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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 12 — TaxationChapter 203 — Property Tax Assessment

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-117a (2025)

Appeals from boards of tax review or boards of assessment appeals

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1993–2026 129citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 129 opinions since 1993, 21 of them in the last five years.

(a)(1) Any person, including any lessee of real property whose lease has been recorded as provided in section 47-19 and who is bound under the terms of such person's lease to pay real property taxes, claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review or the board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, in any town or city may make application, not later than two months after the date of the mailing of notice of such action, in the nature of an appeal therefrom to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated, which shall be accompanied by a citation to such town or city to appear before such court. Such citation shall be signed by the same authority and such appeal shall be returnable at the same time and served and returned in the same manner as is required in case of a summons in a civil action. The authority issuing the citation shall take from the applicant a bond or recognizance to such town or city, with surety, to prosecute the application to effect and to comply with and conform to the orders and decrees of the court in the premises. Any such application shall be a preferred case, to be heard, unless good cause appears to the contrary, at the first session, by the court or by a committee appointed by the court. The pendency of such application shall not suspend an action by such town or city to collect not more than seventy-five per cent of the tax so assessed or not more than ninety per cent of such tax with respect to any real property for which the assessed value is five hundred thousand dollars or more, and upon which such appeal is taken. If, during the pendency of such appeal, a new assessment year begins, the applicant may amend the application as to any matter therein, including an appeal for such new year, that is affected by the inception of such new year and such applicant need not appear before the board of tax review or board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, to make such amendment effective.

(2) For any application made on or after July 1, 2022, under subdivision (1) of this subsection, if the assessed value of the real property that is the subject of such application is one million dollars or more and the application concerns the valuation of such real property, the applicant shall file with the court, not later than one hundred twenty days after making such application, an appraisal of the real property that is the subject of the application. Such appraisal shall be completed by an individual or a company licensed to perform real estate appraisals in the state. The court may extend the one-hundred-twenty-day period for good cause. If such appraisal is not timely filed, the court may dismiss the application, except that for any application made on or after July 1, 2022, but prior to July 1, 2024, that was dismissed due to such appraisal having been submitted to the assessor of the town or city in which such real property is situated rather than the court, the applicant may make another application with the court, provided the applicant (A) had provided notice to the court of such submission to the assessor, and (B) makes such application not later than September 1, 2024.

(b) The court shall have power to grant such relief as to justice and equity appertains, upon such terms and in such manner and form as appear equitable, and, if the application appears to have been made without probable cause, may tax double or triple costs, as the case appears to demand; and, upon all such applications, costs may be taxed at the discretion of the court. If the assessment made by the board of tax review or board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, is reduced by the court, the applicant shall be reimbursed by the town or city for any overpayment of taxes, together with interest and any costs awarded by the court, or, at the applicant's option, shall be granted a tax credit for such overpayment, interest and any costs awarded by the court. Upon motion, the court shall, in event of such overpayment, enter judgment in favor of such applicant and against such city or town for the whole amount of such overpayment, less any lien recording fees incurred under sections 7-34a and 12-176, together with interest and any costs awarded by the court. The amount to which the assessment is so reduced shall be the assessed value of such property on the grand lists for succeeding years until the tax assessor finds that the value of the applicant's property has increased or decreased.

(P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 89-231, S. 4, 5; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; 90-266, S. 4, 6; P.A. 91-221, S. 4, 5; P.A. 92-254, S. 4, 6; P.A. 93-95, S. 4, 5; 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6; 95-283, S. 17, 68; P.A. 96-1, S. 3–5; 96-261, S. 1, 3, 4; P.A. 13-276, S. 5; P.A. 22-118, S. 468; 22-146, S. 19; P.A. 24-151, S. 114.)

History: P.A. 90-266 extended applicability to assessment list for year commencing October 1, 1990, effective June 8, 1990, and applicable to appeals from boards of tax review for assessment years commencing October 1, 1989, and October 1, 1990; P.A. 91-221 extended applicability to assessment list for year commencing October 1, 1991, effective June 10, 1991, and applicable to appeals from boards of tax review for assessment years commencing October 1, 1989, October 1, 1990, and October 1, 1991; P.A. 92-254 extended applicability to assessment list for year commencing October 1, 1992, effective June 3, 1992, and applicable to appeals from boards of tax review for assessment years commencing October 1, 1989, October 1, 1990, October 1, 1991, and October 1, 1992; P.A. 93-95 extended applicability to assessment list for year commencing October 1, 1993, or October 1, 1994, effective June 2, 1993, and applicable to appeals from the board of tax review in any municipality for the assessment years commencing on October first in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994; P.A. 95-283 changed location of appeal from the judicial district in which the town or city is located to the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain and changed the name of the board of tax review to the board of assessment appeals, effective October 1, 1996 (Revisor's note: P.A. 88-230, 90-98, 93-142 and 95-220 authorized substitution of “judicial district of Hartford” for “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain”, effective September 1, 1998). P.A. 96-1 repealed changes made by public act 95-283 and revised wording of previously existing law, effective March 6, 1996, and applicable to assessment years of municipalities commencing on or after October 1, 1995; P.A. 96-261 also repealed changes made by P.A. 95-283 and made technical change in previously existing law, effective June 10, 1996; P.A. 13-276 added provision re subtraction of lien recording fees from amount of judgment for overpayment of taxes; P.A. 22-118 designated existing provisions re making application to superior court as Subsec. (a)(1) and amended same to delete references to assessment years commencing October 1, 1989, to October 1, 1995, and assessment years thereafter, and added Subdiv. (2) re requirement to file appraisal if assessed value of real property is $1,000,000 or more and application concerns valuation of the property, and designated existing provisions re power of court to grant relief as Subsec. (b), effective July 1, 2022; P.A. 22-146 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to change time period for filing appraisal after making application from 90 days to 120 days, effective July 1, 2022; P.A. 24-151 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add provision allowing applicants whose applications were dismissed due to certain circumstances to make another application with the court, and made technical changes throughout, effective July 1, 2024; (Revisor's note: In 2025, an incorrect reference to “subparagraph (B) of”, which appeared before “subdivision (1) of this subsection” in Subsec. (a)(2), was deleted editorially by the Revisors for accuracy).

Cited. 226 C. 407; 227 C. 826; 228 C. 23; 229 C. 618; 231 C. 731. To the extent that conditional approvals deprive taxpayers of immediate economic returns from their investment, such conditional approvals raise issues only of valuation, which properly may be addressed only by appeals under section. 232 C. 335. Cited. Id., 392; 236 C. 710; 240 C. 192; Id., 469; Id., 475; 241 C. 382; Id., 749. Bar to action must at any time use as its initial reference point the assessment date and not the date of the decennial revaluation. 242 C. 363. Judgment of Appellate Court in 41 CA 421 reversed. Id., 550. Cited. Id., 727. Subsequent title holder has no greater rights to challenge prior assessment than were possessed by its immediate assignor or by any prior assignee from the owner of a property at the time of assessment. 249 C. 1. Allegations of certain violations of public policy, such as a person's entering into an invalid contract or unauthorized practice of law, do not bar the person from a property tax appeal. 253 C. 255. Trial court rejected plaintiff's appeal of assessment for lack of credible evidence to establish aggrievement, and not because the going concern income capitalization approach to valuation is not permitted or recognized. 308 C. 87. Issue of city's wrongdoing is a proper consideration in property tax appeal pursuant to section; evidence of wrongdoing is not irrelevant as a matter of law as to the issue of an award of interest. 320 C. 332. Plaintiff property owner and taxpayer aggrieved by decision of the board of assessment appeals, but who was not a party to the proceedings before the board, has standing under section to bring an appeal to the trial court. Id., 535. Service of the appeal, rather than the filing of the application in court, must be completed within the two month limitation period. 324 C. 528, 544.

Cited. 31 CA 115; Id., 793; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 618; 35 CA 269; 38 CA 158; Id., 165; 40 CA 64; 41 CA 249; Id., 421; 42 CA 318; 43 CA 169; 44 CA 494; Id., 517; 46 CA 338. Assessor's method that treated plaintiff's properties as individual lots rather than one merged lot resulted in unfair treatment and a wrongful assessment, and therefore, plaintiff was aggrieved. 61 CA 834. Sec. 22a-45 does not limit property owner's remedy pursuant to this section. 80 CA 630. Plaintiff may not limit parameters of the court's valuation determination by challenging only one portion of the assessment because court determinations under section are de novo and court must arrive at its own conclusions by weighing all the evidence regardless of any alleged judicial admission as to scope of review; defendant town is not required to file a special defense under section; plaintiff who attempted to limit court's review to only one portion of an assessment was not deprived of due process when entire assessment was reviewed because Connecticut law has consistently held that trial court exercises de novo review. 84 CA 473. Statute allows taxpayer to challenge an illegal assessment outside prior statutorily mandated revaluation period and such appeal does not constitute impermissible request for interim revaluation. 85 CA 480. Section creates cause of action for taxpayer aggrieved by excessive and wrongful valuation of property, but there is no private right of action for taxpayer against municipal officials in individual capacities for alleged wrongdoing in tax assessment of property not owned or leased by or directly connected to taxpayer. 119 CA 453. Property owner must serve town with complaint and citation within 2 months of board's notice. 158 CA 565, 576; judgments affirmed, see 324 C. 528, 544. Common law unjust enrichment claim unavailable to plaintiff whose property was overtaxed for 25 years as claims are time limited under statutory scheme whether excess taxes are paid due to clerical errors, improper property valuations, or “manifestly excessive'' assessments. 211 CA 441.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-117a most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSears, Roebuck & Co. v. Bd. of Tax Review, 699 A.2d 81 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 12-117a 50×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“The principal issue in this tax appeal is the extent of a trial court’s discretion, under General Statutes § 12-117a, 1 to award prejudgment interest to an aggrieved taxpayer upon finding that a municipality *751 has overassessed the value of the taxpayer’s real property.”
The case’s holding
The statutory interest rate in tax appeals represents a maximum rate rather than a mandatory rate and remains subject to judicial discretion.
Later courts cite it for
“because a tax appeal is heard de novo, a trial court judge is privileged to adopt whatever testimony he reasonably believes to be credible.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENChestnut Point Realty, LLC v. Town of E. Windsor, 153 A.3d 636 (Conn. 2017).
cites § 12-117a 30×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“See General Statutes § 12-117a. The question presented by this case is whether, for purposes of this limitation period, such application is made upon the filing of the required appeal documents in the Superior Court, or rather, when those appeal documents have been served upon…”
3
GREENKonover v. Town of West Hartford, 699 A.2d 158 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 12-117a 26×cited by 85 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a. 2 The case was tried to the court.”
The case’s holding
A trial court determines whether a taxpayer is overassessed by considering the actual land area owned by the taxpayer on the date of valuation.
Later courts cite it for
“section 12-117a, which allows taxpayers to appeal the decisions of municipal boards of tax review to the superior court, provide s a method by which an owner of property may directly call in question the valuation placed by assessors upon his property . . . .” · 6 citing courts
4
GREENM. Dematteo Constr. Co. v. City of New London, 674 A.2d 845 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 12-117a 17×cited by 67 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“appeal in the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a 2 from a decision *712 of the board of tax review of the defendant, the city of New London, refusing to reduce the assessment of its property.”
The case’s holding
Parties bear their own litigation expenses unless a statute clearly provides otherwise.
Later courts cite it for
“it is a settled principle of our common law that parties are required to bear their own litigation expenses, except as otherwise provided by statute.” · 6 citing courts
5
GREENNat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of East Windsor, 854 A.2d 58 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
cites § 12-117a 25×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“The plaintiff claims that (1) in an appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a, a plaintiff may limit the parameters of the court’s valuation determination by challenging in its pleadings only one portion of the tax assessment, (2) the court improperly valued the land and…”
Later courts cite it for
“the statement relied on as a binding admission however must be clear, deliberate and unequivocal.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENWaterbury Hotel Equity, LLC v. City of Waterbury, 858 A.2d 259 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
cites § 12-117a 26×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“1 The plaintiff appealed pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a, 2 claiming that the valua *484 tion of its property in the years 1996 through 2000 was grossly excessive, disproportionate and illegal.”
7
GREENDavis v. Town of Westport, 767 A.2d 1237 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 12-117a 17×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a. 4 She claimed that the assessment was grossly excessive, disproportionate and unlawful.”
8
GREEN7 Germantown Road, LLC v. Danbury, 329 A.3d 927 (Conn. 2025).
cites § 12-117a 35×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“Danbury the Superior Court had previously dismissed their appeals and that each of them had filed new tax appeals in the Superior Court, in accordance with this new provision. They contend that the filing of those replacement actions renders this appeal moot.”
9
GREENSakon v. Town of Glastonbury, 958 A.2d 801 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 12-117a 14×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“The plaintiff, John Alan Sakon, appeals from the judgments of the trial court denying two tax appeals brought pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-117a and 12-119. The defendant in this matter is the town of Glastonbury.”
Later courts cite it for
“ajlthough we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENConcept Assocs., Ltd. v. Bd. of Tax Review, 642 A.2d 1186 (Conn. 1994).
cites § 12-117a 8×cited by 130 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“On May 6, 1992, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a, 3 the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court.”
The case’s holding
A remedial statute allows the amendment of civil process to correct a defective return date even after the correct date has passed.
Later courts cite it for
“a motion to dismiss . . . has replaced the plea in abatement as the vehicle for challenging the court's jurisdiction . . . .” · 4 citing courts
11
GREENUnited Tech. Corp. v. Town of East Windsor, 807 A.2d 955 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 12-117a 6×cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“The plaintiff, United Technologies Corporation, 1 brought this action against the defendant, *13 the town of East Windsor, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a, 2 appealing from the decision of the board of assessment appeals of the town of East Windsor (board) *14 upholding…”
The case’s holding
A trial court's determination of a property's highest and best use is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard and will not be disturbed if supported by the record.
Later courts cite it for
“relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. . . . ejvidcnce need not exclude all other possibilities to be relevant; it is sufficient if it tends to support the conclusion for which it is offered, even to a slight degree.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 12-117a 7×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“The plaintiff, Carmel Hollow Associates Limited Partnership, filed an appeal in the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-117a 3 and *124 12-119 4 from the decision of the board of assessment appeals of the defendant town of Bethlehem denying the plaintiffs appeal…”
The case’s holding
A town assessor must maintain a forest land classification if the state forester has not cancelled the designation and cannot independently determine that a change in use terminates it.
Later courts cite it for
“the test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” · 6 citing courts
13
GREENBreezy Knoll Ass'n. v. Town of Morris, 946 A.2d 215 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 12-117a 14×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“(association), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its municipal tax appeal, brought pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a, for lack of aggrievement.”
14
GREENS. New England Tel. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Review, 623 A.2d 1027 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
cites § 12-117a 9×cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“The issue presented by this appeal is whether in a tax appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a 1 the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff named the “Board of Tax Review, Town of Bloomfield” as the defendant in the citation and served process…”
The case’s holding
Failure to name and serve a statutorily mandated necessary party in an administrative appeal citation constitutes a jurisdictional defect that renders the appeal subject to dismissal.
Later courts cite it for
“the plaintiff's failure to name and serve the statutorily mandated necessary party in the citation is a jurisdictional defect that renders the administrative appeal subject to dismissal.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENIreland v. Town of Wethersfield, 698 A.2d 888 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 12-117a 11×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“The principal issue in this appeal is whether, in a taxpayer suit brought pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a, 1 a respondent town has a burden *552 of introducing evidence to establish that the town’s assessment of the taxpayer’s property did not result in an unjust tax.”
The case’s holding
A taxpayer fails to meet the burden of proving overassessment if they do not present evidence of unjust valuation, and the town need not provide affirmative evidence to support its assessment.
Later courts cite it for
“we have regularly affirmed such judgments without a showing that the town adduced affirmative evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the assessor's determination of market value was not unjust.” · 1 citing court
16
GREENAndover LP I v. Bd. of Tax Review, 655 A.2d 759 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 12-117a 8×cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“The sole issue in this appeal is whether, in a tax assessment appeal under General Statutes § 12-117a, the plaintiff’s designation of the board of tax review of the town of West Hartford instead of the town of West Hartford as the defendant deprived the trial court of subject…”
The case’s holding
A misnomer in a citation is a circumstantial defect curable by amendment if the proper defendant had actual notice and was not prejudiced.
Later courts cite it for
“because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo.” · 4 citing courts
17
GREENNutmeg Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Colchester, 151 A.3d 358 (Conn. 2016).
cites § 12-117a 8×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“The board disagreed, upholding the town's original valuation, and the plaintiff appealed from the board's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a, again claiming that its property was overvalued.”
18
GREENArnone v. Town of Enfield, 831 A.2d 260 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 12-117a 7×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“, the plaintiff contended that it was entitled to reimbursement for all reasonable appraisal fees incurred in connection with its successful tax appeal pursuant to, inter alia, General Statutes § 12-117a. M. DeMatteo Construction Co.”
The case’s holding
Expert witness fees are not taxable costs under whistleblower statutes unless expressly provided for by statute.
Later courts cite it for
“an award of punitive damages is discretionary, and the exercise of such discretion will not ordinarily be interfered with on appeal unless the abuse is manifest or injustice appears to have been done.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENWind Colebrook South, LLC v. Colebrook, 278 A.3d 442 (Conn. 2022).
cites § 12-117a 8×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 12-117a
“4 General Statutes § 12-117a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person, including any lessee of real property whose lease has been recorded as provided in section 47-19 and who is bound under the terms of his lease to pay real property taxes, claiming to be aggrieved by the action…”
20
REDGoodspeed Airport, LLC v. Town of East Haddam, 973 A.2d 678 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 12-117a 18×cited by 5 cases
Reversed by Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. Town of East Haddam (2011): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 12-117a
“Thereafter, on May 19, 2004, the plaintiff filed the first of three tax appeals in the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-117a and 12-119. The original appeal subsequently was amended on June 14, 2004, and contained two counts.”

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Citing cases by year
199320092026

One bar per year. Tallest: 11 cases in 1997. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Conn. App. Ct.68Conn.55Conn. Super. Ct.4D. Conn.2
By subsection

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Enactment and amendments

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