(a) A person is guilty of threatening in the first degree when such person (1) (A) threatens to commit any crime involving the use of a hazardous substance with the intent to terrorize another person, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, evacuation or inconvenience; (2) (A) threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience; (3) commits threatening in the second degree as provided in section
53a-62, and in the commission of such offense such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm; or (4) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection with the intent to cause an evacuation of a building or the grounds of a (A) house of religious worship, (B) religiously-affiliated community center, (C) public or nonpublic preschool, school or institution of higher education, or (D) day care center, as defined in section
19a-87g, during operational, preschool, school or instructional hours or when a building or the grounds of such house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center are being used for the provision of religious or community services, or house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center-sponsored activities. No person shall be found guilty of threatening in the first degree under subdivision (3) of this subsection and threatening in the second degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) For the purposes of this section, “hazardous substance” means any physical, chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity, concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health and “religiously-affiliated community center” means real property used for the provision of recreational, social or educational services that is owned or leased by a nonprofit organization that holds such property out as being affiliated with an organized religion.
(c) Threatening in the first degree is a class D felony, except that a violation of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section is a class C felony.
(Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 7, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 15; P.A. 03-22, S. 1; P.A. 12-114, S. 10; P.A. 16-67, S. 6; P.A. 17-111, S. 3.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to delete in Subdivs. (1) and (2) provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence; P.A. 03-22 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing elements of crime as Subdiv. (1), redesignating existing Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B), respectively, and adding new Subdiv. (2) to restore provisions re threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and threatening to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience; P.A. 12-114 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (3) re commission of threatening in the second degree with a firearm and add provisions re charges and prosecution for threatening in the first degree under Subdiv. (3) and threatening in the second degree upon the same information; P.A. 16-67 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re violation with intent to cause evacuation of preschool, school or institution of higher education, amended Subsec. (c) by adding provision re class C felony for violation of Subsec. (a)(4) and made technical changes; P.A. 17-111 amended Subsec. (a) to add references to house of religious worship, religiously-affiliated community center and day care center, amended Subsec. (b) to add definition of “religiously-affiliated community center”, and made technical and conforming changes.
See Sec. 52-557t re defense to civil action.
See Sec. 54-130g re pardon.
Subsec. (a)(3): Neither the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution nor the state constitution require that the state prove that defendant had the specific intent to terrorize the target of a threat, only that defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the target of the threat would be terrorized, before defendant can be punished for threatening speech directed at a private individual. 330 C. 149. Subsec. (a)(3): Section is not unconstitutional under the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the state constitution as applied to threatening speech directed at public officials. Id. Subsec. (a)(3): Defendant may be punished for threatening speech directed at a third party if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was aware that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk both that defendant's speech would be interpreted as a serious threat and that the threat would be communicated to the target of the threat. Id.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
14
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 2011–2026 · leading case:
State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2018).
State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2018).
· cites it 32× “*153 The principal issue in this appeal is whether the free speech provisions of the first amendment to the United States constitution 1 and article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut constitution 2 require **154 the state to prove that a defendant has a specific intent…”
State v. Meadows, 197 A.3d 464 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
· cites it 2× “Taupier was a case in which all threats directed against the victim were not directly addressed to the victim, but instead, were made to third parties.”
State v. Brown, 217 A.3d 690 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
· cites it 2× “In 2006, in connection with the assault of a fellow inmate, the defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2), and was sentenced to a term of eighteen months of imprisonment to run consecutively to the sentence he was…”
State v. Scott Lafontaine, 16 A.3d 1281 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
· cites it 2× “These arguments are unpersuasive given that the state did not prosecute the case under either of the two criminal threatening statutes, General Statutes §§ 53a-61aa and 53a-62, or the criminal obscenity statutes, General Statutes § 53a-193 et seq.”
State v. Roberts, 320 A.3d 989 (Conn. App. Ct. 2024).
· cites it 2× “(3) commits threatening in the second degree as provided in section 53a-62, and in the commission of such offense such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person’s words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver,…”
State v. Taupier, 234 A.3d 29 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020).
· cites it 2× “Our Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the defendant’s conviction after rejecting his claims that the statements contained in his e-mail were constitutionally protected free speech.”
State v. Moore (Order on Motion), No. SC240221 (Conn. July 8, 2025).
· cites it 10× “’’ Relying on the language in form JD-CR-205, rather than the language in §§ 53a-3 (24) and 54-64a (c), the court determined that its finding that the defendant was a ‘‘serious safety concern’’ was dispositive and that it did not need to determine whether any of the charged…”
State v. Kerlyn T., 253 A.3d 963 (Conn. 2020).
“ult in the second degree with a firearm in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-60a (a), unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-95 (a), two counts of assault in the third degree in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a-61 (a) (1), three…”
State v. Shenkman, 154 Conn. App. 45 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014).
· cites it 3× “without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35, and, in docket number CR- 09-224139, of threatening in the second degree in viola- tion of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (1), threatening in the second degree in violation of § 53a-62 (a) (2), assault in the third degree…”
State v. Kerlyn T., No. AC40163 (Conn. App. Ct. July 30, 2019).
· cites it 4× “al Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (2), risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), assault in the second degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60a (a), unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §…”
State v. Moore (Order on Motion Dissent), No. SC240221 (Conn. July 8, 2025).
· cites it 2× “Moore second degree with firearm); General Statutes § 53a- 60a (a) (assault in second degree with firearm); General Statutes § 53a-61aa (a) (3) (threatening in first degree); General Statutes § 53a-92a (a) (kidnapping in first degree with firearm).”
State v. Roberts, 354 A.3d 649 (Conn. 2026).
· cites it 2× “Roberts defendant pleaded guilty under the Alford1 doctrine to reckless endangerment in the second degree and threatening in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61aa, and he entered a straight guilty plea to intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third…”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61aa(a)(3): 1 case
State v. Meadows, 197 A.3d 464 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
“Taupier was a case in which all threats directed against the victim were not directly addressed to the victim, but instead, were made to third parties.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.