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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 49 — Mortgages and LiensChapter 846 — Mortgages

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-13 (2025)

Petition for discharge of mortgage or ineffective attachment, lis pendens or lien

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1968–2019 19citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 19 opinions since 1968. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (2 cases).

(a) When the record title to real property is encumbered (1) by any undischarged mortgage, and (A) the mortgagor or those owning the mortgagor's interest therein have been in undisturbed possession of the property for at least six years after the expiration of the time limited in the mortgage for the full performance of the conditions thereof, and for six years next preceding the commencement of any action under this section, or (B) the promissory note or other written evidence of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage is payable on demand and seventeen years have passed without any payment on account of such note or other written evidence of indebtedness, or (C) the mortgage does not disclose the time when the note or indebtedness is payable or disclose the time for full performance of the conditions of the mortgage and ten years have passed without any payment on account of the promissory note or other written evidence of indebtedness, or (D) the note or evidence of indebtedness has been paid or a bona fide offer and tender of the payment has been made pursuant to section 49-8, or (E) the mortgage has become invalid, and in any of such cases no release of the encumbrance to secure such note or evidence of indebtedness has been given, or (2) by a foreclosed mortgage and the mortgagor has made a bona fide offer and tender of payment of the foreclosure judgment on or before the mortgagor's law day and the mortgagee has refused to accept payment, or (3) by an attachment, lis pendens or other lien which has become of no effect, the person owning the property, or the equity in the property, may bring a petition to the superior court for the judicial district in which the property is situated, setting forth the facts and claiming a judgment as provided in this section. The plaintiff may also claim in the petition damages as set forth in section 49-8 if the plaintiff is aggrieved by the failure of the defendant to execute the release prescribed in said section.

(b) The petition shall be served upon all persons interested in the mortgage, attachment, lis pendens or other lien in the manner provided by law for process in civil actions and, in any action where the parties who may have an interest in the property and should be made parties thereto cannot be located by and are unknown to the petitioner in the action, the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney shall annex to the petition in the action an affidavit stating that the petitioner does not know who the interested parties are or where they reside, or, if the party interested in the property is a corporation whose corporate existence has been legally terminated, or the corporation is no longer in existence or doing business, and the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney states that fact in an affidavit, the court to which the action is brought or the clerk, assistant clerk or any judge thereof may make such order relative to the notice which shall be given in the cause as the court, clerk, assistant clerk or judge deems reasonable.

(c) Such notice having been given according to the order and duly proven, the court may proceed to a hearing of the cause at such time as it deems proper, and, if no evidence is offered of any payment on account of the debt secured by the mortgage within a period set out in subsection (a) of this section, or of any other act within such a period as provided in said subsection (a) in recognition of its existence as a valid mortgage, or if the court finds the mortgage has been satisfied but no release given as evidence of such satisfaction, or if the court finds that a bona fide offer and tender of payment of the foreclosure judgment or mortgage has been made and refused, or if the court finds the attachment, lis pendens or other lien has become of no effect, the court may render a judgment reciting the facts and its findings in relation thereto and declaring the mortgage, foreclosure judgment, attachment, lis pendens or other lien invalid as a lien against the real estate, and may order payment of any balance of indebtedness due on the mortgage or foreclosure judgment to the clerk of the court to be held for the benefit of the mortgagee or the persons interested and to be paid to the mortgagee by the clerk of the court upon application of the mortgagee or persons interested following the execution of a release of mortgage.

(d) Upon deposit of the balance of indebtedness with the clerk, such judgment shall issue, which judgment shall, within thirty days thereafter, be recorded in the land records of the town in which the property is situated, and the encumbrance created by the mortgage, foreclosure judgment, attachment, lis pendens or other lien shall be null and void and totally discharged. The town clerk of the town in which the real estate is situated shall, upon the request of any person interested, record a discharge of such encumbrance in the land records.

(1949 Rev., S. 7123; 1959, P.A. 425; 1969, P.A. 595, S. 2; 1971, P.A. 536; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 127; P.A. 79-602, S. 72; P.A. 95-102, S. 4; P.A. 03-74, S. 1; P.A. 09-213, S. 5.)

History: 1959 act added provision re invalidity of mortgage as lien against real estate when title remains encumbered by undischarged mortgage and mortgagor or those owning his interest have been in possession of property for 60 years after time limited in mortgage for performance of its conditions; 1969 act clarified provisions re passage of 17 years, re failure to give release and re attachments, lis pendens or other liens of no effect and deleted provision added by 1959 act; 1971 act added provisions re foreclosure and clarified provisions re court action; P.A. 78-280 replaced “county” with “judicial district”; P.A. 79-602 divided section into Subsecs. and restated provisions but made no substantive changes; P.A. 95-102 changed requirement of undisturbed possession from 17 to 6 years and made technical changes; P.A. 03-74 amended Subsec. (a)(1)(C) by changing time period from 17 years to 10 years and made technical changes; P.A. 09-213 amended Subsec. (d) to replace requirement that town clerk “endorse on the record of the encumbrance or lien the words ‘discharged by judgment of the Superior Court’, and list the volume and page number in the land records where the judgment is recorded” with requirement that town clerk “record a discharge of such encumbrance in the land records”.

See Sec. 7-34a re town clerks' fees.

Does not declare mortgage invalid, merely gives court right to declare it invalid under proper circumstances; section is not a statute of limitations. 131 C. 38. Plaintiff held entitled to have mortgage declared invalid. 134 C. 420. Cited. 140 C. 474. Statute does not apply to those who recognize existence and validity of encumbering mortgage. 156 C. 49. When release of lis pendens is inequitable. 162 C. 26. Procedure used by defendant in seeking to have lis pendens discharged and the granting by the court of defendant's motion does not meet the essential conditions prescribed. 165 C. 675. Cited. 188 C. 477; 223 C. 419.

It is 6 years of undisturbed possession that is crucial to obtaining relief under section, not 6 years of possession by one owner; therefore tacking prior owner's period of possession to party's period of possession is permitted to fulfill the 6-year requirement. 81 CA 808. The time referenced in Subsec. (a)(1)(A) is the maturity date specified in the confines of the mortgage. 173 CA 686.

Cited. 16 CS 257.

Subsec. (c):

Because plaintiffs' properties were not encumbered by the notices of lis pendens, they could not properly invoke court's authority under Subsec. to discharge the lis pendens as liens against the properties. 77 CA 276.

The 19 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-13 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENGordon v. Tufano, 450 A.2d 852 (Conn. 1982).
cites § 49-13 52×subsections: (c)cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“This is an action pursuant to General Statutes § 49-13, [1] to discharge a mortgage and lis pendens placed on the land records against certain real estate owned by the plaintiff located at White Sands Beach in the town of Old Lyme. On July 24, 1958, the plaintiff executed a…”
2
GREENGhent v. Meadowhaven Condo., Inc., 823 A.2d 355 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 49-13 18×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“Thereafter, on November 21, 2000, the plaintiffs filed petitions for the discharge of each lis pendens pursuant to General Statutes §§ 49-13 and 49-8. In then petitions, the plaintiffs sought, pursuant to § 49-13 (c), 2 to have the court render judgment declaring invalid each…”
Later courts cite it for
“an encumbrance is a burden on the title and, as such, impedes its transfer.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENMartino v. Scalzo, 966 A.2d 339 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 49-13 19×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“§ 42a-3-118 (b)” by discussing the applicability of General Statutes § 49-13 7 in her posttrial reply brief.”
Later courts cite it for
“our supreme court has consistently held that our courts should not render advisory opinions.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENHall v. Kasper Assocs., Inc., 846 A.2d 228 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
cites § 49-13 22×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“The defendant, Kasper Associates, doing business as Kasper-Ryan Associates (Kasper), appeals from the judgment of the trial court declaring a certain mortgage invalid and discharging it pursuant to General Statutes § 49-13 and further awarding damages of $5000 and attorney’s…”
5
GREENFountain Pointe, LLC v. Calpitano, 76 A.3d 636 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013).
cites § 49-13 6×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“The plaintiff brought this action in four counts: (1) quiet title pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31; (2) discharge of the mortgages pursuant to General Statutes § 49-13 (a) (1) (E); (3) slander of title pursuant to § 47-33j; and (4) violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade…”
The case’s holding
Statutory slander of title does not require a prior demand for removal of a recorded claim if the defendant acts with reckless disregard for the truth.
6
GREENKopylec v. Town of North Branford, 23 A.3d 51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
cites § 49-13 8×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“In his memorandum in support of the application to discharge, the plaintiff cited General Statutes §§ 49-13, [2] 49-51 and 49-59.”
7
GREENMcLaughlin v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D. Conn. 2010).
cites § 49-13 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“See Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 49-13(a) and 52-325a. Accordingly, Mr.”
The case’s holding
Fraud and statutory claims based on the vapor money theory are legally invalid and fail to state a plausible claim for relief.
Later courts cite it for
“the essence of the 'vapor money' theory is that promissory notes (and similar instruments) are the equivalent of 'money' that citizens literally 'create' with their signatures.” · 11 citing courts
8
GREENFCM Grp., Inc. v. Miller, 17 A.3d 40 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 49-13 2×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“(D) the note or evidence of indebtedness has been paid or a bona fide offer and tender of the payment has been made pursuant to section 49-8, or (E) the mortgage has become invalid, and in any of such cases no release of the encumbrance to secure such note or evidence of…”
The case’s holding
A person who is not a party to a contract is not bound by its terms and cannot be held liable for its breach.
Later courts cite it for
“parties to a contract cannot thereby impose any liability on one who, under its terms, is a stranger to the contract, and, in any event, in order to bind a third person contractually, an expression of assent by such person is necessary. ... in other words, a person who is not a party to a contract (i.e., is not named in the contract and has not executed it) is not bound by its terms.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENGordon v. Tobias, 817 A.2d 683 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 49-13 2×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) granted relief to the plaintiffs pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31 because General Statutes § 49-13 provides an exclusive remedy for the discharge of a mortgage; (2) concluded that Mutual had acted as the…”
The case’s holding
Payment to an agent with authority to accept payments on a principal's behalf constitutes payment to the principal and discharges the debtor's obligation.
Later courts cite it for
“generally, payment to an agent constitutes payment to the principal.” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENNew Milford Sav. Bank v. Jajer, 708 A.2d 1378 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 49-13 2×cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“Accordingly, we do not address *268 the defendants’ argument that the bank’s mortgage on the third parcel may be extinguished in accordance with General Statutes § 49-13, entitled “Petition for discharge of mortgages or of ineffective attachment, lis pendens or lien.”
The case’s holding
A trial court maintains continuing jurisdiction to open a judgment after the legal deadline expires to correct an inadvertent omission in a foreclosure complaint (4 of 8).
Later courts cite it for
“any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion of the court rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person having an interest in the judgment and for cause shown, be opened and modified, notwithstanding the limitation imposed by section 52-212a, upon such terms as to costs as the court deems reasonable, provided no such judgment shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer . . . ,” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENSimonelli v. Fitzgerald, 238 A.2d 418 (Conn. 1968).
cites § 49-13 9×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“The plaintiffs, husband and wife, as record owners of the property in question, sought, pursuant to General Statutes § 49-13, a declaration that two unpaid mortgages of record were invalid.”
12
GREENMilbauer v. Milbauer, 733 A.2d 907 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
cites § 49-13 3×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“The plaintiff characterizes the trial court’s action as an invalidation of a valid mortgage of record pursuant to General Statutes § 49-13. We do not subscribe to that characterization.”
13
GREENWells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. Fitzpatrick, 210 A.3d 88 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
cites § 49-13 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“In their counterclaim, the defendants sought a discharge of the mortgage pursuant to General Statutes § 49-13. In a memorandum of decision dated June 20, 2017, that counterclaim was dismissed by the court.”
14
GREENRatick v. Scalo, 345 A.2d 26 (Conn. 1974).
cites § 49-13 7×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“The plaintiff makes the claim that the appropriate method of having the lis pendens declared invalid is by petition brought to the Superior Court under §49-13. This statute is entitled “Petition for discharge of mortgages or of ineffective attachment, lis pendens or lien.”
15
NEUTRALFitzpatrick v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assn., 164 A.3d 832 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 49-13 15×subsections: (a) 3× (a)(1)(A) 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 49-13
“He claims that the court erred in ruling that he failed to meet the temporal requirements to petition to discharge his mortgage pursuant to General Statutes § 49-13. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”
16
GREENRocco v. Shaikh, 196 A.3d 366 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 49-13 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“" In count two, the plaintiffs sought to discharge an invalid lien under General Statutes §§ 49-13 and 49-92e. They alleged that the defendants' land records filing "is an improper and invalid encumbrance on the property," and that the defendants wrongfully have refused to…”
17
GREENSmith v. Barbour, 571 S.E.2d 872 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 49-13 1×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“C.G.S. § 49-13 (2001) (right to have child’s surname changed to father’s).”
18
GREENRavitch v. Stollman Poultry Farms, Inc., 291 A.2d 213 (Conn. 1971).
cites § 49-13 1×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“Finally, §49-13 (b) of the General Statutes provides that when record title is encumbered by a lis pendens which “has become of no effect,” the owner of the property may bring a petition in the Superior Court within the county in which the property is situated and, after proper…”
19
NO FLAGNoroton Props., LLC v. Lawendy, 154 Conn. App. 367 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014).
cites § 49-13 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 49-13
“nd the maturity date of the mortgage note, (2) determined that the mortgage note provided a ten day grace period for the payment of the final balloon payment, (3) concluded that the defendant satisfied his obligations by being ‘‘ready, will- ing and able’’ to make the final…”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196819932019

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 2003. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.10Conn.7D. Conn.1N.C. Ct. App.1
By subsection
(a)2 cases
McLaughlin v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D. Conn. 2010).“See Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 49-13(a) and 52-325a. Accordingly, Mr.”
Fitzpatrick v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assn., 164 A.3d 832 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).“He claims that the court erred in ruling that he failed to meet the temporal requirements to petition to discharge his mortgage pursuant to General Statutes § 49-13. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”
(a)(1)(A)1 case
Fitzpatrick v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assn., 164 A.3d 832 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
(c)1 case
Gordon v. Tufano, 450 A.2d 852 (Conn. 1982).“This is an action pursuant to General Statutes § 49-13, [1] to discharge a mortgage and lis pendens placed on the land records against certain real estate owned by the plaintiff located at White Sands Beach in the town of Old Lyme. On July 24, 1958, the plaintiff executed a…”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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