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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 13a — Highways and BridgesChapter 238 — Highway Construction and Maintenance

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 13a-76 (2025)

Reassessment of damages or benefits by judge trial referee or court

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1965–2023 52citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 52 opinions since 1965, 2 of them in the last five years.

Any person claiming to be aggrieved by the assessment of such special damages or such special benefits by the commissioner may, at any time within six months after the same has been so filed, apply to the superior court for the judicial district within which such land is situated for a reassessment of such damages or such benefits so far as the same affect such applicant. The court, after causing notice of the pendency of such application to be given to the commissioner, may appoint a judge trial referee to make such reassessment of such damages or such benefits. The court or such judge trial referee, after giving at least ten days' notice to the parties interested of the time and place of hearing, shall hear the applicant and the commissioner, may view the land, and shall take such testimony as the court or such judge trial referee deems material and shall thereupon reassess such damages and benefits so far as they affect such applicant. The reassessment by the court or such judge trial referee shall take into account any evidence relevant to the fair market value of the property, including evidence of required environmental remediation by the Department of Transportation. The court or such judge trial referee shall make a separate finding for remediation costs, and the property owner shall be entitled to a set-off of such costs in any pending or subsequent legal action to recover remediation costs for the property. If the amount of the reassessment of such damages awarded to any such property owner exceeds the amount of the assessment of such damages by the commissioner for such land, the court or such judge trial referee shall award to such property owner such appraisal fees as the court or such judge trial referee determines to be reasonable. If no appeal to the Appellate Court is filed within the time allowed by law, or if one is filed and the proceedings have terminated in a final judgment finding the amount due the landowner, the clerk shall send a certified copy of the assessment of the commissioner and of the judgment to the Comptroller, who shall, upon receipt thereof, draw an order upon the Treasurer in favor of the landowner for the amount due the landowner as damages. The pendency of any such application for reassessment shall not prevent or delay the layout, extension, alteration, widening, change of grade or other improvement of any such highway.

(1949 Rev., S. 2267; 1957, P.A. 632, S. 2; 1958 Rev., S. 13-150; 1963, P.A. 226, S. 76; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 127; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 24, 82; P.A. 86-274; P.A. 96-37, S. 3; P.A. 01-75, S. 1, 3; 01-186, S. 2; P.A. 02-132, S. 72.)

History: 1963 act replaced previous provisions: See title history; P.A. 78-280 substituted “judicial district” for “county”; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 deleted reference to supreme court and substituted appellate court in lieu thereof; P.A. 86-274 specified that the referee appointed to reassess damages and benefits shall be a “trial” referee, provided that the trial referee rather than the court or judge award appraisal fees determined to be reasonable, deleted provisions which required the referee to submit a report of his reassessment to the court for acceptance or rejection by the court and the appointment by the court of another referee if it rejected the report, and added provision defining trial referee; P.A. 96-37 changed state trial referee to judge trial referee; P.A. 01-75 added provisions requiring the reassessment of the trial referee to take into account the fair market value of the property, including environmental remediation by the Department of Transportation, requiring such referee to make a separate finding for remediation costs and requiring a set-off of such cost to the property owner in any pending or subsequent legal action and made technical changes for the purposes of gender neutrality, effective June 6, 2001; P.A. 01-186 changed “shall” appoint to “may” appoint a judge trail referee, deleted definition of trial referee for purposes of section, and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality (Revisor's note: In merging the gender-neutral technical changes contained in public acts 01-75 and 01-186, the Revisors gave precedence to the changes contained in public act 01-75); P.A. 02-132 added provisions re review by court, replaced provision re mandatory viewing of land with provision re discretionary viewing of land and made technical and conforming changes.

On appeal under section, no question of validity of assessment can be raised. 113 C. 660. Cited. 116 C. 124; 117 C. 139; 125 C. 417. Function of court goes no further than to determine amount due plaintiff. 127 C. 464; 129 C. 117. Cited. Id., 250; 134 C. 228; 137 C. 300. When report of referee reassessing damages may be overturned; correct procedure for attacking findings contained in such report. 147 C. 685. Cited. 148 C. 731. Existence of sand and gravel on property should be considered as factor in damages insofar as it affects marked value of land. Id., 736. Cited. 149 C. 210. The referee should include the entire reasonable cost of moving plaintiff's equipment in determining the fair market value of the property taken. 150 C. 32. Cited. Id., 524; 152 C. 353, 354; 153 C. 292. Referee should consider market value of renewal options in determining value of leasehold. Id., 377. Cited. Id., 718. Where there was credible evidence by experts of value of plaintiff's property to support referee's conclusion, court did not err in overruling plaintiff's exceptions to report of referee. 155 C. 602. Motion to reopen hearing by referee to introduce further evidence denied where there was no showing by plaintiff that evidence to be offered could not have been produced at hearing. 156 C. 70. State's appraiser may be required by condemnee to testify to his expert opinion concerning value of condemned property. Id., 166. Cited. 163 C. 204. Where portion of parcel is taken and remainder of land is not taken, either by right of statutory authority or in a constitutional sense, owner has no direct cause of action against condemnor but is left to recover any severance damage under section. 169 C. 195. Condemnation proceeding is limited to reassessment of damages caused by taking. 172 C. 182. Cited. Id., 234. Time limit for appeal from assessment extended to 6 months from date of Superior Court judgment. 173 C. 220. Cited. 174 C. 323. Where appeal based on determination of damages, only referee(s) may not assess benefits. 176 C. 391. Court correctly considered cost to cure expenditures in determining the after value of remaining land after taking. 177 C. 432. Cited. 178 C. 710; 180 C. 11. Denial of access was a foreseeable, necessary, natural and proximate result of the taking and the property owner was entitled to compensation. Id., 355, 356, 360. Although under statute the Superior Court clerk is required, following a final judgment in a condemnation proceeding, to send to the State Comptroller certified copies of both the assessment and the judgment, clerk's failure to send copy of assessment did not impair plaintiff's right to pursue its mandamus actions. 187 C. 171. Cited. 192 C. 377; 203 C. 364; 209 C. 480; 211 C. 173; Id., 382; 214 C. 225; 215 C. 437; 236 C. 710. 6-month limitation period for filing an application for reassessment is not subject matter jurisdictional but is analogous to a statute of limitations, requiring Commissioner of Transportation to raise in a timely manner property owner's failure to comply with such provision with failure to do so constituting a waiver of the defense; since commissioner failed to raise issue of property owner's failure to file her reassessment applications in a timely manner, commissioner's claim of untimely filing was waived; trial court has burden of “causing notice” of property owner's application for reassessment to be given commissioner; property owner was not required to initiate and serve notice of her application on commissioner, and there is no language in statute to support commissioner's construction allocating burden to property owner to initiate and serve notice on commissioner. 262 C. 257.

Because appeal under section is a trial de novo, motion for summary judgment available. 11 CA 439. Cited. 35 CA 9; 36 CA 49. Trial court's failure to award appraisal fees was clearly erroneous because it was presented with facts and evidence from which it could have determined a reasonable appraisal fee in the exercise of its discretion. 109 CA 16. There is no statutory authority for awarding a prevailing party title search fees as costs against state in a condemnation action taken pursuant to section; reassessment of damages under section did not affect title to defendant's properties because proceeding did not have influence on or bring about a change in ownership of properties. 121 CA 13. Issue of reimbursement expenses for business relocation falls under purview of Secs. 8-268 and 8-278, is outside scope of compensation for the taking of real property and is not an essential term of settlement agreement pursuant to this section. 189 CA 828.

Cited. 4 CS 474; 6 CS 335. An injunction will not lie in condemnation if there is an adequate remedy at law. Id., 393. Does not determine relative rights of interested persons who claim reverter interests. 9 CS 497. Section affords no review of validity of the condemnation. 11 CS 39. If all means of access to property are taken, measure of damages is value of the property. 14 CS 138. Cited. 17 CS 47. Court in awarding appraisal fees is not bound by Sec. 52-257; elements to be considered by court in determining what is a reasonable appraisal fee. 21 CS 343. Cited. 24 CS 391. Appeal from a condemnation proceeding is limited in scope to a reassessment of damages. 27 CS 23. Cited. Id., 287. Referee directed to file a report when case had been heard before enactment of Sec. 51-50f. Id., 494. State referee's report rejected and matter referred to another referee when the conclusion that the building on the condemned property was of no value was not sustained by the findings of fact. 28 CS 68. Cited. 34 CS 194, 195. Statutory condition subsequent for an appeal to be taken in a condemnation proceeding under section discussed; court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal by owner for reassessment of damages under section where commissioner was not served with notice of the appeal and return of service ordered by the court was never filed. 46 CS 623.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 13a-76 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENComm'r of Transp. v. Kahn, 811 A.2d 693 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 13a-76 26×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“Specifically, the commissioner claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under General Statutes § 13a-76 4 to consider Kahn’s applications because: (1) *260 Kahn had failed to file the applications within the six month period prescribed under the statute; and (2) the…”
2
GREENComm'r of Transp. v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, 894 A.2d 259 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 13a-76 7×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“The commissioner contends that the trial court was not authorized to compensate Viacom for the billboards because the billboards are personal property and personal property is not compensable in an eminent *709 domain appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 13a-76. 13 Moreover,…”
The case’s holding
A trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to award damages for personal property in an eminent domain proceeding if that property was not included in the notice of condemnation.
Later courts cite it for
“the uniform relocation act further requires states seeking federal funds to comply with the provisions of the act.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENAlemany v. Comm'r of Transp., 576 A.2d 503 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 13a-76 6×cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“Alemany, brought an appeal for reassessment of damages in accordance with General Statutes § 13a-76. 1 After a hearing, the Hon.”
The case’s holding
A landowner is entitled to compensation for the value of the property taken and severance damages for the diminution in value of the remaining property.
Later courts cite it for
“when only a portion of a party's property is taken, the landowner is entitled not only to compensation for the value of the property taken, but also to severance damages for the diminution in the value of the landowner's remaining property that the severance of a portion of the property causes.” · 9 citing courts
4
GREENHensley v. Comm'r of Transp., 558 A.2d 971 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 13a-76 8×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“I The plaintiff’s first claim of error is that the trial referee erred in failing to view the condemned property as required by General Statutes § 13a-76. Additionally, the plaintiff claims that she did not waive that requirement.”
5
GREEND'ADDARIO v. Comm'r of Transp., 429 A.2d 890 (Conn. 1980).
cites § 13a-76 5×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“This is the second appeal by the defendant commissioner of transportation from the judgment of a state referee who, exercising the powers of the Superior Court, in accordance with General Statutes § 13a-76, reassessed the damages resulting from the condemnation of a portion of…”
The case’s holding
Damages for a partial taking are measured by the difference between the market value of the whole tract before the taking and the market value of the remainder thereafter.
Later courts cite it for
“damages recoverable for a partial taking are measured by application of the before and after rule to determine the difference between the market value of the whole tract as it lay before the taking and the market value of what remained of it thereafter, taking into consideration the changes contemplated in the improvement and those which are so possible of occurrence in the future that they may reasonably be held to affect market value. . . .” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENComm'r of Transp. v. Larobina, 882 A.2d 1265 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 13a-76 6×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“to 1999) § 13a-76. 3 The court heard testi *19 mony from each of the parties’ appraisers and received into evidence the appraisers’ reports.”
Later courts cite it for
“when faced with the constraints of incomplete information, a court cannot be faulted for fashioning an award as equitably as possible under the circumstances.” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENDeLucia v. Burns, 527 A.2d 1234 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
cites § 13a-76 8×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“4 The plain *442 tiff thereafter filed an appeal under General Statutes § 13a-76 5 claiming that he was aggrieved because the damages assessed by the defendant were inadequate.”
The case’s holding
Just compensation in a condemnation proceeding is limited to the fixed contract price when a landowner is bound by an agreement to convey the property for that sum.
Later courts cite it for
“the doctrine of election of remedies is equitable in nature, and is purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double recovery for a single wrong.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENComm'r v. Towpath Assocs., 767 A.2d 1169 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 13a-76 4×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“See General Statutes §§ 13a-76, 6 *535 48-10 7 and 52-434 (a) (l); 8 Practice Book § 19-3.”
The case’s holding
A highest and best use valuation requiring the assemblage of separate parcels is only permissible if there is a reasonable probability that such an integrated use will occur.
Later courts cite it for
“an award may be made based on a parcel's highest and best use when that use requires an assemblage of separate lands.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENLaurel, Inc. v. Comm'r of Transp., 377 A.2d 296 (Conn. 1977).
cites § 13a-76 7×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“It is entitled to a determination of its damages in an appeal from the assessment under General Statutes § 13a-76. The Superior Court in Fairfield County is ordered to reinstate the condemnation proceedings as initiated by the defendants and known as State Highway Commissioner v.”
10
GREENTransp. Plaza Assocs. v. Powers, 525 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 13a-76 4×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“These decisions make it clear that expenses arising from curing injuries sustained by the remaining land which was not condemned are not recoverable per se in an appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 13a-76, but may be evidence which would sustain a finding that the remaining…”
The case’s holding
Proof of the reasonable probability that land could be put to a particular use does not require testimony from the specific administrative officials involved in the approval process.
Later courts cite it for
“proof of the reasonable probability that land could be put to a particular use need not be established by the testimony of the particular administrative officials involved.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENNew England Estates, LLC v. Town of Branford, 988 A.2d 229 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 13a-76 3×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“) The scope of an appeal pursuant to § 8-132, as stated in the statute, is whether, based on evidence relevant to fair market value, the statement of compensation should be revised. This reading of the statute is consistent with our case law.”
The case’s holding
A government actor's bad faith exercise of the power of eminent domain violates the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well established ... that a government actor's bad faith exercise of the power of eminent domain is a violation of the takings clause,” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENHanson v. Comm'r of Transp., 408 A.2d 8 (Conn. 1979).
cites § 13a-76 6×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“General Statutes § 13a-76. In accordance with a further application, the court 1 ordered the appointment of two additional referees (Hon.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is necessary to the validity of the judgment” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENSmith v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 387 A.2d 542 (Conn. 1978).
cites § 13a-76 2×cited by 133 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“The remaining issue in this appeal is the plaintiffs’ claim that the granting of a variance without their consent violates their constitutional right to just compensation by forcing them to assume the financial risk of structural alteration or sale of property subject to a…”
The case’s holding
The condemnation of land that renders a property nonconforming constitutes an unusual hardship for the purpose of granting a zoning variance.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well settled that the hardship must be different in kind from that generally affecting properties in the same zoning district, and must arise from circumstances or conditions beyond the control of the property owner.” · 15 citing courts
14
GREENLaurel, Inc. v. State, 362 A.2d 1383 (Conn. 1975).
cites § 13a-76 6×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“As to this argument, the provision referred to by the plaintiff refers to cul-de-sacs but does not prohibit the extension of such streets as would be necessary for any development of the area. As the action of the defendants in condemning 0.”
The case’s holding
A constitutional taking occurs only when property cannot be used for any reasonable and proper purpose or its economic utilization is destroyed for all practical purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“there is, however, no confiscation of property or a taking in the constitutional sense unless the property cannot be used for any reasonable and proper purpose;. . .as where the economic utilization of the property is, for all practical purposes, destroyed.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENMinicucci v. Comm'r of Transp., 559 A.2d 216 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 13a-76 2×cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“See General Statutes § 13a-76. Examination of the appraisal reports and numerous photographs in evidence discloses that the subject property obviously contained a significant quantity of rock, as there are visible outcroppings of ledge along route 6 and other portions of the…”
The case’s holding
The owner of land taken by condemnation is entitled to be paid just compensation based on the property's highest and best use, provided subdivision is a reasonable probability in the near future.
Later courts cite it for
“the owner of land taken by condemnation is entitled to be paid just compensation. . . .” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENM. Dematteo Constr. Co. v. City of New London, 674 A.2d 845 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 13a-76 2×cited by 67 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“municipality to collect delinquent taxes on personal property, the owner of the property shall pay reasonable appraiser’s fees incurred by municipality); General Statutes § 12-193 (reasonable appraiser’s fees incurred by municipality as result of foreclosure action under General…”
The case’s holding
Parties bear their own litigation expenses unless a statute clearly provides otherwise.
Later courts cite it for
“it is a settled principle of our common law that parties are required to bear their own litigation expenses, except as otherwise provided by statute.” · 6 citing courts
17
GREENLaurel, Inc. v. Comm'r of Transp., 428 A.2d 789 (Conn. 1980).
cites § 13a-76 2×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“Upon reinstatement of the condemnation proceedings and Laurel’s appeal from the assessment of damages, the commissioner filed a plea in abatement alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because Laurel’s appeal had not been filed within six months of the assessment as…”
The case’s holding
Just compensation for a partial taking includes the value of the land taken and any damages to the remainder resulting from the taking.
Later courts cite it for
“where only a portion of a tract is taken for public use, the award will include the value of the part taken as well as any damages visited upon the remainder as a result of the taking.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENLaurel, Inc. v. Caldwell, 444 A.2d 1386 (Conn. 1982).
cites § 13a-76 8×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“Upon reinstatement of the condemnation proceedings and Laurel’s appeal from the assessment of damages, the commissioner filed a plea in abatement alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because Laurel’s appeal had not been filed within six months of the assessment as…”
Later courts cite it for
“the fundamental purpose of statutory provisions like 13a-76 is to provide notice” · 1 citing court
19
GREENWakeman v. Comm'r of Transp., 418 A.2d 78 (Conn. 1979).
cites § 13a-76 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“The principal issue presented by this appeal as briefed by all parties is whether the methods used by the court in reassessing damages were within the strictures of General Statutes § 13a-76 which require the court to “make such reassessment of such damages.”
Later courts cite it for
“also considered are any and all damages which will foreseeably follow from the proper construction of the project, including any and all damages to that remainder which are a necessary rational and proximate result of the taking.” · 3 citing courts
20
GREENMongillo v. Comm'r of Transp., 571 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 13a-76 2×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 13a-76
“The plaintiff appealed the assessment to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 13a-76. The appeal was referred to Hon.”
The case’s holding
Multiple writings regarding the same transaction are considered together to determine intent, and the terms of a deed supersede an underlying contract absent a reservation of collateral rights.
Later courts cite it for
“when there are multiple writings regarding the same transaction, the writings should be considered together to determine the intent of the parties.” · 8 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196519942023

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1965. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Conn.35Conn. App. Ct.8Conn. Super. Ct.8D. Conn.1
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