Delaware Code

6 Del. C. § 3-104 (2026)

Negotiable instrument

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), “negotiable instrument” means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:

(1) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;

(2) Is payable on demand or at a definite time; and

(3) Does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor, (iv) a term that specifies the law that governs the promise or order, or (v) an undertaking to resolve in a specified forum a dispute concerning the promise or order.

(b) “Instrument” means a negotiable instrument.

(c) An order that meets all of the requirements of subsection (a), except paragraph (1), and otherwise falls within the definition of “check” in subsection (f) is a negotiable instrument and a check.

(d) A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is not an instrument governed by this Article.

(e) An instrument is a “note” if it is a promise and is a “draft” if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of both “note” and “draft,” a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either.

(f) “Check” means (i) a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a cashier’s check or teller’s check. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by another term, such as “money order.”

(g) “Cashier’s check” means a draft with respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank.

(h) “Teller’s check” means a draft drawn by a bank (i) on another bank, or (ii) payable at or through a bank.

(i) “Traveler’s check” means an instrument that (i) is payable on demand, (ii) is drawn on or payable at or through a bank, (iii) is designated by the term “traveler’s check” or by a substantially similar term, and (iv) requires, as a condition to payment, a countersignature by a person whose specimen signature appears on the instrument.

(j) “Certificate of deposit” means an instrument containing an acknowledgment by a bank that a sum of money has been received by the bank and a promise by the bank to repay the sum of money. A certificate of deposit is a note of the bank.

5A Del. C. 1953, §§  3-10455 Del. Laws, c. 34970 Del. Laws, c. 86, §  384 Del. Laws, c. 174, § 20
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 2015–2024 · leading case: Weinstein v. Luxeyard, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2022).
Weinstein v. Luxeyard, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2022). · cites it 6× “30 See 6 Del. C. § 3-104 cmt. 1 (“the term “negotiable instrument” is limited to a signed writing that orders or promises payment of money”).”
Shen v. Li (Del. Super. Ct. 2023). · cites it 3× “§ 3-104(a) (1-3) and 6 Del. C. § 3-104 cmt. 1). 32 Id. (citing 6 Del.”
Valhalla Partners II, L.P. v. Vistar Media, Inc. (Del. Ch. 2024). · cites it 2× “A breach of contract claim requires: “(i) a contractual obligation, (ii) a breach of that obligation by the 194 6 Del. C. § 3-104. 195 See Def.’s Opening Br.”
The Bank of New York Mellon v. Shrewsbury (Del. Super. Ct. 2018). “The Legislature in adopted amendments to the UCC noting “These amendments have been proposed by the American Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code.”
Corso v. Concordia Healthcare USA, Inc. (D. Del. 2023). “1979)); accord Weinstein, 2022 WL 130973 , at *5; 6 Del. C. § 3-104(a). “[A] promise is unconditional unless it states: (1) an express condition to payment; (2) that the promise is subject to or governed by an- other writing; or (3) that rights or obligations with respect to the…”
Pekin Brook Farm LLC (Bankr. D. Vt. 2024). “1979)); accord Weinstein, 2022 WL 130973 , at *5; 6 Del. C. §3-104(a). 94 Weinstein, 2022 WL 130973 , at *5 (emphasis added); accord 6 Del.”
Stone Wolf Capital Mgmt. Co. (Bankr. D. Vt. 2024). “1979)); accord Weinstein, 2022 WL 130973 , at *5; 6 Del. C. §3-104(a). 94 Weinstein, 2022 WL 130973 , at *5 (emphasis added); accord 6 Del.”
Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Sears. (Del. Super. Ct. 2015). “21 6 Del. C. § 3-104. 22 6 Del. C. § 3-109. 23 6 Del.”
WBCMT 2006-C29 Off. 4250, LLC v. Chestnut Run Investors, LLC. (Del. Super. Ct. 2015). “83 6 Del. C. § 3-104; Minn. Stat. 336.3-104.”
— 6 Del. C. § 3-104(a) — 5 cases
Weinstein v. Luxeyard, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2022). “30 See 6 Del. C. § 3-104 cmt. 1 (“the term “negotiable instrument” is limited to a signed writing that orders or promises payment of money”).”
Shen v. Li (Del. Super. Ct. 2023). “§ 3-104(a) (1-3) and 6 Del. C. § 3-104 cmt. 1). 32 Id. (citing 6 Del.”
Corso v. Concordia Healthcare USA, Inc. (D. Del. 2023). “1979)); accord Weinstein, 2022 WL 130973 , at *5; 6 Del. C. § 3-104(a). “[A] promise is unconditional unless it states: (1) an express condition to payment; (2) that the promise is subject to or governed by an- other writing; or (3) that rights or obligations with respect to the…”
Pekin Brook Farm LLC (Bankr. D. Vt. 2024). “1979)); accord Weinstein, 2022 WL 130973 , at *5; 6 Del. C. §3-104(a). 94 Weinstein, 2022 WL 130973 , at *5 (emphasis added); accord 6 Del.”
Stone Wolf Capital Mgmt. Co. (Bankr. D. Vt. 2024). “1979)); accord Weinstein, 2022 WL 130973 , at *5; 6 Del. C. §3-104(a). 94 Weinstein, 2022 WL 130973 , at *5 (emphasis added); accord 6 Del.”
— 6 Del. C. § 3-104(a)(1) — 1 case
Weinstein v. Luxeyard, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2022). “30 See 6 Del. C. § 3-104 cmt. 1 (“the term “negotiable instrument” is limited to a signed writing that orders or promises payment of money”).”
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