Any conveyance or lease, for any term, of any building, land or tenement, of which the grantor or lessor is ousted by the entry and possession of another, unless made to the person in actual possession, shall be void.
(1949 Rev., S. 7105.)
Section does not extend to the state. K. 221. Conveyance prohibited by statute is void. 1 R. 100; Id., 199; Id., 402; 2 D. 151. Possession of mortgagee not adverse. 2 R. 499. What evidence is admissible. Id., 121. Reconveyance of mortgage to mortgagor, both out of possession, not within statute; whether conveyance of incorporeal hereditament falls within statute. 4 D. 234. Mortgage not an alienation so as to make the parties liable. 4 C. 421. When a deed releasing title by execution is void under statute. Id., 575. Landlord is not ousted by possession of tenant; grantee of corporation may be liable. 9 C. 421. Conveyance may be void in part and valid in part under statute. 13 C. 75; 14 C. 104; 109 C. 693. Owner of the soil of a highway may be disseized thereof, subject to the public easement. 19 C. 182. Quitclaim deed is such an alienation. Id., 471; 20 C. 262. Actual possession by any one as owner is sufficient ouster of another. Id. Receipt of rents and profits of land insufficient to prove an ouster of the holder of the legal title. 36 C. 345. Tenant of land under agreement to purchase may, after performing his contract, deny title of vendor, and thereafter his holding will be adverse. 38 C. 262. Quitclaim by ousted mortgagee to third party conveys an equitable, but no legal, title. 40 C. 90. A conveyance by an ousted grantor, made to a party to whom grantor, before ouster, had contracted to convey it, is not within statute. 50 C. 46. Ouster which will render grantor's deed void under section is the same which is required to establish adverse possession. 69 C. 28; 71 C. 574; 74 C. 523; 81 C. 133; 102 C. 56; 103 C. 335; 104 C. 288; 112 C. 6; Id., 125. Existence of way not an ouster; 69 C. 163; nor is building jutting over land; 75 C. 662; 87 C. 31; nor is possession of life tenant ouster of remainderman; 76 C. 594; 77 C. 407. Effect of ouster. 81 C. 551. Grantor, or grantee in grantor's name, may sue for possession of lands from which grantor was ousted. 93 C. 115. Cited. 120 C. 16; 134 C. 342. Ouster which will make deed void is same which is required to establish adverse possession. 135 C. 691. Cited. 137 C. 42. Possession necessary to constitute an ouster under section must be of the type which would ripen into a title by adverse possession if it were continued long enough. 147 C. 689. In action to quiet title under Sec. 47-31, if defendant had been deeded land which plaintiffs occupied, judgment should declare deed to defendant void. 155 C. 327. Possession necessary to constitute an ouster under section is possession that would, if continued for the requisite period, ripen into title by adverse possession. 165 C. 457.
Cited. 1 CA 481; 37 CA 153. Possession necessary to constitute ouster is possession that would ripen into a title by adverse possession if continued for the requisite period. 48 CA 436.
Cited. 3 CS 49; 4 CS 34; 5 CS 477. Defendant's deed from his immediate predecessor in title, delivered more than 15 years after plaintiff's adverse possession began, was unavailing to convey the land in dispute since such predecessor was then out of possession. 6 CS 20. Purpose is to codify the common-law rule against champerty and maintenance; executor's deed issued by order of Probate Court is not within its scope. 34 CS 31.
Notes of Decisions
1525 Highland Assocs., LLC v. Fohl, 772 A.2d 1128 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
· cites it 10× “In his special defense, the defendant alleged that the deed conveying the land to the plaintiff was void as to the subject portion of parcel A because the defendant had entered on and possessed the land in such a fashion as to constitute an ouster of the plaintiffs predecessors…”
Wadsworth Realty Co. v. Sundberg, 338 A.2d 470 (Conn. 1973).
· cites it 5× “The defendants Párese, on the plaintiff’s appeal, assign error in the conclusion of the court that (1) the defendants Párese failed to prove any title in fee or right to an easement, (2) the overruling of their claim that §47-21 of the General Statutes makes void a deed by one…”
Goodrich v. Diodato, 710 A.2d 818 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
· cites it 5× “We first address the plaintiffs’ assertion that this issue should not be reviewed on appeal because the defendant did not state in her special defense or counterclaim that her ouster claim was made pursuant to General Statutes § 47-21. The plaintiffs cite Practice Book § 109A…”
Clark v. Drska, 473 A.2d 325 (Conn. App. Ct. 1983).
· cites it 2× “” 2 The trial court correctly concluded that General Statutes § 47-21 did not apply. Gray v.”
Davis v. Prop. Owners Assn. at Moodus Lake Shores, Inc., 193 A.3d 1245 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
· cites it 4× “In the second count, the plaintiffs sought a judgment quieting title to a northwestern portion of the association's parcel pursuant to General Statutes § 47-21. 2 In count three, the plaintiffs claimed that an easement by implication 3 over that northwestern portion of the…”
Loewenberg v. Wallace, 166 A.2d 150 (Conn. 1960).
· cites it 2× “The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs’ grantor was ousted of possession of the triangular strip at the time of the delivery by her of the warranty deed to the plaintiffs in 1956, and that consequently that deed was, as to that strip, void under the provisions of § 47-21 of…”
Skakel v. Benedict, 738 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
“2d 818 (1998) (“ [although the defendant did not specifically refer to [General Statutes] § 47-21 in her special defense, the defendant sufficiently apprised the trial court of her special defense of ouster”); DeVita v.”
Thomas v. Collins, 21 A.3d 518 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
· cites it 5× “, had been ousted from possession of the disputed portions of the two lots, and that the deeds purporting to convey those portions of property to the plaintiff were void pursuant to General Statutes § 47-21, 6 the plaintiff had failed to establish an interest in the contested…”
Peters v. Pearl, 655 A.2d 262 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
· cites it 2× “The defendants filed a special defense alleging, pursuant to General Statutes § 47-21, that a portion of the plaintiff’s property had been acquired from a grantor who had been ousted of possession.”
Marquis v. Drost, 231 A.2d 527 (Conn. 1967).
“Lonis, had been ousted of possession when he deeded the strip to the defendant and hence under the provisions of § 47-21 of the General Statutes that deed to the defendant was void.”
Vennard v. Morrison, 209 A.2d 202 (Conn. App. Ct. 1964).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 47-21. Adverse possession and disseisin are in a practical sense the obverse and the reverse sides of the same coin.”
Gray v. Hudson, 375 A.2d 1039 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974).
· cites it 5× “Fitter, the grantee of the executors of William W. Scofield’s estate. It is noted, of course, that the executors were dropped as parties plaintiff upon substitution of *33 their grantee as the party plaintiff.”
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