Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-159 (2025)

Requirements for recognition of extradition demand

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No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another state shall be recognized by the Governor unless in writing alleging, except in cases arising under section 54-162, that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and that thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon; or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole. The indictment, information or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state; and the copy of indictment, information, affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand.

(1957, P.A. 362, S. 3.)

As long as copy of judgment recited plaintiff's conviction and sentence as second offender, copy of information upon which he was presented as second offender not essential to validity of extradition request. 149 C. 73. Cited. 157 C. 407; 161 C. 329; 186 C. 404; 188 C. 364; 190 C. 631; 193 C. 270; 194 C. 702. Provisions of Sec. 1-36 not applicable to extradition documentation. 195 C. 465. Cited. 196 C. 557; 201 C. 162.

Recognition of extradition requests under federal law and this statute discussed. 3 CA 512. Cited. 26 CA 254; 33 CA 41; 36 CA 678.

Affiant's statement that she “believes” plaintiff to be the perpetrator of the crimes charged in Florida is not a substantial charge hereunder and writ of habeas corpus releasing plaintiff was granted. 31 CS 412. Implements Art. IV, Sec. 2 of U.S. Constitution; person demanded may resist extradition by proving, in habeas corpus proceeding, that he was not present in demanding state at time of alleged offense and is, therefore, not a fugitive from its justice. 34 CS 78. Judicial finding of probable cause should be explicitly made. 40 CS 179. Cited. 42 CS 569.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases, 1961–2007 · leading case: Clark v. Comm'r of Corr., 917 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2007).
Clark v. Comm'r of Corr., 917 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2007). · cites it 27× “See General Statutes § 54-157 et seq. In accordance with General Statutes § 54-159, 1 the extradition demand stated that the petitioner had been *383 charged with the commission of a crime in the state of Texas, 2 ‘was present in [Texas] at the time of the commission of said…”
Wright v. Bourbeau, 490 A.2d 522 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985). · cites it 27× “The sole issue in this appeal is whether the documents filed in support of the rendition warrant meet the statutory requirements of General Statutes § 54-159. 1 The plaintiff claims that they do not.”
Parks v. Bourbeau, 477 A.2d 636 (Conn. 1984). · cites it 8× “On appeal, Parks claims error in that: (1) he was not substantially charged with a crime in Florida as required by Connecticut General Statutes § 54-159 because the finding of probable cause made in Florida and appearing on the face of the supporting documents is “palpably…”
Wentworth v. Bourbeau, 449 A.2d 1015 (Conn. 1982). · cites it 10× “In this appeal the plaintiff claims that the court erred in denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus because (1) the requisition documents did *367 not substantially charge him with a crime as required by General Statutes § 54-159, by the constitution of the United…”
Fain v. Bourbeau, 488 A.2d 824 (Conn. 1985). · cites it 13× “2 See General Statutes § 54-159. 3 At the hearing, the trial court interpreted the petitioner’s first ground to include the claim that the documents were defective on their face because they lacked proper authentication.”
Clark v. Comm'r of Corr., 868 A.2d 798 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 13× “See General Statutes § 54-157 et seq. In accordance with General Statutes § 54-159, 5 the *181 extradition demand stated that the petitioner had been charged with the commission of a crime in the state of Texas, “was present in [Texas] at the time of the commission of said…”
Barrila v. Blake, 461 A.2d 1375 (Conn. 1983). · cites it 2× “In accordance with the procedures set out in the Uniform Extradition Act, General Statutes § 54-157 et seq., the governor of Connecticut received from the governor of Indiana a written demand, dated November 5,1980, for the extradition of the petitioner Robert Barrila.”
Smith v. Liburdi, 600 A.2d 17 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991). · cites it 4× “General Statutes § 54-159. 2 The court further held that the underlying detainer was unaffected by *256 the defects in the request for temporary custody.”
LaValley v. Correia, 632 A.2d 1143 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). · cites it 5× “All four petitioners on appeal claim that the trial court improperly concluded (1) that Pennsylvania’s documents were properly authenticated and (2) that the petitioners were “substantially charged” within the meaning of General Statutes § 54-159. 2 The petitioners Richard…”
State v. Falcon, 494 A.2d 1190 (Conn. 1985). · cites it 2× “See General Statutes §§ 54-159, 54-179 (c). In that situation, the defendant arguably would have a cognizable claim for the presence of counsel at an interrogation following the initiation of extradition proceedings.”
Engel v. Bourbeau, 513 A.2d 688 (Conn. 1986). · cites it 5× “8 The petitioner claims that the indictment handed down in Georgia does not charge him with committing acts in New York with an intent to violate Georgia law and that the requisition and rendition warrants “repeatedly describe” him as a fugitive. The petitioner claims therefore…”
Crew v. State, 486 A.2d 664 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984). · cites it 4× “2d 1015 (1982), emphasized that “[t]o charge ‘substantially/ as provided by General Statutes § 54-159, requires that the charge be based upon probable cause.”
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