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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 54 — Criminal ProcedureChapter 959 — Court Jurisdiction and Power

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-33g (2025)

Forfeiture of moneys and property related to commission of criminal offense. In rem proceeding. Disposition. Secondary evidence of forfeited property

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
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CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1964–2024 34citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 34 opinions since 1964, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (3 cases).

(a) When any property believed to be possessed, controlled, designed or intended for use or which is or has been used or which may be used as a means of committing any criminal offense, or which constitutes the proceeds of the commission of any criminal offense, except a violation of section 21a-267, 21a-277, 21a-278, 21a-278b or 21a-279, has been seized as a result of a lawful arrest or a lawful search that results in an arrest, which the state claims to be a nuisance and desires to have destroyed or disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this section, the Chief State's Attorney or a deputy chief state's attorney, state's attorney or assistant or deputy assistant state's attorney may petition the court not later than ninety days after the seizure, in the nature of a proceeding in rem, to order forfeiture of such property. Such proceeding shall be deemed a civil suit in equity, in which the state shall have the burden of proving all material facts by clear and convincing evidence. The court shall identify the owner of such property and any other person as appears to have an interest in such property, and order the state to give notice to such owner and any interested person by certified or registered mail.

(b) The court shall hold a hearing on the petition filed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section not more than two weeks after the criminal proceeding that occurred as a result of the arrest has been nolled, dismissed or otherwise disposed of. The court shall deny the petition and return the property to the owner if the criminal proceeding does not result in (1) a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any offense charged in the same criminal information, (2) a guilty verdict after trial to a forfeiture-eligible offense for which the property was possessed, controlled, designed or intended for use, or which was or had been used as a means of committing such offense, or which constitutes the proceeds of the commission of such offense, or (3) a dismissal resulting from the completion of a pretrial diversionary program.

(c) If the court finds the allegations made in such petition to be true and that the property has been possessed, controlled or designed for use, or is or has been or is intended to be used, with intent to violate or in violation of any of the criminal laws of this state, or constitutes the proceeds of a violation of any of the criminal laws of this state, except a violation of section 21a-267, 21a-277, 21a-278, 21a-278b or 21a-279, and that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to such offense or another charge in the same criminal information, or a guilty verdict after trial for such forfeiture-eligible offense, or a dismissal resulting from the completion of a pretrial diversionary program has been entered, the court shall render judgment that such property is a nuisance and order the property to be destroyed or disposed of to a charitable or educational institution or to a governmental agency or institution, except that if any such property is subject to a bona fide mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest, such property shall not be so destroyed or disposed of in violation of the rights of the holder of such mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest.

(d) (1) When the condemned property is money (A) on and after October 1, 2014, and prior to July 1, 2016, the court shall order that such money be distributed as follows: (i) Seventy per cent shall be allocated to the law enforcement agency, including the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection and local police departments, responsible for investigating the criminal violation and seizing the money, and such local police departments shall use such money for the detection, investigation, apprehension and prosecution of persons for the violation of criminal laws, and any money allocated to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall be deposited in the General Fund; (ii) twenty per cent shall be deposited in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund established in section 54-215; and (iii) ten per cent shall be allocated to the Division of Criminal Justice and deposited in the General Fund; and (B) on and after July 1, 2016, such money shall be deposited in the General Fund.

(2) When the condemned property is a valuable prize, which is subject to a bona fide mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest, such property shall remain subject to such mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest.

(e) When any property or valuable prize has been declared a nuisance and condemned under this section, the court may also order that such property be sold in accordance with procedures approved by the Commissioner of Administrative Services. Proceeds of such sale shall first be allocated toward the balance of any mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest, and the remaining proceeds of such sale, if any, shall be allocated in accordance with subparagraphs (A) to (C), inclusive, of subdivision (1) of subsection (d) of this section. In any criminal prosecution, secondary evidence of property condemned and destroyed pursuant to this section shall be admissible against the defendant to the same extent as such evidence would have been admissible had the property not been condemned and destroyed.

(f) If the court finds the allegations not to be true, irrespective of the findings in the criminal proceeding, or that the property has not been kept with intent to violate or in violation of the criminal laws of this state, or that the property does not constitute the proceeds of a violation of the criminal laws of this state, or that the property is the property of a person who is not a defendant, the court shall order the property returned to the owner forthwith and the party in possession of such property pending such determination shall be responsible and personally liable for such property from the time of seizure and shall immediately comply with such order.

(g) Failure of the state to proceed against such property in accordance with the provisions of this section shall not prevent the use of such property as evidence in any criminal trial.

(1963, P.A. 652, S. 8; February, 1965, P.A. 215; 574, S. 47; 1972, P.A. 49; P.A. 75-54, S. 1, 3; P.A. 76-77, S. 4; 76-436, S. 531, 681; P.A. 80-313, S. 11; P.A. 84-540, S. 4, 7; P.A. 87-294, S. 1; P.A. 89-269, S. 3; P.A. 14-233, S. 1; P.A. 17-193, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-1, S. 157.)

History: 1965 acts specified applicability of provisions to seized property “which the state claims to be a nuisance and desires to have destroyed or disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this section” and added provision allowing use of property which state has failed to proceed against as evidence in criminal trial; 1972 act referred to property “possessed, controlled or designed for use ... or intended to be used” in violation of criminal laws rather than to property “kept” in connection with violation of law and added proviso re superior court's assumption of trial jurisdiction; P.A. 75-54 changed deadline for issuing summons from 48 hours after seizure to 10 days after seizure and clarified applicability re property which is subject to liens; P.A. 76-77 added provision re sale of property at public auction; P.A. 76-436 replaced prosecuting attorneys with assistant state's attorneys and deleted proviso re superior court's assumption of trial jurisdiction rendered obsolete because of transfer of all trial jurisdiction to that court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 80-313 divided section into Subsecs. and moved provision re final destruction or disposal of property but made no substantive changes; P.A. 84-540 deleted reference in Subsec. (a) to property seized “pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 54-33a” and substituted reference to property “believed to be possessed, controlled, designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as a means of committing any criminal offense” seized “as a result of a search incident to an arrest, a warrantless arrest or a search warrant”; expanded provision in Subsec. (a) requiring judge or court “issuing the warrant” to issue a summons to include judge or court “before whom the arrested person is to be arraigned”; P.A. 87-294 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that property which is money shall be deposited in the general fund; P.A. 89-269 amended Subsec. (a) to add exception for “a violation of section 21a-267, 21a-277, 21a-278 or 21a-279”, to require that the property has been seized as a result of a “lawful arrest or lawful search” rather than a “search incident to an arrest, a warrantless arrest or a search warrant”, and to delete provision that the summons notify the owner to appear “then and there to show cause why such property should not be adjudged a nuisance and ordered to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as herein provided”, amended Subsec. (b) to place on the state's attorney or assistant state's attorney “the burden of proving all material facts by clear and convincing evidence” and amended Subsec. (c) to add exception for “a violation of section 21a-267, 21a-277, 21a-278 or 21a-279”; P.A. 14-233 substantially revised section by amending Subsec. (a) to add provision making section applicable to proceeds of commission of a criminal offense and replacing provisions re judge or court issuing warrant and summons with provisions authorizing state's attorney to petition court, after seizure of property, for forfeiture order in a civil proceeding in rem after notice to owner or interested party by certified or registered mail, deleting former Subsec. (b) re owner of property claiming interest, redesignating existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b), inserting new Subsec. (c)(1) and (2) designators, replacing provision re money or prize seized with provisions re distribution of money, adding provisions re when property is a valuable prize, designating existing provisions re nuisance as new Subsec. (d) and amending same to replace provisions re sale at public auction and use of property as evidence with provisions re sale in accordance with procedures approved by Commissioner of Administrative Services, allocation of balance of proceeds and admissibility of secondary evidence of condemned property, redesignating existing Subsecs. (d) and (e) as Subsecs. (e) and (f), and making technical and conforming changes; P.A. 17-193 amended Subsec. (a) by adding “that results in an arrest” re property seized as a result of a lawful search and deleting provision re court to promptly hold hearing on petition, added new Subsec. (b) re hearing on petition after criminal proceeding has been nolled, dismissed or otherwise disposed of and denial of petition and return of property to owner, redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c) and amended same to add provision re plea of guilty or nolo contendere or dismissal resulting from completion of pretrial diversionary program, redesignated Subsecs. (c) to (f) as Subsecs. (d) to (g), amended redesignated Subsec. (f) to add “irrespective of the findings in the criminal proceeding”, and made technical and conforming changes; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-1 amended Subsecs. (a) and (c) to add reference to Sec. 21a-278b, effective July 1, 2021.

Origin of former statute. 126 C. 433. Under former statute, obscene materials could be destroyed regardless of who possessed them or of knowledge or intent in such possession. 146 C. 78. Intervening federal tax lien has precedence over state's inchoate claim which is not perfected until a final adjudication of forfeiture. 176 C. 339. Cited. 192 C. 98; 194 C. 589; 196 C. 471; 204 C. 259; 207 C. 743.

Statute requires that the issuance of the warrant, pursuant to which the property sought to be confiscated is seized, precede the seizure and that the seizure take place pursuant to that warrant. 1 CA 315. Statute, being a forfeiture statute, must be read and applied strictly. 5 CA 540. Cited. 15 CA 589; 19 CA 195; Id., 588; 39 CA 40.

Cited. 36 CS 551.

Seizure warrant is prerequisite to condemnation of gambling device; action to condemn is civil and state has right to appeal. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 399. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 96. Defendant's lack of knowledge his car was being used by person to whom he entrusted it for policy playing is no defense to forfeiture proceeding. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 1. Cited. Id., 44, 46; 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 283. Not a criminal statute, but provides for forfeiture of car used in violation of law by in rem civil action. Id., 284.

Subsec. (a):

Time limit is directory, not mandatory. 19 CA 195. Cited. 23 CA 724.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-33g most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. One 1977 Buick Auto., 493 A.2d 874 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 54-33g 33×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“The court adjudicated the Buick a nuisance and ordered it forfeited to the state pursuant to General Statutes § 54-33g (c). McNellis was eventually acquitted of the crimes for which he was arrested on February 24,1982.”
The case’s holding
A civil in rem forfeiture action for property seized in connection with a criminal arrest is valid even if the driver is acquitted of the related criminal charges.
2
GREENState v. One 1981 BMW Auto., 500 A.2d 961 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 54-33g 19×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“The defendant, Russell Kuskowski, is the owner of a 1981 BMW automobile which was the sub *541 ject of an in rem proceeding by the state pursuant to General Statutes § 54-33g. 1 He appeals from the judgment of the court ordering the automobile forfeited, raising several claims…”
3
GREENGanim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 54-33g 4×cited by 109 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“The plaintiffs alleged further that the flow of handguns into Bridgeport inflicts continuing injury on the city, and that an illegally possessed handgun can be deemed a public nuisance under General Statutes § 54-33g, 7 and is subject to seizure and destruction.”
The case’s holding
A municipality lacks standing to assert claims for indirect and remote injuries that are derivative of harms suffered by individual residents.
Later courts cite it for
“it is axiomatic that a party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENState v. One 1976 Chevrolet Van, 562 A.2d 62 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
cites § 54-33g 14×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“The defendant, Timothy Rickards, 1 is the owner of a 1976 Chevrolet van that was the subject of an in rem proceeding by the state pursuant to General Statutes § 54-33g. 2 He appeals from the trial court’s judgment ordering forfeiture of the vehicle.”
5
GREENState v. Magnano, 528 A.2d 760 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 54-33g 5×cited by 118 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“One 1977 Buick Automobile, supra, 479, the owner and operator appealed the seizure of their car under the forfeiture statute; General Statutes § 54-33g; for failure of the state to seize the property pursuant to a search warrant as required by *280 the statute and by State v.”
The case’s holding
A subsequent warrantless entry by detectives to process evidence observed in plain view during an initial emergency response constitutes a lawful continuation of the original entry.
Later courts cite it for
“it is clear that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Bucchieri, 407 A.2d 990 (Conn. 1978).
cites § 54-33g 12×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“1 On the day of the search the Circuit Court from which the warrant had been issued instituted an in rem proceeding for adjudication of the seized articles as a nuisance, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-33g. 2 Some five months *341 later, on June 30, 1972, the United States…”
7
GREENState v. Redmond, 171 A.3d 1052 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 54-33g 11×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“to 2013) § 54-33g. 2 For the reasons that follow, we disagree and dismiss the writ of error.”
8
GREENState v. Adams, 982 A.2d 187 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 54-33g 6×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“The defendant is an unrepresented prisoner who was given a stay of execution of his sentence to obtain his high school diploma.”
9
GREENStuart v. Stuart, 996 A.2d 259 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 54-33g 2×cited by 82 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“y when it finds by clear and convincing evidence that such operation or procedure is in that person’s best interests); General Statutes § 46b-160 (a) (4) (court may order temporary child support upon finding of clear and convincing evidence of paternity); General Statutes §…”
The case’s holding
The preponderance of the evidence standard applies to statutory theft claims in the absence of explicit legislative language mandating a higher burden of proof.
Later courts cite it for
“it is manifest to our hierarchical judicial system that this court has the final say on matters of connecticut law and that the appellate court and superior court are bound by our precedent” · 12 citing courts
10
GREENState v. One 1981 BMW Auto., 546 A.2d 879 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
cites § 54-33g 7×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
““General Statutes § 54-33g ‘provides for a civil action in rem for the condemnation and forfeiture of the [property] which was used in violation of the law.”
11
NEUTRALState v. Sabia, 471 A.2d 673 (Conn. App. Ct. 1983).
cites § 54-33g 18×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“This is an appeal 1 from the judgment of the trial court granting the state’s motion to confiscate the defendant’s automobile pursuant to the in rem statute, General Statutes § 54-33g. 2 *317 The facts are not in dispute.”
12
GREENState v. One 1960 Mercury Station Wagon, 240 A.2d 99 (Conn. App. Ct. 1968).
cites § 54-33g 6×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“Due notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture was directed to the registered owner of the vehicle as provided for in § 54-33g of the General Statutes, 1 and we shall refer to him as the defendant.”
13
NEUTRALState v. Connelly, 483 A.2d 1085 (Conn. 1984).
cites § 54-33g 10×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“The defendant has appealed from a judgment of the trial court ordering the forfeiture to the state of his 1981 Lincoln Continental automobile pursuant to General Statutes § 54-33g (c). 1 The only claim of error which the defendant has briefed is that the forfeiture was improper…”
14
GREENState v. Garcia, 949 A.2d 499 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 54-33g 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
““Unless such seized property is stolen property and is ordered returned pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or unless such seized property is adjudicated a nuisance in accordance with section 54-33g, or unless the court finds that such property shall be forfeited or is…”
The case’s holding
Under the criminal disposition statute, the state may petition for in rem forfeiture of seized contraband, including drug-linked currency, when a nexus to the charged crimes exists.
15
GREENState v. Perez, 162 A.3d 76 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 54-33g 5×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 54-33g
“We cannot conclude that that finding is clearly erroneous on the basis of the record before us.”
16
GREENDanbury Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Delaney, 542 A.2d 1153 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 54-33g 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“2d 990 (1978), in which we concluded that state forfeiture of contraband pursuant to General Statutes § 54-33g did not give the state a choate lien “when the section itself provides for a hearing at which competing claims may be heard and at which forfeiture is to be adjudicated.”
17
GREENState v. $7379.54 United States Currency, 844 A.2d 220 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 54-33g 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“Because General Statutes § 54-36h, unlike allied forfeiture statutes, General Statutes §§ 54-33g and 22a-250, does not have a provision designating the owner or possessor of currency as a party defendant in forfeiture proceedings, we refer to Hunt as the appellant and not as the…”
18
NEUTRALState v. 2 Acres Known as 319 Jackson Street, 663 A.2d 1115 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
cites § 54-33g 6×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“In the in rem action, the state alleged that the property constituted a nuisance and was subject to forfeiture and disposition pursuant to General Statutes § 54-33g. 2 Subsequently, on April 2, 1993, the trial court found that the state and the defendant had entered into a…”
19
NEUTRALState v. Pierro, 470 A.2d 240 (Conn. 1984).
cites § 54-33g 4×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“If any criminal proceeding is transferred to another court location, then the clerk with whom the inventory is filed shall transfer such inventory to the clerk of the court location to which such action is transferred.” The defendant has raised a further claim that the…”
20
GREENState v. Raffone, 136 A.3d 647 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
cites § 54-33g 6×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 54-33g
“The defendant, Pasquale Raffone, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following an in rem proceeding, ordering the forfeiture of his motor vehicle pursuant to General Statutes § 54-33g. On appeal he raises a number of claims, most of which are not reviewable.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196419942024

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1978. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.21Conn.8D. Conn.3Conn. Super. Ct.2
By subsection
(a)3 cases
Garofalo v. Sheehan, No. 3:19-cv-01587 (D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2021).
Garofalo v. Sheehan, No. 3:19-cv-01587 (D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2020).
Garofalo v. Sheehan, No. 3:19-cv-01587 (D. Conn. May 22, 2020).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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