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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 27 — Armed Forces and VeteransChapter 504 — Militia

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 27-2 (2025)

Classes of militia

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1966–2016 31citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 31 opinions since 1966.

The militia shall be divided into four classes as follows: The unorganized militia, the organized militia, the National Guard and the naval militia. The National Guard for the purposes of this chapter shall consist of the National Guard and the Air National Guard. The unorganized militia shall consist of all male citizens and all male residents of the state who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, not exempt from military duty by federal or state laws or by such reasons of physical or mental disabilities as shall be prescribed in general orders or regulations published by the Adjutant General and approved by the Governor and who are not members of the organized militia or of the National Guard or of the naval militia, and all female citizens and all female residents of the state who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, who may voluntarily offer their services to the state. The organized militia shall consist of the Governor's Guards, the State Guard and such other military forces as may be designated by the Governor as commander-in-chief, which may hereafter be organized under the provisions of the laws of this state. The National Guard shall consist of such forces as may be organized and maintained by this state pursuant to the laws and regulations of the United States relating to the National Guard. The naval militia shall consist of such persons as may enlist or be appointed or commissioned therein as a special force for coast protection and as a naval reserve and shall be organized and maintained by this state pursuant to the laws and regulations of the United States relating to the naval militia and may include a marine corps branch of the naval militia subordinate thereto in all matters pertaining to command, discipline or administration. The organized militia, the National Guard, the naval militia and marine corps branch of the naval militia, whenever organized, shall be, for all purposes under the general statutes, the armed forces of the state.

(1949 Rev., S. 1225; 1951, S. 848d; 1957, P.A. 365, S. 2.)

State guard is part of the militia of the state and the provisions of chapter apply to it. 12 CS 21.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 27-2 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Lutters, 853 A.2d 434 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 27-2 4×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“apply to the carrying of any pistol or revolver by any parole officer or peace officer of this state, or parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
The case’s holding
The rule of lenity applies only when reasonable doubt persists regarding a statute's scope after considering its language, structure, legislative history, and motivating policies.
Later courts cite it for
“courts do not apply the rule of lenity unless a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the language and structure , legislative history , and motivating policies of the statute .” · 3 citing courts
2
YELLOWState v. Tinsley, 435 A.2d 1002 (Conn. 1980).
cites § 27-2 2×cited by 52 cases
Overruled by State v. Pinnock on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 1 says overruled outright.
Where it cites § 27-2
“The provisions of this section shall not apply to the carrying of any pistol or revolver by any marshal, sheriff, parole officer or peace officer, or to any member of the armed forces of the United States, as defined by section 27-103, or of this state, as defined by section…”
The case’s holding
The state bears the burden of proving the absence of statutory exceptions in a prosecution for carrying a pistol without a permit.
3
GREENState v. Delossantos, 559 A.2d 164 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 100 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“The provisions of this section shall not apply to the carrying of any pistol or revolver by any marshal, sheriff, parole officer or peace officer, or to any member of the armed forces of the United States, as defined by section 27-103, or of this state, as defined by section…”
The case’s holding
The state constitution recognizes an exception to the warrant requirement for searches conducted incident to a lawful arrest (State v. Delossantos).
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant claiming discriminatory prosecution must show (1) that others similarly situated have generally not been prosecuted and that he has been singled out and (2) that he is the victim of invidious discrimination based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or the exercise of a constitutionally protective right.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Vickers, 796 A.2d 502 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
The case’s holding
The statutory exception for a place of business applies only to individuals with a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises and does not extend to mere employees.
Later courts cite it for
“the purpose of the statute has remained consistent: to legislate the prohibition of unregistered handguns in the public sphere.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENState v. Bailey, 551 A.2d 1206 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 85 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
The case’s holding
A jury instruction requiring unanimity on alternative acts is necessary only if the acts are conceptually distinct and the state presents supporting evidence for each.
Later courts cite it for
“where a trial court charges a jury that the commission of any one of several alternative acts would subject a defendant to criminal liability, a unanimity charge on a specific act is required only if two conditions are met: (1) the alternative acts are conceptually distinct from each other; and (2) the state has presented supporting evidence on each alternative act.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Jones, 662 A.2d 1199 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
The case’s holding
Trial proceedings in capital felony cases must be bifurcated when a prior conviction is used solely to enhance the penalty to death to prevent undue prejudice.
Later courts cite it for
“that which the law allows and even encourages.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENState v. Negron, 603 A.2d 1138 (Conn. 1992).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 73 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
The case’s holding
A witness may not be impeached by contradicting testimony regarding collateral matters that are not directly relevant and material to the merits of the case.
Later courts cite it for
“a witness may not be impeached by contradicting his or her testimony as to collateral matters, that is, matters that are not directly relevant and material to the merits of the case.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Mejia, 658 A.2d 571 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
The case’s holding
A jury may reasonably infer an intent to kill from the type of weapon used, the manner of its use, and the circumstances surrounding the shooting.
9
GREENState v. McIntyre, 699 A.2d 911 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
The case’s holding
The admission of irrelevant or impermissible hearsay statements does not constitute a constitutional error.
Later courts cite it for
“merely placing a constitutional tag on a nonconstitutional claim does not make it so.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Guess, 715 A.2d 643 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
The case’s holding
A rule is not inconsistent with the Penal Code and may be adopted under the saving clause if it does not conflict with statutory provisions (State v. Guess).
Later courts cite it for
“we have searched unsuccessfully for evidence that the legislature intended to render immutable the criteria by which to determine death. in the absence of any such indication, we are loath to limit the criteria to a fixed point in the past.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Dudla, 458 A.2d 682 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“The provisions of this section shall not apply to the carrying of any pistol or revolver by any marshal, sheriff, parole officer or peace officer, or to any member of the armed forces of the United States, as defined by section 27-103, or of this state, as defined by section…”
The case’s holding
The constitutional requirement to instruct juries that no inference may be drawn from a defendant's silence applies retroactively to all convictions not yet final when the rule was announced.
Later courts cite it for
“free to reject even uncontradicted testimony, if they do not find it credible.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Guess, 692 A.2d 849 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“ny pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any *792 other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
The case’s holding
The removal of life support systems from a brain-dead patient does not constitute an intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation for a defendant's prior actions.
Later courts cite it for
“the removal of those systems is not an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation that started with the defendant's act.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Jones, 718 A.2d 470 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
The case’s holding
Under the state due process standard, loss of evidence violates due process only after weighing materiality, likelihood of misinterpretation, reason for unavailability, and prejudice, not bad faith alone.
14
GREENState v. Scarpiello, 670 A.2d 856 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
15
GREENState v. Billie, 738 A.2d 586 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
16
GREENState v. Keiser, 491 A.2d 382 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“ny pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of the…”
17
GREENState v. Beall, 769 A.2d 708 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
18
GREENState v. Ryan, 709 A.2d 21 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“ting or in any other manner, he advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits the unlawful burning, injury to or destruction of any public or private property or advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits any assault upon any organization of…”
Later courts cite it for
“this conclusion is buttressed by applying another principle of statutory construction. when the language used within a statute is doubtful in meaning, the true meaning may be ascertained by considering it in the light of all of its provisions . . . as well as its title. . . .” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Sober, 347 A.2d 61 (Conn. 1974).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“rinting or in any other manner, advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits the unlawful burning, injury to or destruction of any public or private property or advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits any assault upon any organization of…”
The case’s holding
Special policemen appointed by the state police commissioner to state buildings possess the full powers of state police and are entitled to statutory protections against assault.
20
GREENState v. Abdalaziz, 696 A.2d 1310 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
cites § 27-2 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 27-2
“of any pistol or revolver by any sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of this state, or sheriff, parole officer or peace officer of any other state while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, or federal marshal or federal law enforcement agent, or to any member of…”
Later courts cite it for
“the majority view is that imperfect self-defense applies to murder and homicide charges.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196619912016

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1995. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.17Conn. App. Ct.11D. Conn.2Conn. Super. Ct.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Show all 31 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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