the plea bargain, Raymond Ray pled guilty to second-degree burglary and conspiracy.”
Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1985).
· cites it 2× “Although the defendant would be entitled to credit only for that period of presentence confinement attributable to the case resulting in the sentence, the parties nonetheless could agree as part of a sentence concession that credit should be given for the entire period of…”
Young v. People, 30 P.3d 202 (Colo. 2001).
· cites it 4× “When advising a defendant at a providency hearing, the trial court must advise the defendant of the fact that it exercises independent judgment in deciding whether or not to grant the sentence concessions in a plea agreement, and that the court may therefore sentence the…”
Adair v. People, 651 P.2d 389 (Colo. 1982).
“*390 “(2) Prior to entry of a plea of guilty to be followed by deferred judgment and sentence, the district attorney, in the course of plea discussion as provided in sections 16-7-301 and 16-7-302, is authorized to enter into a written stipulation, to be signed by the defendant,…”
People v. Wilder, 687 P.2d 451 (Colo. 1984).
“), 1 provides, in pertinent part: Prior to entry of a plea of guilty to be followed by deferred judgment and sentence, the district attorney, in the course of plea discussion as provided in sections 16-7-301 and 16-7-302, is authorized to *453 enter into a written stipulation,…”
Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1999).
“ll(f)(2)(I); see also § 16-7-301(2)(b), 6 C.R.S. (1998). In this context, then, the concessions specified in any particular plea agreement must be understood as speaking only to the discretionary aspects of sentencing where such recommendations actually could be entertained by…”
People v. Lewis, 671 P.2d 985 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 5× “Section 16-7-301(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.”
Gelfand v. People, 586 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1978).
· cites it 2× “2d 69 (1973); Sections 16-7-301 through 303, C.R.S.1973 (1977 Supp.”
v. Jiron, 2020 COA 36, 490 P.3d 612.
· cites it 3× “1, § 16-7-301, 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 1622 -23.”
People v. Darlington, 105 P.3d 230 (Colo. 2005).
“§§ 16-7-301 to -303, C.R.S. (2004). A defendant may plead guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or with the consent of the court, nolo contendere.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(1): 4 cases
People v. Lewis, 671 P.2d 985 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
“Section 16-7-301(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(2)(a): 5 cases
Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1985).
“Although the defendant would be entitled to credit only for that period of presentence confinement attributable to the case resulting in the sentence, the parties nonetheless could agree as part of a sentence concession that credit should be given for the entire period of…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(2)(b): 2 cases
Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1999).
“ll(f)(2)(I); see also § 16-7-301(2)(b), 6 C.R.S. (1998). In this context, then, the concessions specified in any particular plea agreement must be understood as speaking only to the discretionary aspects of sentencing where such recommendations actually could be entertained by…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(2)(d): 1 case
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(3): 2 cases
People v. Lewis, 671 P.2d 985 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
“Section 16-7-301(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(4)(a): 1 case
v. Jiron, 2020 COA 36, 490 P.3d 612.
“1, § 16-7-301, 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 1622 -23.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(4)(a)(D): 1 case
Young v. People, 30 P.3d 202 (Colo. 2001).
“When advising a defendant at a providency hearing, the trial court must advise the defendant of the fact that it exercises independent judgment in deciding whether or not to grant the sentence concessions in a plea agreement, and that the court may therefore sentence the…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(4)(a)(I): 2 cases
Young v. People, 30 P.3d 202 (Colo. 2001).
“When advising a defendant at a providency hearing, the trial court must advise the defendant of the fact that it exercises independent judgment in deciding whether or not to grant the sentence concessions in a plea agreement, and that the court may therefore sentence the…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(8): 1 case
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