Any pedestrian who uses any street or highway negligently or recklessly or fails to obey the signal of any traffic officer, pedestrian control, sign, signal, marking or device or recklessly disregards his own safety or the safety of any person by the manner of his use of any street or highway shall be deemed to have committed an infraction and be fined not less than thirty-five dollars nor more than fifty dollars.
(1949 Rev., S. 8513; February, 1965, P.A. 448, S. 42; P.A. 82-223, S. 29; P.A. 83-577, S. 33.)
History: 1965 act deleted the word “wilfully” before “fails to obey the signal,” added the words “pedestrian control, sign, signal, marking or device” and substituted reference to the penalty in Sec. 14-296 for a specific penalty of not less than $2 nor more than $25; P.A. 82-223 specified that violation of the section constituted an infraction and replaced the penalty provision with minimum and maximum fine amounts; P.A. 83-577 increased the minimum fine from $25 to $35.
See Sec. 14-300 re crosswalks, regulation of pedestrian traffic, etc.
Pedestrian standing in street awaiting approach of trolley car and not looking for 1 minute in direction from which an automobile was approaching held not necessarily negligent under statute; question of fact for jury. 99 C. 2; Id., 11. Not necessary to charge as to full terms and effect of statute when so much of statute as was applicable was explained in charge on contributory negligence. 103 C. 552. As regards negligence, statute establishes no other standards than those of the common law. 116 C. 53; 127 C. 159; 128 C. 584. Cited. 144 C. 449; 239 C. 235.
Cited. 39 CA 579.
Interest of state in enforcing its traffic laws outweighs defendant's interest in stopping traffic to distribute literature; terms “negligent” and “reckless” have precise legal definition. 33 CS 725.
Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 584.
Secs. 53-183 to 53-189. Animals on highway, generally. Transportation of wild animals. Signal lights and exhausts or mufflers on motor boats. Reckless operation of motor boats. Sections 53-183 to 53-189, inclusive, are repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 4152–4154, 8535–8538; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 135; 1961, P.A. 520, S. 20; 1969, P.A. 828, S. 214.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases, 1971–2019 · leading case:
State v. Rodriguez, 684 A.2d 1165 (Conn. 1996).
State v. Rodriguez, 684 A.2d 1165 (Conn. 1996).
· cites it 6× “Komoroski subsequently began to issue the defendant a summons for the infraction of reckless use of a highway by a pedestrian in violation of General Statutes § 53-182. 5 While filling out the summons, he asked the defendant for identification in order to confirm the *241…”
State v. Rodriguez, 665 A.2d 1357 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
· cites it 2× “See General Statutes § 53-182. Komoroski asked the man if he had any identification and, without checking his pockets, the man responded that he did not.”
State v. Ennis, 368 A.2d 1186 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976).
· cites it 8× “After a trial without a jury the three defendants were found guilty of reckless use of a highway by a pedestrian in violation of General Statutes § 53-182. 1 The principal issues *726 raised in this appeal are whether § 53-182 is unconstitutional for vagueness and overbreadth,…”
State v. Lavorgna, 437 A.2d 131 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981).
“The information charges the Defendant with disorderly conduct in violation of section 53-182 [sic]. The applicable section there is that dealing with offensive or disorderly conduct, and this section provides: a person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause…”
Pettiford v. State, 178 A.3d 1126 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
· cites it 2× “8 Finally, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff's actions amounted to negligent use of a highway in violation of General Statutes § 53-182. The plaintiff filed a reply generally denying the allegations in the special defense.”
Rodriguez v. Comm'r of Corr., 948 A.2d 372 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 3× “*493 “Komoroski subsequently began to issue the [petitioner] a summons for the infraction of reckless use of a highway by a pedestrian in violation of General Statutes § 53-182. While filling out the summons, he asked the [petitioner] for identification in order to confirm the…”
State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 583 (Conn. App. Ct. 1971).
“This is a three-count information charging the defendant with (1) failure to keep drugs in original container (General Statutes *584 § 19-464); (2) illegal possession of controlled drugs (§ 19-481 [b]); and (3) reckless use of the highway by a pedestrian (§ 53-182). The question…”
Picard v. Torneo, No. 3:16-cv-01564 (D. Conn. Oct. 4, 2019).
“ervation of plaintiff standing on the on-ramp triangle provided them with probable cause to believe that plaintiff had recklessly crossed a busy four-lane road or the highway on-ramp to access the triangular island, thereby disregarding “his own safety or the safety of any…”
USA v. Juan Zayas-Diaz, No. CR-94-30-01-B (D.N.H. Mar. 23, 1995).
“Second, even if Zayas-Diaz's seizure is viewed as an arrest, the arrest was lawful because Trooper Taylor had probable cause to believe that Zayas-Diaz had violated Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-182 (1992). This statute provides that Any pedestrian who uses any street or highway…”
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