Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-108 (2026)

Payable on demand or at definite time

✓ current as of July 2026

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(a) A promise or order is "payable on demand" if it (i) states that it is payable on demand or at sight, or otherwise indicates that it is payable at the will of the holder, or (ii) does not state any time of payment.

(b) A promise or order is "payable at a definite time" if it is payable on elapse of a definite period of time after sight or acceptance or at a fixed date or dates or at a time or times readily ascertainable at the time the promise or order is issued, subject to rights of (i) prepayment, (ii) acceleration, (iii) extension at the option of the holder, or (iv) extension to a further definite time at the option of the maker or acceptor or automatically upon or after a specified act or event.

(c) If an instrument, payable at a fixed date, is also payable upon demand made before the fixed date, the instrument is payable on demand until the fixed date and, if demand for payment is not made before that date, becomes payable at a definite time on the fixed date.

Source: L. 94: Entire article R&RE, p. 845, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former §§ 4-3-108 and 4-3-109 as they existed prior to 1994.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 3 cases, 1989–2002 · leading case: Roa v. Miller, 784 P.2d 826 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).

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Roa v. Miller, 784 P.2d 826 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 4× “In rejecting this assertion, the trial court concluded that, since the instrument made defendant’s obligation to pay conditioned upon an event for which no definite time of occurrence was specified, it was a demand note under § 4-3-108, C.R.S. Thus, since the filing of suit…”

Reid v. Pyle, 51 P.3d 1064 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “Thus, the promissory note was not a negotiable instrument and § 4-3-108, C.R.S.2001, was not applicable to it.”

First Nat'l Bank v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 748 F. Supp. 1464 (D. Colo. 1990). · cites it 2× “Both terms refer to the maturity date of the draft: A sight draft is payable on demand while a time draft is payable a certain time after acceptance by the drawee or after ‘sight’ ”. B.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.