Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-240 (2025)

Vehicles to be driven reasonable distance apart. Exceptions. Operation of platoon

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(a) As used in this section, “platoon” means two or three commercial motor vehicles or buses, excluding school buses, traveling in a unified manner at electronically coordinated speeds at following distances that are closer than would be reasonable and prudent without such coordination.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, no person operating a motor vehicle shall follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of such vehicles, the traffic upon and the condition of the highway and weather conditions.

(c) No person operating a motor vehicle shall drive such vehicle in such proximity to another vehicle as to obstruct or impede traffic.

(d) Motor vehicles being driven upon any highway in a caravan shall be so operated as to allow sufficient space between such vehicles or combination of vehicles to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy such space without danger. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to funeral processions or to motor vehicles under official escort, traveling under a special permit or operating in a platoon.

(e) (1) A person may operate a platoon on the highways of this state, provided such person files a plan for the general platoon operations with the Commissioner of Transportation and such plan is approved by the commissioner. The commissioner shall approve or reject a plan for general platoon operations not later than fifteen days after the receipt of such plan. If the commissioner rejects any such plan, the commissioner shall provide a written explanation of the reason for such rejection and guidance to amend such plan for resubmission.

(2) Each commercial motor vehicle or bus in a platoon shall display a mark identifying such vehicle or bus as part of a platoon at all times when such vehicle or bus is engaged in platooning. Such mark shall be issued by the commissioner and displayed in a manner prescribed by the commissioner.

(3) Each person operating a commercial motor vehicle or bus in a platoon shall be seated in the driver's seat of such vehicle or bus and hold a commercial driver's license of the appropriate class and bearing endorsements for the type of vehicle or bus being driven.

(4) No person operating a commercial motor vehicle or bus in a platoon shall pull or drag another motor vehicle in the platoon.

(f) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall have committed an infraction, except that (1) any person operating a commercial vehicle combination or a commercial motor vehicle or bus in a platoon in violation of any such provision shall have committed a violation and shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one hundred fifty dollars, or (2) if the violation results in a motor vehicle accident, such person shall have committed a violation and shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than two hundred dollars.

(1955, S. 1392d; P.A. 75-577, S. 84, 126; P.A. 84-372, S. 6, 9; P.A. 96-180, S. 42, 166; P.A. 18-164, S. 29; P.A. 22-40, S. 15.)

History: P.A. 75-577 added Subsec. (d); P.A. 84-372 established higher penalty for person operating a commercial vehicle combination; P.A. 96-180 made a technical change in Subsec. (c), effective June 3, 1996; P.A. 18-164 amended Subsec. (d) to designate existing provision re operation of commercial vehicle combination as Subdiv. (1) and add Subdiv. (2) re violation resulting in motor vehicle accident, and made technical and conforming changes; P.A. 22-40 added new Subsec. (a) re defining “platoon”, redesignated existing Subsec. (a) as Subsec. (b) and amended same to add provision re except as provided in Subsec. (e), redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d) and amended same to add provision re operating in platoon, added Subsec. (e) re operation of platoon and redesignated existing Subsec. (d) as Subsec. (f) and amended same by adding “or a commercial motor vehicle or bus in a platoon” in Subdiv. (1), effective July 1, 2022.

See Sec. 14-111g re operator's retraining program.

See Sec. 14-260n for definition of “commercial vehicle combination”.

Cited. 148 C. 266; 150 C. 217. Request to charge statute must be made. 154 C. 381. Cited. 160 C. 128; 166 C. 152; 171 C. 303; 180 C. 415; 185 C. 483; 206 C. 608; 217 C. 73; 231 C. 930. Statute is directed against practice of “tailgating”. 234 C. 401. Cited. Id., 408.

Cited. 4 CA 451; 11 CA 122; 17 CA 209. Application of “following too closely” statute discussed; statute directed against practice of “tailgating”; legislature did not intend provisions of statute to apply in all rear-end collisions. 35 CA 464.

Cited. 29 CS 21; 39 CS 228.

Statute not limited to situations where car ahead is moving. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 487. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 107; 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 697.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 32 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1961–2022 · leading case: Wrinn v. State, 661 A.2d 1034 (Conn. 1995).
Wrinn v. State, 661 A.2d 1034 (Conn. 1995). · cites it 22× “The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury regarding General Statutes § 14-240, 1 which prohibits *403 vehicles from following too closely.”
Jacobs v. Goodspeed, 429 A.2d 915 (Conn. 1980). · cites it 10× “That is, it must be found to be negligence as a matter of law.”
Gosselin v. Perry, 348 A.2d 623 (Conn. 1974). · cites it 15× “It is undisputed that the defendant pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court to "follow[ing] another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of such vehicles, the traffic upon and the condition of the highway and weather conditions.”
Wrinn v. State, 646 A.2d 869 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994). · cites it 17× “1 The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied the plaintiffs motion to set aside the verdict, (2) refused to charge the jury on the applicability of General Statutes § 14-240, 2 and (3) excluded questions at voir dire concerning prospective jurors’…”
Colucci v. Pinette, 441 A.2d 574 (Conn. 1981). · cites it 7× “The plaintiffs’ claims of error are directed to the court’s instructions to the jury, particularly to the failure to give their requested charge number seven.”
Daley v. Kashmanian, 280 A.3d 68 (Conn. 2022). · cites it 5× “We agree with the plaintiff, however, and conclude that the defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity because the motor vehicle statutes providing the rules of the road imposed numerous ministerial duties that Kashmanian violated in his operation of the soft car.”
State v. Floyd, 584 A.2d 1157 (Conn. 1991). · cites it 2× “” The court also noted that a different constitutional balancing would be required if a peace officer commanded assistance in capturing a suspected felon.”
Elliott v. Larson, 840 A.2d 59 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 2× “she operated her vehicle at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable under the conditions in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a, she operated her vehicle with inadequate brakes in violation of General Statutes § 14-80h, she operated her vehicle too close to the rear of…”
O'BRIEN v. Cordova, 370 A.2d 933 (Conn. 1976). · cites it 2× “rez, while acting as Julio Cordova’s agent and within the scope of his authority, negligently operated Cordova’s motor vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed, failed to keep his vehicle under proper control, failed to maintain a proper lookout, failed to give a signal of his…”
State v. McKenna, 525 A.2d 1374 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987). · cites it 2× “The defendant was charged with manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle while intoxicated, a violation of General Statutes § 53a-56b (a), operating without insurance, a violation of General Statutes § 14-213b, and following too closely, a violation of General…”
Menon v. Frinton, 170 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Conn. 2001). · cites it 2× “He charged her with following too closely in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 14-240. See Defs.’ Stat.”
Lowell v. Daly, 169 A.2d 888 (Conn. 1961). · cites it 2× “They had filed a request to charge which in effect merely quoted the statute and stated that its violation would constitute negligence per se and that such negligence, if it was a proximate cause of the collision, would render the defendants liable. The charge requested was in…”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-240(a): 1 case
TISO v. Blumenthal, 371 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D. Conn. 2005).
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