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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 14 — Motor Vehicles. Use of the Highway By Vehicles. GasolineChapter 246 — Motor Vehicles

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-72 (2025)

Suspension, revocation or refusal to renew school license

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1986–2026 49citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 49 opinions since 1986, 6 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (22 cases).

The commissioner may suspend, revoke or refuse to renew any school license if: (a) The licensee has made a material false statement or concealed a material fact in connection with the application for a license or the renewal thereof; (b) the licensee has failed to comply with any of the provisions of this part or any of the regulations of the commissioner; (c) the licensee or any partner or officer of such licensee has been guilty of fraud or fraudulent practices in relation to the business conducted under the license, or guilty of inducing another person to resort to fraud or fraudulent practices in relation to securing for himself or another a license to drive a motor vehicle; (d) the licensee has failed to maintain satisfactory insurance to meet damage claims as required by section 14-70.

(1957, P.A. 507, S. 5.)

Cited. 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-72 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Gardner, 340 S.E.2d 701 (N.C. 1986).
cites § 14-72 6×subsections: (a) 2× (b)(2) 2×cited by 162 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72 provided, inter alia, that larceny committed pursuant to a burglary (N.”
The case’s holding
An appellate court must determine that a plain error tilted the scales of justice and caused the jury to reach a guilty verdict.
Later courts cite it for
“the double jeopardy clause protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and 446 (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” · 15 citing courts
2
YELLOWState v. Belton, 347 S.E.2d 755 (N.C. 1986).
cites § 14-72 4×subsections: (a) 2× (b) (b)(2)cited by 72 cases
Overruled by State v. Gaines on other grounds: 8 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72(a), property worth more than $400.”
The case’s holding
Ambiguous jury verdicts must be construed in favor of the defendant rather than assuming the jury adopted a theory favorable to the state.
Later courts cite it for
“cannot assume the jury adopted a theory favorable to the state; instead, we must construe the ambiguity in favor of defendant.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Tanner, 695 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. 2010).
cites § 14-72 4×subsections: (b)(2) 2× (b) (c)cited by 17 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
4
GREENState v. Brice, 806 S.E.2d 32 (N.C. 2017).
cites § 14-72 2×subsections: (b)(6) 2×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“If a person is convicted of more than one offense of misdemeanor larceny in a single session of district court, or in a single week of superior court or of a court in another jurisdiction, only one of the convictions may be used as a prior conviction under this subdivision;…”
The case’s holding
An indictment for felony habitual larceny is sufficient if it alleges all essential elements, including the specific prior convictions required to establish the offense.
Later courts cite it for
“couched in mandatory terms, that fact, standing alone, does not make them jurisdictional in nature.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Haymond, 691 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 14-72 4×subsections: (b)(2) 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72(b)(2). 08 CRS 1474 Felonious Possession of stolen property belong to William Pelón in violation of N.”
Later courts cite it for
“the state was required to prove that defendant committed the offenses himself.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Buckom, 401 S.E.2d 362 (N.C. 1991).
cites § 14-72 4×subsections: (a) (b)(1)cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72, however, the legislature declared inter alia that the larceny of goods of a value of not more than $400.”
The case’s holding
Larceny from the person occurs when property is under a person's protection at the time of the taking, even if the property is not physically attached to them.
Later courts cite it for
“as none of our statutes define the phrase 'from the person' as it relates to larceny, the common law definition controls.” · 2 citing courts
7
REDState v. Roy, 643 A.2d 289 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
cites § 14-72 4×cited by 16 cases
Reversed by State v. Roy (1995): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 14-72
“(North Carolina General Statutes § 14-72 (b) (4), theft of a firearm, and North Carolina General Statutes § 14-72, larceny, not separate offenses because firearm statute does not require operability.”
8
GREENState v. Reid, 434 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 1993).
cites § 14-72 2×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“§ 14-72, larceny requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "(1) took the property of another; (2) carried it away; (3) without the owner's consent; and (4) with the intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently." State v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 233 ,…”
The case’s holding
A direct reference to a defendant's failure to testify during closing arguments and the refusal to give a curative instruction require a new trial.
Later courts cite it for
“the prosecution may comment on a defendant's failure to produce witnesses or exculpatory evidence to contradict or refute evidence presented by the state.” · 5 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Owens, 586 S.E.2d 519 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 14-72 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“Ammons testified that he and defendant had agreed to break into the Economy Food store to steal cigarettes and that he had seen defendant, who was equipped with a large white bag, break the glass door of the store and enter the building.”
Later courts cite it for
“to convict a defendant of felonious larceny, it must be shown that he: (1) took the property of another, (2) with a value of more than 1,000.00, (3) carried it away, (4) without the owner's consent, and (5) with the intent to deprive the owner of the property permanently.” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Adams, 416 S.E.2d 380 (N.C. 1992).
cites § 14-72 2×subsections: (b)(2) (b)(4)cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. §§ 14-72(b)(2) and 14-54. As noted by then-judge (now Justice) Whichard, “[a] single larceny offense is committed when, as part of one continuous act or transaction, a perpetrator steals several items at the same time and place.”
The case’s holding
A single larceny offense is committed when a perpetrator steals multiple items during one continuous transaction.
Later courts cite it for
“defendant was improperly convicted and sentenced for both larceny of a firearm and felonious larceny of that same firearm pursuant to a breaking or entering.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENState v. West, 638 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 14-72 2×subsections: (a) (b)(4)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72(a). Defendant argues that the two felony larceny charges were all part of the same transaction and therefore constituted a single offense.”
The case’s holding
Joined convictions should not be used to calculate a defendant's prior record level under the Structured Sentencing Act.
Later courts cite it for
“nothing within the sentencing act specifically addresses the effect of joined charges when calculating previous convictions to arrive at prior record levels, . . . the assessment of a defendant's prior record level using joined convictions would be unjust and in contravention of the intent of the general assembly.” · 8 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Morris, 350 S.E.2d 91 (N.C. 1986).
cites § 14-72 4×subsections: (a) 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72(a) (1986). Finding one factor in aggravation, the trial judge sentenced defendant to a term of four years and recommended work release.”
13
GREENState v. Bacon, 803 S.E.2d 402 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 14-72 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“[and] two gold earrings, the personal property of April Faison, such property having a value of $1,210.”
14
GREENState v. White, 369 S.E.2d 813 (N.C. 1988).
cites § 14-72 1×subsections: (a)cited by 114 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72(a), while the value of the property stolen is not an element of armed robbery.”
The case’s holding
Larceny is a lesser included offense of armed robbery.
Later courts cite it for
“to convict of larceny, there must be proof that defendant (a) took the property of another; (b) carried it away; (c) without the owner's consent; and (d) with the intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENUnited States v. Glynn Bowden, 975 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1992).
cites § 14-72 1×cited by 74 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72, for conduct that occurred on December 3, 1985.”
The case’s holding
A state conviction for breaking or entering qualifies as a generic burglary if the statute requires unlawful entry into a structure with intent to commit a crime.
Later courts cite it for
“a crime consisting of three necessary elements: 1) an unlawful or unprivileged entry or remaining in; 2) a building or other structure; 3) with intent to commit a crime.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Hargett, 577 S.E.2d 703 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 14-72 1×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72] suggests that to charge a person with a separate offense for each firearm stolen in a single criminal incident was intended.”
The case’s holding
An error occurring during sentencing does not constitute an error at trial for the purposes of appellate preservation.
Later courts cite it for
“our supreme court has held that an error at sentencing is not considered an error at trial for the purpose of n.c. rule 10(b)(1) of the north carolina rules of appellate procedure.” · 2 citing courts
17
YELLOWState v. Holland, 350 S.E.2d 56 (N.C. 1986).
cites § 14-72 2×cited by 16 cases
Overruled by State v. Childress on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72 (1981). Defendant's plea of not guilty placed every essential element of the charge in issue, including the automobile's value.”
The case’s holding
The state must prove the corpus delicti by establishing that the victim possessed the stolen property and that the defendant took it from the victim.
Later courts cite it for
“vacated the defendant's conviction for felonious possession of stolen property . . . and remanded . . . for entry of a judgment of guilty of misdemeanor possession of stolen property, and for re-sentencing accordingly.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Key, 636 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 14-72 1×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72[,]” and “does not require the taking and carrying away of the owner’s property.”
The case’s holding
A state theft statute is substantially similar to another if both follow common-law definitions of theft, taking, and asportation (State v. Key).
Later courts cite it for
“avoid absurd or bizarre consequences.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENState v. Pickard, 547 S.E.2d 102 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 14-72 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72. Larceny from the person forms a middle ground in the common law between the ‘private’ stealing most commonly associated with larceny, and the taking by force and violence commonly associated with robbery.”
Later courts cite it for
“the doctrine of recent possession allows the jury to infer that the possessor of certain stolen property is guilty of larceny.” · 3 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Sherrod, 663 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 14-72 1×subsections: (b)(3)cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 14-72
“C.G.S. § 14-72(b)(3). 4 . “ '[EJxplosive or incendiary device’ means (i) dynamite and all other forms of high explosives, (ii) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar device, and (iii) any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb, or similar device].”
Later courts cite it for
“fairly susceptible of two or more meanings.” · 6 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198620062026

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 1986. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
N.C. Ct. App.29N.C.184th Cir.1Conn. App. Ct.1
By subsection
(a)22 cases
State v. Gardner, 340 S.E.2d 701 (N.C. 1986).“C.G.S. § 14-72 provided, inter alia, that larceny committed pursuant to a burglary (N.”
State v. Belton, 347 S.E.2d 755 (N.C. 1986).“C.G.S. § 14-72(a), property worth more than $400.”
State v. Owens, 586 S.E.2d 519 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).“Ammons testified that he and defendant had agreed to break into the Economy Food store to steal cigarettes and that he had seen defendant, who was equipped with a large white bag, break the glass door of the store and enter the building.”
State v. Morris, 350 S.E.2d 91 (N.C. 1986).“C.G.S. § 14-72(a) (1986). Finding one factor in aggravation, the trial judge sentenced defendant to a term of four years and recommended work release.”
State v. Bacon, 803 S.E.2d 402 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).“[and] two gold earrings, the personal property of April Faison, such property having a value of $1,210.”
Showing the top 5 of 22. More in the list view →
(b)2 cases
State v. Belton, 347 S.E.2d 755 (N.C. 1986).
State v. Tanner, 695 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. 2010).
(b)(1)1 case
State v. Buckom, 401 S.E.2d 362 (N.C. 1991).“C.G.S. § 14-72, however, the legislature declared inter alia that the larceny of goods of a value of not more than $400.”
(b)(2)11 cases
State v. Haymond, 691 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).“C.G.S. § 14-72(b)(2). 08 CRS 1474 Felonious Possession of stolen property belong to William Pelón in violation of N.”
State v. Gardner, 340 S.E.2d 701 (N.C. 1986).
State v. Tanner, 695 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. 2010).
State v. Belton, 347 S.E.2d 755 (N.C. 1986).
State v. Adams, 416 S.E.2d 380 (N.C. 1992).“C.G.S. §§ 14-72(b)(2) and 14-54. As noted by then-judge (now Justice) Whichard, “[a] single larceny offense is committed when, as part of one continuous act or transaction, a perpetrator steals several items at the same time and place.”
Showing the top 5 of 11. More in the list view →
(b)(3)1 case
State v. Sherrod, 663 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).“C.G.S. § 14-72(b)(3). 4 . “ '[EJxplosive or incendiary device’ means (i) dynamite and all other forms of high explosives, (ii) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar device, and (iii) any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb, or similar device].”
(b)(4)2 cases
State v. Adams, 416 S.E.2d 380 (N.C. 1992).
State v. West, 638 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).“C.G.S. § 14-72(a). Defendant argues that the two felony larceny charges were all part of the same transaction and therefore constituted a single offense.”
(b)(6)1 case
State v. Brice, 806 S.E.2d 32 (N.C. 2017).“If a person is convicted of more than one offense of misdemeanor larceny in a single session of district court, or in a single week of superior court or of a court in another jurisdiction, only one of the convictions may be used as a prior conviction under this subdivision;…”
(c)2 cases
State v. Tanner, 695 S.E.2d 97 (N.C. 2010).
State v. Liles, 379 S.E.2d 821 (N.C. 1989).

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Enactment and amendments

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Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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