(a) The provisions of section
14-267a shall not apply to any four-wheeled motor vehicle equipped with pneumatic tires which is engaged in construction work or in supplying or transporting materials or equipment for public or private construction projects and which is operating upon a highway or bridge within twenty-five miles of such construction project.
(b) No such motor vehicle may be operated upon any highway or bridge if its gross weight, including its load, exceeds forty thousand pounds.
(c) The gross vehicle weight and wheel base limitations of section 14-267a shall not apply to any four-axled motor vehicle equipped with pneumatic tires which is engaged in construction work or in supplying or transporting materials or equipment for public or private construction projects, provided the Commissioner of Transportation may restrict or prohibit by signs, legal notices or direct notice the highways or bridges which may be used by such vehicles.
(d) No such four-axled motor vehicle may be operated upon any highway or bridge if its gross weight, including its load, exceeds seventy-three thousand pounds.
(e) Any person who violates the provisions of subsection (b) or (d) of this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (f) of section 14-267a.
(f) The owner of any such vehicle operated over any highway or bridge in violation of any provision of this section or of section 13a-151 shall be liable for all damages which such highway or bridge may sustain as a result of such violation, and such damages may be recovered in an action at law by the authority in charge of the maintenance of such highway or bridge.
(g) The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may require a special registration and may issue special and distinguishing number plates for each motor vehicle which is subject to the provisions of this section.
(1953, S. 1377d; February, 1965, P.A. 574, S. 20; 1969, P.A. 446, S. 5; 1971, P.A. 546; P.A. 79-188, S. 7, 10; P.A. 80-71, S. 26, 30; Oct. Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-1, S. 2, 4.)
History: 1965 act corrected obsolete statutory reference in Subsec. (c); 1969 act deleted references to combinations of motor vehicle and trailer or semitrailer, making provision applicable instead to four-wheeled vehicles with pneumatic tires and replaced various limits in Subsec. (b) with single weight limit of 40,000 pounds; 1971 act inserted new Subsecs. (c) and (d) providing exception for vehicles used in construction work and placing absolute weight limit of 73,000 pounds and redesignated former Subsecs. (c) and (d) as (e) and (f); P.A. 79-188 replaced reference to repealed Sec. 14-268 with reference to Sec. 14-267a; P.A. 80-71 added reference to wheel base limitations in Subsec. (c) and replaced “four-or-more axled” vehicles with “four axled” vehicles in Subsecs. (c) and (d); Oct. Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-1 inserted new Subsec. (e) re penalty for violation of Subsec. (b) or (d), relettering former Subsec. (e) as Subsec. (f).
Cited. 22 CS 489.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
12
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 1991–2026 · leading case:
State v. Brooks, 446 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1994).
State v. Brooks, 446 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1994).
“C.G.S. § 14-269 (1993) (defining the misdemeanor of carrying a concealed weapon).”
State v. Hackett, 804 A.2d 225 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
· cites it 2× “…highway); General Statutes § 14-257 (public highway, other public place); General Statutes § 14-261 (public highway); General Statutes § 14-262 (highway, bridge); General Statutes § 14-264 (highway, bridge); General Statutes § 14-266 (state highway); General Statutes § 14-267a…”
State v. Mbacke, 721 S.E.2d 218 (N.C. 2012).
“C.G.S. § 14-269 (al) (2011). . I also disagree with the majority’s suggestion that the Fourth Amendment permits officers to search the passenger compartment of a defendant’s vehicle when the secured defendant has an air of “furtiveness” surrounding him.”
State v. Gaines, 421 S.E.2d 569 (N.C. 1992).
“Further, our legislature has mandated that an officer employed by a private security firm to act solely as a security guard is prohibited from wearing his official police uniform.”
State v. Hill, 741 S.E.2d 911 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
“Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of carrying a concealed weapon, because, he asserts, there was insufficient 'evidence that the weapon was “concealed about his person.”
State v. Mbacke, 703 S.E.2d 823 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 14-269(a1); however, our Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he criminal intent in such cases is the intent to carry the weapon concealed.”
State v. Lamb, 406 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
“C.G.S. § 14-269 (1986). He appealed to superior court where a jury found him guilty of carrying a concealed weapon.”
State v. Newborn, 864 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 3× “2(b); and carrying a concealed weapon in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-269(a). In a separate indictment, Defendant was charged with attaining habitual felon status as defined by N.”
State v. Newborn, 887 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 2023).
· cites it 3× “Sergeant Flowers asked defendant if there were other firearms in the vehicle, and defendant stated there were not.”
State v. Rowdy, 929 S.E.2d 324 (N.C. 2026).
· cites it 2× “He argued that, because illegal marijuana is indistinguishable from legal hemp without laboratory testing, “the sight or odor of Cannabis sativa does not indicate with any certainty that the defendant was engaged in, or about to engage in any illegal activity.”
State v. Newborn, 864 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 3× “2(b); and carrying a concealed weapon in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-269(a). In a separate indictment, Defendant was charged with attaining habitual felon status as defined by N.”
State v. Frisby, 692 S.E.2d 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
“C.G.S. § 14-269. In apt time, he moved to suppress all of the evidence which he contended was seized as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure by law enforcement officers.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-269(a): 4 cases
State v. Hill, 741 S.E.2d 911 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
“Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of carrying a concealed weapon, because, he asserts, there was insufficient 'evidence that the weapon was “concealed about his person.”
State v. Newborn, 864 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021).
“2(b); and carrying a concealed weapon in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-269(a). In a separate indictment, Defendant was charged with attaining habitual felon status as defined by N.”
State v. Newborn, 887 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 2023).
“Sergeant Flowers asked defendant if there were other firearms in the vehicle, and defendant stated there were not.”
State v. Newborn, 864 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021).
“2(b); and carrying a concealed weapon in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-269(a). In a separate indictment, Defendant was charged with attaining habitual felon status as defined by N.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-269(a1): 2 cases
State v. Mbacke, 703 S.E.2d 823 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
“C.G.S. § 14-269(a1); however, our Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he criminal intent in such cases is the intent to carry the weapon concealed.”
State v. Rowdy, 929 S.E.2d 324 (N.C. 2026).
“He argued that, because illegal marijuana is indistinguishable from legal hemp without laboratory testing, “the sight or odor of Cannabis sativa does not indicate with any certainty that the defendant was engaged in, or about to engage in any illegal activity.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-269(al): 1 case
State v. Mbacke, 703 S.E.2d 823 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
“C.G.S. § 14-269(a1); however, our Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he criminal intent in such cases is the intent to carry the weapon concealed.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-269(c): 1 case
State v. Rowdy, 929 S.E.2d 324 (N.C. 2026).
“He argued that, because illegal marijuana is indistinguishable from legal hemp without laboratory testing, “the sight or odor of Cannabis sativa does not indicate with any certainty that the defendant was engaged in, or about to engage in any illegal activity.”
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