(1) (a) When it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public, as well as the defendant, will be served thereby, the court may grant the defendant probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it deems best. The length of probation shall be subject to the discretion of the court and may exceed the maximum period of incarceration authorized for the classification of the offense of which the defendant is convicted but shall not exceed five years for any misdemeanor or petty offense. If the court chooses to grant the defendant probation, the order placing the defendant on probation shall take effect upon entry and, if any appeal is brought, shall remain in effect pending review by an appellate court unless the court grants a stay of probation pursuant to section 16-4-201. Unless an appeal is filed that raises a claim that probation was granted contrary to the provisions of this title, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of adjudicating complaints filed against the defendant that allege a violation of the terms and conditions of probation. In addition to imposing other conditions, the court has the power to commit the defendant to any jail operated by the county or city and county in which the offense was committed during such time or for such intervals within the period of probation as the court determines. Except as described in subsection (1)(b) of this section, the aggregate length of any such commitment whether continuous or at designated intervals may not exceed ninety days for a felony, sixty days for a misdemeanor, or ten days for a petty offense unless it is a part of a work release program pursuant to section 18- 1.3-207. That the defendant submit to commitment imposed under this section is deemed a condition of probation.
(b) For a defendant who is convicted of a felony offense described in section 42-4-1301 (1)(a), (1)(b), or (2)(a), the aggregate length of any commitment to a county jail is determined as provided in section 42-4-1307 (6.5)(b).
(2) The probation department in each judicial district may enter into agreements with any state agency or other public agency, any corporation, and any private agency or person to provide supervision or other services for defendants placed on probation by the court. The agreements shall not include management of any intensive supervision probation programs created pursuant to section 18-1.3-208.
Source: L. 2002: Entire article added with relocations, p. 1376, § 2, effective October 1. L. 2003: (1) amended, p. 976, § 13, effective April 17. L. 2013: (2) amended, (SB 13-250), ch. 333, p. 1942, § 68, effective October 1. L. 2017: (1) amended, (HB 17-1288), ch. 387, p. 2005, § 3, effective August 9.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 16-11-202 as it existed prior to 2002.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
31
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 2003–2025 · leading case:
People v. Steen, 2014 CO 9, 318 P.3d 487.
People v. Steen, 2014 CO 9, 318 P.3d 487.
· cites it 25× “3-202, a trial court's decision to grant a stay of probation is discretionary: After convietion, a defendant who is granted probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-202, C.R.S., may orally, or in writing, move for a stay of probation pending determination of a motion for a new trial…”
People v. Jenkins, 2013 COA 76, 305 P.3d 420.
· cites it 5× “Referring to the statute that describes a court's probationary power, section 18-1.3-202(1), C.R.S.2012 (subsection 202(1)), the trial court stated that it was "authorized to impose an indeterminate sentence" because "It] he statute places no limitations on the duration of…”
People v. Trujillo, 2018 COA 12, 433 P.3d 78.
· cites it 8× “3d 420 , the division concludes that section 18-1.3-202(1), C.R.S. 2017, provides statutory authority for the imposition of an indeterminate probation sentence.”
Veith v. People, 2017 CO 19, 390 P.3d 403.
· cites it 2× “Assuming that a defendant is eligible for probation, a trial court has discretion to sentence him to probation if it will best serve the interests of justice, the public, and the defendant.”
v. Dominguez, 2021 COA 76.
· cites it 2× “” § 18-1.3-202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2020. ¶ 16 For convictions entered on or after May 25, 2010 (such as Dominguez’s conviction), the probation eligibility statute states that a person who has been twice or more convicted of a felony upon charges separately brought and tried and…”
v. People, 2019 CO 78, 451 P.3d 826.
· cites it 4× “See § 18-1.3-202(1); § 18-1.3-207(1), C.R.S. (2019).”
v. Ehlebracht, 2020 COA 132, 480 P.3d 727.
· cites it 7× “Allman’s Prohibition of Consecutive Prison and Probation Sentences Does Not Apply to Indeterminate Probationary Sentences Imposed Under SOLSA ¶5 In Allman, the supreme court, interpreting the general probation statutes — sections 18-1.3-202 and 18-1.3-203, C.R.S.”
People v. Trujillo, 261 P.3d 485 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 12× “3-202(1) (vesting trial courts with discretion to determine the length of probationary sentences in felony cases), with § 18-1.”
In re People v. Huckabay, 2020 CO 42, 463 P.3d 283.
· cites it 4× “5), is a term of probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-202, C.R.S. (2019). Among other conditions, the DUI penalty statute specifies that, if the court elects a sentence to probation, “the court shall order” as a condition of probation for the defendant to serve either 90 to 180…”
People v. Smith, 2014 CO 10, 318 P.3d 472.
· cites it 7× “2 IIL - Analysis T7 To resolve this issue we first examine our precedent regarding the seope of the trial court's authority when sentencing a con- *475 vieted offender to probation under the probation statute, section 18-1.3-202, C.RS. (2018). Next, we evaluate the statutory…”
People v. Kennaugh, 80 P.3d 315 (Colo. 2003).
· cites it 7× “See § 18-1.3-202, 6 C.R.S. (2003). Therefore I find the majority's actual holding less significant than its resort to a bald assertion that the plain and unambiguous meaning of this statutory language is precisely the meaning we have rejected for fifteen years.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-202(1): 16 cases
People v. Steen, 2014 CO 9, 318 P.3d 487.
“3-202, a trial court's decision to grant a stay of probation is discretionary: After convietion, a defendant who is granted probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-202, C.R.S., may orally, or in writing, move for a stay of probation pending determination of a motion for a new trial…”
People v. Jenkins, 2013 COA 76, 305 P.3d 420.
“Referring to the statute that describes a court's probationary power, section 18-1.3-202(1), C.R.S.2012 (subsection 202(1)), the trial court stated that it was "authorized to impose an indeterminate sentence" because "It] he statute places no limitations on the duration of…”
People v. Trujillo, 2018 COA 12, 433 P.3d 78.
“3d 420 , the division concludes that section 18-1.3-202(1), C.R.S. 2017, provides statutory authority for the imposition of an indeterminate probation sentence.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-202(1)(a): 11 cases
v. Dominguez, 2021 COA 76.
“” § 18-1.3-202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2020. ¶ 16 For convictions entered on or after May 25, 2010 (such as Dominguez’s conviction), the probation eligibility statute states that a person who has been twice or more convicted of a felony upon charges separately brought and tried and…”
v. People, 2019 CO 78, 451 P.3d 826.
“See § 18-1.3-202(1); § 18-1.3-207(1), C.R.S. (2019).”
v. Ehlebracht, 2020 COA 132, 480 P.3d 727.
“Allman’s Prohibition of Consecutive Prison and Probation Sentences Does Not Apply to Indeterminate Probationary Sentences Imposed Under SOLSA ¶5 In Allman, the supreme court, interpreting the general probation statutes — sections 18-1.3-202 and 18-1.3-203, C.R.S.”
People v. Trujillo, 2018 COA 12, 433 P.3d 78.
“3d 420 , the division concludes that section 18-1.3-202(1), C.R.S. 2017, provides statutory authority for the imposition of an indeterminate probation sentence.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.