Every order, judgment or decree of a court of probate made by a judge who is disqualified shall be valid unless an appeal is taken as hereinafter specified. All orders, judgments and decrees of courts of probate, rendered after notice and from which no appeal is taken, shall be conclusive and shall be entitled to full faith, credit and validity and shall not be subject to collateral attack, except for fraud.
(1949 Rev., S. 6817; P.A. 80-476, S. 11.)
History: P.A. 80-476 made technical corrections for consistency; Sec. 45-9 transferred to Sec. 45a-24 in 1991.
Annotations to former section 45-9:
Generally as to collateral attack. 2 C. 388; 26 C. 273; 39 C. 523; 45 C. 196; 48 C. 165; 50 C. 330; 59 C. 361; 62 C. 221; 63 C. 338; 66 C. 140; 67 C. 7; Id., 184; 69 C. 78; 70 C. 378; 75 C. 308; 86 C 470. Order by disqualified judge unappealed from held valid. 39 C. 257. Effect of fraud on provision. 66 C. 140; 91 C. 521. Court cannot ordinarily revoke its own decrees. 76 C. 420; 81 C. 688. Failure to conform to law in preliminary matter may not be ground to set aside decree. Id., 681; 86 C. 281. Foreign judgment of Probate Court entitled to full credit. 81 C. 686. Where an estate is administered as intestate because of mistaken belief that there was no will, equity can enjoin any use of probate decrees to hamper or defeat proceedings to secure probate of will later discovered. 135 C. 489. Action in equity to set aside a decree admitting a will to probate held a direct attack and not within prohibition of section. 146 C. 188. Cited. 152 C. 530, 532; 153 C. 545; Id., 603; 165 C. 478, 487. Fraudulent assertion of death concerned jurisdictional fact, and decree was subject to collateral attack and to being declared null and void, but a void decree may form basis for adverse possession. 171 C. 149.
Cited. 22 CA 490; 23 CA 174.
Where estate was administered and distributed as intestate and will was discovered 4 years later, court permitted proceedings in probate though there was no fraud. 15 CS 316. Where tax commissioner appealed Probate Court decree holding 2 of 3 antemortem transfers by decedent nontaxable, executor who had failed to appeal finding of third transfer as taxable could not raise the issue by affirmative claim in his answer and plea in abatement was granted on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. 28 CS 210.
Annotations to present section:
Counterclaim was essentially an appeal from Probate Court decree and coexecutor's separate application for authorization to sell real property was a pleading filed in furtherance of their claim on appeal; Superior Court was sitting as a Probate Court in a probate appeal; Superior Court's adjudication of application did not violate section. 152 CA 282; judgment reversed in part, see 320 C. 103. Section provides only for collateral attacks and has no provision permitting direct attacks on probate decrees, therefore, in order for Superior Court to possess jurisdiction, a plaintiff would need to institute a separate action collaterally attacking the probate decree admitting the will and invoke the court's equitable jurisdiction by alleging fraud or other equitable grounds. 197 CA 373.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
21
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 2001–2025 · leading case:
Gaynor v. Payne, 804 A.2d 170 (Conn. 2002).
Gaynor v. Payne, 804 A.2d 170 (Conn. 2002).
· cites it 4× “See General Statutes § 45a-24; 6 Reiley v. Healey, 122 Conn.”
Barash v. Lembo, 303 A.3d 577 (Conn. 2023).
· cites it 4× “9 General Statutes § 45a-24 provides in relevant part: ‘‘All orders, judgments and decrees of courts of probate, rendered after notice and from which no appeal is taken, shall be conclusive and shall be entitled to full faith, credit and validity and shall not be subject to…”
Heussner v. Day, Berry & Howard, LLP, 893 A.2d 486 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
· cites it 4× “In its oral decision granting the motion, the court incorporated the findings and decree of the Probate Court, and concluded that the plaintiffs claims were precluded by the provisions of General Statutes § 45a-24 2 because no appeal had been filed by the plaintiff from that…”
Lundborg v. Lawler, 776 A.2d 519 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
· cites it 4× “II The plaintiffs claim of fraud, as argued in this court, relies heavily on General Statutes § 45a-24, 7 a statute that the trial court did not address in its memorandum of decision.”
Connery v. Gieske, 147 A.3d 94 (Conn. 2016).
· cites it 2× “See General Statutes § 45a-24 ("[a]ll orders, judgments and decrees of courts of probate, rendered after notice and from which no appeal is taken, shall be conclusive and shall be entitled to full faith, credit and validity and shall not be subject to collateral attack, except…”
Schiavone v. Snyder, 812 A.2d 26 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
· cites it 4× “General Statutes § 45a-24 precludes a collateral attack on any order, judgment or decree of a Probate Court “from which no appeal is taken .”
Ferris v. Faford, 890 A.2d 602 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
· cites it 4× “2d 106 (1996); see also General Statutes § 45a-24. Only in exceptional circumstances, such as fraud, mistake or a like equitable ground, may a court consider an equitable attack on a probate order or decree.”
Silverstein v. Laschever, 970 A.2d 123 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 2× “Although it appears that the administrator did not comply with the order of the Probate Court, and withheld distribution of the property, this does not change the fact that distribution of the Columbia property clearly was ordered by the Probate Court in 1994.”
Feehan v. Marcone, 204 A.3d 666 (Conn. 2019).
“As a result, the plaintiff's complaint is legally insufficient, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the plaintiff could amend his complaint to allege a viable claim for relief under [General Statutes] § 45a-24."); Mercer v. Rodriquez , 83 Conn.”
Patterson v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 936 A.2d 241 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
· cites it 2× “” General Statutes § 45a-24. Because the Probate Court determined that the fiduciary complied with his obligations and terminated the bonds, res judicata acts as a bar to further litigation absent a timely appeal, which, in the present case, was not filed by the plaintiff.”
Solon v. Slater, 253 A.3d 503 (Conn. App. Ct. 2021).
· cites it 2× “The Probate Court decree, therefore, is a final judgment for the purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”
In re Prob. Appeal of Buckingham, 231 A.3d 1261 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020).
· cites it 11× “Specifically, they contend that they sufficiently pleaded their claims of fraud, and, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-24,1 the Superior Court has jurisdiction to set aside prior probate decrees without any applicable statutory time limitation ‘‘when the claim involves fraud,…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.