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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 08 — Zoning, Planning, Housing and Economic and Community DevelopmentChapter 128 — Department of Housing: Municipal Housing Projects

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-53 (2025)

Provisions of bonds, trust indentures and mortgages

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1965–2023 25citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 25 opinions since 1965, 2 of them in the last five years.

In connection with the issuance of bonds or the incurring of obligations under leases and in order to secure the payment of such bonds or obligations, an authority, in addition to its other powers, shall have power: (a) To pledge all or any part of its gross or net rents, fees or revenues to which its right then exists or may thereafter come into existence; (b) to mortgage all or any part of its real or personal property, then owned or thereafter acquired; (c) to covenant against pledging all or any part of its rents, fees and revenues, or against mortgaging all or any part of its real or personal property, to which its right or title then exists or may thereafter come into existence, or against permitting any lien to remain or stand against such revenues or property; to covenant with respect to limitations on its right to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any housing project or any part thereof and to covenant as to the additional debts or obligations which may be incurred by it; (d) to covenant as to the bonds to be issued and as to the issuance of such bonds in escrow or otherwise and as to the use and disposition of the proceeds thereof; to provide for the replacement of lost, destroyed or mutilated bonds; to covenant against extending the time for the payment of its bonds or interest thereon; to redeem the bonds and to covenant for their redemption and to provide the terms and conditions thereof; (e) to covenant, subject to the limitations contained in this chapter, as to the rents and fees to be charged in the operations of a housing project or projects and as to the amount to be raised each year or other period of time by rents, fees and other revenues and the use and disposition to be made thereof; to create or to authorize the creation of special funds for moneys held for construction or operating costs, contingencies, debt service, reserves or other purposes and to covenant as to the use and disposition of the moneys held in such funds; (f) to prescribe the procedure, if any, by which the terms of any contract with bondholders may be amended or abrogated, the amount of bonds the holders of which shall consent thereto and the manner in which such consent may be given; (g) to covenant as to the use of any or all of its real or personal property; to warrant its title and to covenant as to the maintenance of its real and personal property, the replacement thereof, the insurance to be carried thereon and the use and disposition of insurance moneys; (h) to covenant as to the rights, liabilities, powers and duties arising upon the breach by it of any covenant, condition or obligation; and to covenant and prescribe the procedure in the event of default and the terms and conditions upon which any or all of its bonds or obligations shall become or may be declared due before maturity, and as to the terms and conditions upon which such declaration and its consequences may be waived; (i) to vest in a trustee or trustees or the holders of bonds or any proportion of them the right to enforce the payment of the bonds or any covenants securing or relating to the bonds; to vest in a trustee or trustees the right, in the event of a default by such authority, to take possession of and use, operate and manage any housing project or part thereof, and to collect the rents and revenues arising therefrom and to dispose of such moneys in accordance with the agreement of the authority with such trustee; to provide for the powers and duties of a trustee or trustees and to limit liabilities thereof and to provide the terms and conditions upon which the trustee or trustees or the holders of bonds or any proportion of them may enforce any covenant or rights securing or relating to the bonds; and (j) to exercise all or any part or combination of the powers herein granted; to make covenants, in addition to the covenants herein expressly authorized, of like or different character; to make such covenants and to do any and all such acts as may be necessary or desirable in order to secure its bonds or, in the absolute discretion of such authority, as will tend to make the bonds more marketable notwithstanding that such covenants or acts may not be enumerated herein. The validity of a pledge made by an authority pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall not be affected by the deposit of the funds pledged in a savings account in the name of the authority pursuant to the pledge agreement, and section 36a-291 shall not be applicable to such pledge.

(1949 Rev., S. 935; 1963, P.A. 650, S. 1.)

History: 1963 act provided that validity of pledge not affected by deposit of funds pledged in savings account and that Sec. 36-113 not applicable to pledge.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-53 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. 1987).
cites § 8-53 4×cited by 186 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 to bar the admission of this testimony.”
The case’s holding
The indecent liberties statute covers a broad range of behavior to provide children with greater protection than other statutes proscribing sex acts.
Later courts cite it for
“the youth and vulnerability of children, coupled with the power inherent in a parent's position of authority, creates a unique situation of dominance and control in which explicit threats and displays of force are not necessary to effect the abuser's purpose.” · 10 citing courts
2
GREENIn re the Investigation of the Death of Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 2003).
cites § 8-53 3×cited by 71 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53, the General Assembly has established the privilege for confidential communications between physician and patient, providing that confidential information obtained in such a relationship shall be furnished only on the authorization of the patient or, if deceased,…”
The case’s holding
The trial court bears the responsibility of determining whether the attorney-client privilege applies and is not required to rely solely on an attorney's assertion of privilege.
Later courts cite it for
“if any one of these five elements is not present in any portion of an attorney-client communication, that portion of the communication is not privileged.” · 7 citing courts
3
GREENCrist v. Moffatt, 389 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. 1990).
cites § 8-53 4×cited by 78 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 (1986). Upon being questioned by plaintiff’s attorney, Mr.”
The case’s holding
Defense counsel may not conduct private ex parte interviews with a plaintiff's nonparty treating physicians without the plaintiff's express consent.
Later courts cite it for
“considerations of patient privacy, the confidential relationship between doctor and patient, the adequacy of formal discovery devices, and the untenable position in which ex parte contacts place the nonparty treating physician supersede defendant's interest in a less expensive and more convenient method of discovery. . . . thus . . . defense counsel may not interview plaintiff's nonparty treating physicians privately without plaintiff's express consent.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENMidkiff v. Compton, 693 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 8-53 6×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“Confidential information obtained in medical records shall be furnished only on the authorization of the patient, or if deceased, the executor, administrator, or, in the case of unadministered estates, the next of kin.”
Later courts cite it for
“when reviewing a trial court's ruling on a discovery issue, we review the order of the trial court for an abuse of discretion.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENCates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734 (N.C. 1987).
cites § 8-53 3×cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 provides, in pertinent part: No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be required to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to…”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff's recovery is not reduced by payments from a collateral source such as Medicaid because such social legislation serves as health insurance for the needy.
Later courts cite it for
“medicaid is a form of insurance paid for by taxes collected from society in general. 'the medicaid program is social legislation; it is the equivalent of health insurance for the needy; and, just as any other insurance form, it is an acceptable collateral source” · 4 citing courts
6
YELLOWState v. Fullwood, 373 S.E.2d 518 (N.C. 1988).
cites § 8-53 2×cited by 85 cases
Vacated: 2 citing opinions add another limit ("vacated (caution)").
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 (1986) (emphasis added). The privilege thus "is not absolute; it is qualified by the statute itself.”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not err by refusing to submit a non-statutory mitigating circumstance if the jury is permitted to consider relevant circumstances through statutory mitigation or general instructions.
Later courts cite it for
“neither lockett nor eddings requires that the sentencer must determine that the submitted mitigating circumstance has mitigating value.” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENShelton v. Morehead Mem'l Hosp., 347 S.E.2d 824 (N.C. 1986).
cites § 8-53 2×cited by 71 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“Defendants assert on appeal, not having relied on either ground in the trial court, that any information or documents relating to peer reviews of the individual physicians not protected under § 95 are immune from discovery and use as evidence under a common law privilege and the…”
The case’s holding
Statutory protections for medical review committee proceedings do not shield information learned by committee members from sources outside the committee itself.
Later courts cite it for
“a court must consider the act as a whole, weighing the language of the statute, its spirit, and that which the statute seeks to accomplish.” · 7 citing courts
8
GREENMims v. Wright, 578 S.E.2d 606 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 8-53 3×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 (2001). Because this statutory privilege is to be strictly construed, Sims v.”
The case’s holding
A patient waives the physician-patient privilege only if they place their medical condition at issue through a claim, counterclaim, or defense.
Later courts cite it for
“subsequent case law has also recognized an implied waiver where a patient by bringing an action, counterclaim, or defense directly placed her medical condition at issue.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENSharpe v. Worland, 522 S.E.2d 577 (N.C. 1999).
cites § 8-53 1×cited by 208 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53. Id. at 756-57, 136 S.E.2d at 68-69 .”
The case’s holding
An interlocutory order affecting a substantial right occurs when a trial court compels the disclosure of documents protected by a statutory privilege.
Later courts cite it for
“a party asserts a statutory privilege which directly relates to the matter to be disclosed under an interlocutory discovery order, and the assertion of such privilege is not otherwise frivolous or insubstantial, the challenged order affects a substantial right . . . .” · 24 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Smith, 496 S.E.2d 357 (N.C. 1998).
cites § 8-53 2×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 (1986) (emphasis added). The decision that disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of justice “is one made in the discretion of the trial judge, and the defendant must show an abuse of discretion in order to successfully challenge the ruling.”
The case’s holding
A defendant's self-serving statements regarding a lack of requisite intent are insufficient to rebut the elements of a charged crime (State v. Smith).
Later courts cite it for
“the decision that disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of justice 'is one made in the discretion of the trial judge, and the defendant must show an abuse of discretion in order to successfully challenge the ruling.” · 4 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Smith, 789 S.E.2d 873 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 8-53 3×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 itself, to support his argument that this statute provides the exclusive means of obtaining patient medical records.”
Later courts cite it for
“continued to detect a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath and observed that the defendant had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Drdak, 411 S.E.2d 604 (N.C. 1992).
cites § 8-53 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 sets forth the procedure to compel disclosure of information which ordinarily is protected by the doctor-patient privilege.”
The case’s holding
A claim for destruction of evidence under the state constitution fails if the defendant fails to demonstrate bad faith (rejecting destruction of evidence claim because bad faith was not shown).
13
GREENAdams v. Lovette, 411 S.E.2d 620 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 8-53 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“Likewise, during arguments on the plaintiff's motions in limine, the defendant stated that the physician-patient "privilege .”
The case’s holding
A patient impliedly waives the physician-patient privilege by failing to object to requested disclosures on privilege grounds, and the party objecting to discovery bears the burden of establishing the privilege.
Later courts cite it for
“a patient impliedly waives his privilege when he does not object to requested disclosures of the privileged information.” · 1 citing court
14
GREENState v. Williams, 510 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. 1999).
cites § 8-53 1×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 does not require such an explicit finding” and that such a “finding is implicit in the admission of the evidence.”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not err by failing to give a curative jury instruction after sustaining an objection if the defendant does not request such an instruction.
Later courts cite it for
“it is not error for the trial court to fail to give a curative jury instruction after sustaining an objection, when defendant does not request such an instruction.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENState v. East, 481 S.E.2d 652 (N.C. 1997).
cites § 8-53 1×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53. We find defendant’s arguments unpersuasive.”
The case’s holding
Failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter is harmless error when the jury receives proper instructions on first-degree and second-degree murder and returns a first-degree murder verdict.
Later courts cite it for
“when a jury is properly instructed on both first-degree and second-degree murder and returns a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder, the failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter is harmless error.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENLOWD v. Reynolds, 695 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 8-53 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53” and because the “interrogatory is overly broad and unduly burdensome.”
17
GREENJones v. Asheville Radiological Grp., P.A., 518 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 8-53 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 (1986) ("Confidential information obtained in medical records shall be furnished only on the authorization of the patient.”
The case’s holding
Third-party providers must use formal discovery procedures or obtain patient authorization to disclose medical records regardless of whether a patient has impliedly waived privilege through a lawsuit.
Later courts cite it for
“causally or historically related to the claims.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENJones v. Asheville Radiological Grp., P.A., 500 S.E.2d 740 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 8-53 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“I disagree, however, that plaintiff's filing of a medical malpractice action against Dr.”
19
GREENCommonwealth v. Moore, 548 A.2d 1250 (Pa. 1988).
cites § 8-53 1×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53. In an insightful opinion, Sims v.”
20
GREENNorris v. Sattler, 533 S.E.2d 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 8-53 1×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 8-53
“C.G.S. § 8-53 (1999), defense counsel may not interview plaintiff’s nonparty treating physicians privately without plaintiff’s express consent.”
Later courts cite it for
“enforcement of that right, absent immediate appeal, will be lost, prejudiced, or be less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order.” · 1 citing court

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Citing cases by year
196519942023

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1999. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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N.C.14N.C. Ct. App.9W.D.N.C.1Pa.1
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