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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 46b — Family LawChapter 815t — Juvenile Matters

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-135 (2025)

(Formerly Sec. 51-316). Right to counsel and cross-examination

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1983–2024 27citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 27 opinions since 1983, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (1 case).

(a) At the commencement of any proceeding concerning the alleged delinquency of a child, the child shall have the right to counsel and be so informed by the judge, and that if the child and the parent or parents or guardian of the child are unable to afford counsel, counsel will be provided for the child. Such counsel and the child shall have the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. If a parent fails to comply with a court order entered in the best interests of the alleged or adjudicated delinquent child and is facing potential imprisonment for contempt of court, such parent, if unable to afford counsel, shall be entitled to have counsel provided for such parent pursuant to this subsection.

(b) At the commencement of any proceeding on behalf of a neglected, uncared-for or abused child or youth, the parent or parents or guardian of the child or youth shall have the right to counsel, and shall be so informed by the judge, and that if they are unable to afford counsel, counsel will be provided for them. Such parent or guardian of the child or youth shall have the rights of confrontation and cross-examination.

(1967, P.A. 630, S. 8; 1969, P.A. 794, S. 11, 12; P.A. 75-602, S. 5, 13; P.A. 76-436, S. 23, 681; P.A. 95-225, S. 19; P.A. 07-159, S. 6; P.A. 11-240, S. 9.)

History: 1969 act deleted references to persons, other than parent or guardian, “having control of the child” and required that judge inform parent, guardian and child of their right to counsel and their right to have counsel provided if they cannot afford counsel themselves, both in Subsec. (a) and in new Subsec. (b); P.A. 75-602 added references to youths in Subsec. (b); P.A. 76-436 deleted references to juvenile court, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 17-66b temporarily renumbered as Sec. 51-316 and ultimately transferred to Sec. 46b-135 in 1979; P.A. 95-225 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “proceeding on behalf of a delinquent child” with “proceeding concerning the alleged delinquency of a child” and make technical changes; P.A. 07-159 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that parent who fails to comply with a court order and is facing imprisonment for contempt is entitled to counsel pursuant to subsection and to make conforming changes and amended Subsec. (b) to delete “and such counsel” re rights of confrontation and cross-examination and to make technical changes, effective July 1, 2007; P.A. 11-240 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “dependent” with “abused”, effective July 1, 2011.

Annotation to former section 17-66b:

Cited. 158 C. 439.

Annotations to present section:

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 195 C. 303; 207 C. 725; 211 C. 289.

Juvenile is entitled to counsel at both adjudicatory and dispositive phases. 39 CS 400.

Subsec. (b):

Subsec. does not indicate an intent to disturb the rules of evidence governing admission of hearsay statements. 296 C. 524.

Cited. 23 CA 207; Id., 410; 25 CA 536; 42 CA 664. In parental rights termination case, trial court did not violate respondent's right of confrontation under Subsec. by deciding not to question child in camera where trial court found that child's testimony was not necessary based on all the evidence in case and that requiring child to testify would victimize her. 49 CA 763. Parent's right to confrontation and cross-examination not violated by admission of the children's statements under the residual exception to the hearsay rule because, although available, the children would be harmed if called to testify. 111 CA 28; judgment affirmed, see 296 C. 524. In action for termination of parental rights, the court did not deny respondent her procedural due process rights when conducting a trial on the merits with only her counsel present as the court still required petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence not only the grounds for termination, but that it was in the child's best interest for respondent's parental rights to be terminated. Id., 210. Although provision supports father's argument that he was a legally necessary party with right of confrontation, it does not require that the court or petitioner repeatedly attempt to locate a properly served, nonappearing, defaulted respondent throughout a hearing nor require that a new trial be ordered when a nonappearing, defaulted respondent is incarcerated after the beginning of a hearing, makes no attempt to contact the court and is later located by the petitioner. 117 CA 521.

Cited. 41 CS 145.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-135 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENIn re Samantha C., 847 A.2d 883 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 46b-135 8×cited by 101 cases
The case’s holding
A trial court must provide prior notice before drawing an adverse inference from a parent's failure to testify in a termination of parental rights proceeding.
Later courts cite it for
“reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENIn re Tayler F., 995 A.2d 611 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 46b-135 10×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“The respondent appealed from the trial court’s judgments to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had admitted: (1) Mantell’s testimony regarding whether the children should testify in court, for lack of notice; (2) hearsay evidence of the children’s…”
The case’s holding
A trial court may deem a child unavailable if competent evidence shows testifying would cause psychological harm specific to the child and the circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“we conclude that a trial court properly may conclude that a child is unavailable if there is competent evidence that the child will suffer psychological harm from testifying.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENIn re Ralph M., 559 A.2d 179 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 46b-135 9×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“The only purpose of the transfer proceeding is to determine the proper forum for adjudication. Nowhere in the legislative history is there any indication that § 46b-135 (a) was to apply to a hearing in which there had not been and will not be an adjudication of delinquency.”
The case’s holding
A transfer hearing is not a juvenile proceeding and does not require the suppression of statements allegedly obtained in violation of juvenile statutes (In re Ralph M.).
Later courts cite it for
“statutory and constitutional questions concerning the admissibility of a juvenile's statements raised by the state, while relevant at a later adjudicatory proceeding, are not appropriate for resolution at a transfer i.e., bindover hearing” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENIn re Tayler F., 958 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 46b-135 10×subsections: (b)cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“2d 177 (2004), and General Statutes § 46b-135 (b) to the hearsay statements of the children.”
Later courts cite it for
“did the appellate court correctly conclude that the trial court properly admitted statements under the residual exception to the hearsay rule?” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENIn re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 46b-135 7×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“II Any child in Connecticut is guaranteed the right to assistance of counsel in the defense of a delinquency petition by virtue of General Statutes § 46b-135 (a), 4 which provides that, “[a]t the commencement of any proceeding” involving his or her delinquency, a child “shall…”
The case’s holding
Evidence must be sufficient to prove a juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived the right to counsel (finding insufficient evidence that a fifteen-year-old waived his right to counsel).
Later courts cite it for
“a valid waiver is defined . . . as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENIn re Noel M., 580 A.2d 996 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990).
cites § 46b-135 6×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“*420 Ill The respondent next claims that her constitutional rights to confrontation and to cross-examination and her statutory right to cross-examination provided by General Statutes § 46b-135 (b) 3 were violated by the procedure employed by the court in questioning the child.”
The case’s holding
Sixth Amendment confrontation rights do not extend to parental neglect hearings involving in-chambers examinations of witnesses.
7
GREENIn re Lauren R., 715 A.2d 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 46b-135 6×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“V The respondent’s final claim is that the trial court improperly refused to allow her to call Lauren as a witness, thereby violating her statutory right of confrontation under General Statutes § 46b-135 (b).”
8
GREENIn re Ceana R., 172 A.3d 870 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 46b-135 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“shall have the right to counsel, and shall be so informed by the judge, and that if they are unable to afford counsel, counsel will be provided for them.”
9
GREENIn re Jonathan P., 579 A.2d 587 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990).
cites § 46b-135 4×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“General Statutes § 46b-135 (b). 9 The trial court in the present case did not follow the mandates of our statutes and rules of practice when it commenced the termination proceeding in the absence of the respondent and his counsel.”
The case’s holding
A court may not begin a parental termination hearing without a legally necessary parent and his counsel present; doing so violates statutory rights and due process.
10
GREENIn re Jan Carlos D., 997 A.2d 471 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 46b-135 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“Many of the rights afforded adults at the commencement of criminal proceedings are specifically afforded to juveniles.”
Later courts cite it for
“a statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENIn re Brandon W., 747 A.2d 526 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
cites § 46b-135 4×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“Ill The respondent next claims that the trial court improperly refused to allow her to call her children as witnesses, thereby violating the right to confrontation afforded her under the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions and General Statutes § 46b-135…”
12
GREENIn re Wayne A., 595 A.2d 373 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
cites § 46b-135 6×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“We conclude that the actions of the trial court were proper.”
13
GREENIn re Adelina G., 740 A.2d 920 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
cites § 46b-135 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“On appeal, the respondent claims that (1) her due process and equal protection rights have been infringed by the department of children and families’ (department) rescission of its promise of long-term foster care to Adelina and (2) the trial court improperly denied her motion…”
14
GREENIn re David L., 733 A.2d 897 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
cites § 46b-135 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“The statutes and rules of practice, however, do not afford a parent in a neglect proceeding the right to require the trial court to adjudge each parent’s blameworthiness for a child’s neglect.”
Later courts cite it for
“a finding that the child is neglected is different from finding who is responsible for the child's condition of neglect” · 1 citing court
15
GREENSmall v. State, 920 A.2d 1024 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 46b-135 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
““Among those who have a statutory right to counsel in civil cases are petitioners in habeas corpus proceedings arising from criminal matters, General Statutes § 51-296 (a); litigants in termination of parental rights cases, General Statutes § 45a-717 (b), and proceedings on…”
Later courts cite it for
“the petitioner is neither statutorily nor constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel” · 1 citing court
16
GREENIn re Zowie N., 41 A.3d 1056 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
cites § 46b-135 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“to 2009) § 46b-135 (b) was not cited by the parties, we also note that § 46b-135 (b) provides: “At the commencement of any proceeding on behalf of a neglected, uncared-for or dependent child or youth, the parent or parents or guardian of the child or youth shall have the right…”
17
GREENIn re Juv. Appeal (85-AB), 488 A.2d 778 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 46b-135 1×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“The trial court did not have the benefit of the subsequent legislative history concerning a proposal in 1983 to substitute the word “proceeding” for the word “hearing” in § 46b-126.”
The case’s holding
An interlocutory order is appealable only if it terminates a separate and distinct proceeding or concludes the rights of the parties such that further proceedings cannot affect them.
Later courts cite it for
“that further proceedings cannot affect them.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Guitard, 765 A.2d 30 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 46b-135 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“ans (1) a person who is formally charged with tile commission of a crime punishable by imprisonment and who does not have the financial ability at the time of his request for representation to secure competent legal representation and to provide other necessary expenses of legal…”
Later courts cite it for
“to convict a defendant of risk of injury to a child, a court must find that the defendant acted wilfully and that he either intended the resulting injury to the victim, or he knew that the injury would occur, or that his conduct was of such a character that it demonstrated a reckless disregard of the consequences.” · 2 citing courts
19
REDGipson v. Comm'r of Corr., 735 A.2d 847 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
cites § 46b-135 1×cited by 11 cases
Reversed by Gipson v. Commissioner of Correction (2001): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 46b-135
“eans (1) a person who is formally charged with the commission of a crime punishable by imprisonment and who does not have the financial ability at the time of his request for representation to secure competent legal representation and to provide other necessary expenses of legal…”
20
NEUTRALIn re Soncheray H., 680 A.2d 1363 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
cites § 46b-135 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 46b-135
“Also as to this first claim, the respondent asserts that the trial court’s acceptance of the brief violated her statutory rights to confrontation and due process under General Statutes § 46b-135 (b). 3 The respondent’s second claim is that the trial court had before it…”

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Citing cases by year
198320032024

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1999. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.18Conn.7Conn. Super. Ct.2
By subsection
(b)1 case
In re Tayler F., 958 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).“2d 177 (2004), and General Statutes § 46b-135 (b) to the hearsay statements of the children.”

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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