Cases from cite.case.law:

STATE v. TEAGUE,, 275 So. 3d 828 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Joronjaye Leprino Teague guilty of fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer in violation of section 316.1935 . . . of twenty grams of cannabis in violation of section 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2017). " Section 316.1935 . . . ) expressly prohibits the court from withholding adjudication of guilt for any violation of section 316.1935 . . . We have considered and rejected Teague's argument regarding the constitutionality of section 316.1935 . . .

DANIEL, v. STATE, 271 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . judgment of conviction on the lesser included offense of second-degree fleeing or eluding under section 316.1935 . . . a law enforcement officer at high speed causing serious bodily injury or death pursuant to section 316.1935 . . . require the death of victim; serious bodily injury of a victim is sufficient to support this offense. § 316.1935 . . . See § 316.1935(3)(b) , Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

JAMES, v. STATE, 264 So. 3d 982 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . a), (b) and (2)(c)6., Florida Statutes and aggravated fleeing or eluding in violation of subsection 316.1935 . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019)

. . . . § 316.1935 , Fla. Stat. . . . Fleeing to elude 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8 Fleeing to elude 316.1935(2) 28.7 Fleeing to elude 316.1935(1) 28.6 . . . (1) 28.6 LEO Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 28.8(a) Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8 . . . Aggravated Fleeing 316.1935(4)(a) 28.85 28.8(e) Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Leaving the Scene . . . Vehicle or Property* Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 28.8(a) Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935 . . .

OWENS, v. STATE, 261 So. 3d 585 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . officer with lights and sirens activated while driving recklessly or at a high speed pursuant to section 316.1935 . . .

MOBLEY, v. STATE, 263 So. 3d 117 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . the day-for-day provision from mandatory minimum sentence after comparing the language from sections 316.1935 . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 254 So. 3d 493 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 316.1935(2), Florida Statutes (2016), under which appellant was prosecuted, does not include . . .

MANNERS, v. CANNELLA,, 891 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2018)

. . . . § 316.1935(1). . . .

ELLIS, v. STATE, 258 So. 3d 491 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 316.1935(2) & (3), Fla. . . . Ellis was convicted of a second-degree felony under section 316.1935(3)(a), Florida Statutes. . . . Id. § 316.1935(2). . . . Id. § 316.1935(3)(a). Such conduct is punishable as a second degree felony. . . . Id. §§ 316.1935(2) & (3). . . . markings prominently displayed on the vehicle, with siren and lights activated" pursuant to section 316.1935 . . . marked with a fifteen-inch City of Miami seal did not have the agency insignia required by section 316.1935 . . .

ROBERTS, v. STATE, 240 So. 3d 883 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 316.1935(2), Florida Statutes (2014), provides that "[a]ny person who willfully flees or attempts . . .

CANIDATE, v. STATE, 238 So. 3d 412 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . enforcement officer at a high speed or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property under section 316.1935 . . . offense of fleeing to elude a law enforcement officer with sirens and lights activated under section 316.1935 . . . a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084." § 316.1935 . . . of fleeing to elude a law enforcement officer with sirens and lights activated pursuant to section 316.1935 . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 236 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 2018)

. . . ONE TWO Fleeing to elude 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8 Fleeing to elude 316.1935(2) 28.7 Fleeing to elude 316.1935 . . . (1) 28.6 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8 Fleeing to . . . Aggravated Fleeing 316.1935(4)(a) 28.85 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Leaving the Scene of a . . . Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(2) 28.7 Reckless Driving (if . . . (1) 28.6 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8 Fleeing to . . .

COHEN, v. STATE, 230 So. 3d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 316.1935(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

MCCULLOUGH, v. STATE, 230 So. 3d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . While section 316.1935(3)(b) contains the additional elements of fleeing or attempting to elude a law . . . causing serious bodily injury, each element of section 782.071(l)(a) is also an element of section 316.1935 . . . That a violation of section 316.1935(3)(b) may be committed by causing serious bodily injury and not . . . Because section 316.1935(3)(b) includes the element of causing a death, it is a homicide offense. . . . This court hás explained that section 316.1935(3)(b)’s "wanton disregard” language is synonymous with . . . . § 316.1935(3)(b). . . . issue in Cooper and the fleeing and eluding “caus[ing] serious bodily injury or death to another.” § 316.1935 . . . According to the rationale in Cooper, that section 316.1935(3)(b) does not necessarily require that an . . . See §§ 316.1935(3)(b), 782.071(l)(a). . . . McCullough was not, however, charged under section 316.1935(4)(b). . . . .

GUZMAN- AVILES, v. STATE, 226 So. 3d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 316.1935(1), Fla. . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. MARTIN,, 864 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 316.1935(2) qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal . . .

LINTON, v. STATE, 212 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Id. at 648-49; see also § 316.1935(3)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . convicting Appellant of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of section 316.1935 . . . McKinney refers to section 316.1935(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), which includes the element of causing . . .

BALL, v. STATE, 208 So. 3d 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 316.1935(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013); Bynes v. State, 127 So.3d 556, 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). . . .

N. CLARK, v. STATE, 207 So.3d 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . enforcement officer with a weapon; (2) high speed or wanton fleeing law enforcement in violation of section 316.1935 . . .

J. SULLIVAN, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 837 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . §316.1935(3); possession of cocaine, Fla. . . .

R. BANNER, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 659 F. App'x 1005 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 810.02(1), (3); aggravated fleeing or eluding, id, § 316.1935(3)(a); grand theft, id, § 812,014(1 . . .

UNITED STATES v. TELUSME,, 655 F. App'x 743 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 316.1935(2), which could serve as ACCA-predicate offenses. . . .

UNITED STATES v. HILL,, 652 F. App'x 835 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 316.1935 is a qualifying predicate crime of violence. United States v. . . .

LUCAS, v. STATE, 192 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See §§ 316.063(1), 316.1935(1), 810.02(1)(b)(4), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . The information tracked the language of section 316.1935(1) (fleeing-to elude a law enforcement officer . . . 136, 137-38 (Fla.2011) (Standard Jury Instruction 28.6, Fleeing to Elude a Law Enforcement Officer, § 316.1935 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 192 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 2016)

. . . Lesser Included Offenses Comments * § 316.1935(4), Fla. . . . Lesser Included Offenses Comments * § 316.1935(4), Fla. . . . Involving Serious Bodily Injury, Injury or Death then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) § 316.1935 . . . Lesser Included Offenses Comments * § 316.1935(4), Fla. . . . Lesser Included Offenses Comments * § 316.1935(4), Fla. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FORD,, 649 F. App'x 756 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . did not err in determining Ford’s prior fleeing-or-eluding conviction under Florida Statutes section 316.1935 . . . As such, given the risks posed by the fleeing-or-eluding offense, Ford’s prior § 316.1935(2) conviction . . .

UNITED STATES v. GEFFRARD,, 648 F. App'x 848 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 316.1935(1) — qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause of ACCA. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CASAMAYOR,, 643 F. App'x 905 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . — fleeing and eluding a police officer by driving at high speed, in violation of Florida Statutes § 316.1935 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GARNER,, 644 F. App'x 880 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 316.1935. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) qualified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause. . . . Stat. § 316.1935 does not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical fore . . .

UNITED STATES v. T. ADAMS,, 815 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 316.1935 — qualified as violent felonies under the residual clause of the ACCA. . . . Stat. § 316.1935, can serve as predicate offenses only if they qualify as violent felonies under a different . . . Stat. § 316.1935(1) and (2) do not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical . . . Stat. § 316.1935. . . . . Stat. § 316.1935(1) and (2) provide as follows: (1) It is unlawful for the operator of any vehicle, having . . .

L. BRADSHAW, v. McCORMICK, Jr., 182 So. 3d 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . or' attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of one of the subsections of section 316.1935 . . . Subsection 316.1935(7) provides that “fa]ny motor vehicle involved in a violation of [section 316.1935 . . . Operating under the authority of subsection 316.1935(7), the Sheriffs Office filed a forfeiture complaint . . . directed at McCormick’s truck based on a violation of section 316.1935. . . . that, in his criminal case, he pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor, not to any felony violation of section 316.1935 . . .

UNITED STATES v. COOK, a. k. a., 624 F. App'x 723 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 316.1935, qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause, 18 . . . Stat. § 316.1935(l)-(2) does not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical . . .

MELVIN, v. STATE, 177 So. 3d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . For example, section 316.1935, which imposes a three-year mandatory minimum prison term for high-speed . . . or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the mandatory minimum sentence.” § 316.1935 . . .

BURNS, v. STATE, 170 So. 3d 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . simultaneous convictions for felony fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, in violation of section 316.1935 . . .

LAMBERT, v. STATE, 170 So. 3d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See §§ 316.1935(3)(a), 775.083(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 166 So. 3d 161 (Fla. 2015)

. . . 1851, January 10, 2008] [973 So.2d 432] and 2015. 28.6 FLEEING TO ELUDE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER § 316.1935 . . . So.3d 136], and 2015. 28.7 FLEEING TO ELUDE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER (Siren and Lights Activated) § 316.1935 . . . and Lights Activated with High Speed or Reckless Driving Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) § 316.1935 . . . OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death then Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) § 316.1935 . . . Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death and then Causing Injury.or Property _Damage to Another) — 316.1935 . . .

T. RHODES, v. STATE, 168 So. 3d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . The judgment correctly cites section 316.1935(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and should show the offense as . . .

UNITED STATES v. SYMINGTON,, 781 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, in violation of Florida Statute § 316.1935 . . .

GRAHAM, v. STATE, 162 So. 3d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . score sheet offense of felony fleeing to elude law enforcement with lights and sirens activated under § 316.1935 . . .

UNITED STATES v. VIAUD,, 601 F. App'x 833 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . This Court has held that a conviction under § 316.1935(2), Florida Statutes, such as Viaud’s fleeing . . .

D. WHITE, v. STATE, 157 So. 3d 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . One of these offenses was “fleeing and eluding (high speed),” a violation of section 316.1935(3)(a), . . . sentence characterize this offense as “aggravated fleeing and eluding,” which is a violation of section 316.1935 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ANDERSON,, 600 F. App'x 666 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . He argues that his prior convictions for “simple” fleeing and eluding under Florida Statutes § 316.1935 . . . (1) in 2009 and fleeing and eluding the police with lights and sirens under § 316.1935(2) in 2010 and . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2). . . . Stat. § 316.1935(1). . . . (1), unlike § 316.1935(2), does not require that the offender flee from a marked patrol vehicle with . . .

UNITED STATES v. E. DAVIS,, 773 F.3d 334 (1st Cir. 2014)

. . . (11th Cir.2014), the Eleventh Circuit held that “vehicle flight” in violation of Florida Statutes § 316.1935 . . . So instead of making a futile argument that a conviction for vehicular flight under § 316.1935(1) does . . . Stat. § 316.1935(1) (emphasis added). . . . ) a 2007 Florida conviction for vehicular flight to elude police in violation of Florida Statutes § 316.1935 . . . Defendant objected to his convictions under both § 316.1935(1) and (2) in the district court as improper . . .

UNITED STATES v. SMITH,, 772 F.3d 680 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) did not qualify as a “Violent felony” under the ACCA. Id. at 1282-84. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) was a violent felony for ACCA purposes. In United States v. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2). . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) “is categorically a violent felony under the [ACCA].” . . . This jury instruction was “based on the text of section 316.1935(2).” Id. cmt. . . .

DIXON, a. k. a. a. k. a. v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 768 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 316.1935(4)(a), was not an aggravated felony. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(4)(a). . . . The issue to resolve with respect to section 316.1935(4)(a), then, is whether it is an “offense[] that . . .

UNITED STATES v. DAVIS, a. k. a., 572 F. App'x 786 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . prior conviction for fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer, in violation of Florida Statute § 316.1935 . . . In Smith we concluded that fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer under Florida Statute § 316.1935 . . . Having already concluded that fleeing and eluding a law enforcement under Florida Statute § 316.1935( . . .

UNITED STATES v. M. JOHNSON, Jr., 570 F. App'x 852 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . Stat. § 316.1935(1). In United States v. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(1) qualifies as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.” 747 F.3d 1312, . . . At the time he pleaded guilty in 2007, the pattern jury instruction for § 316.1935(1) allowed jurors . . . Johnson uses the difference in jury instructions to argue that § 316.1935(1) was not categorically a . . . There we rejected a similar argument from a defendant convicted under Florida Statute § 316.1935(2). . . .

ROCHESTER, v. STATE, 140 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2014)

. . . See §§ 316.1935(6), Fla. Stat. (2008); 775.087(2) & (3); 784.07(3)(b), Fla. . . .

UNITED STATES v. VINALES,, 564 F. App'x 518 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 316.1935(3) also constitutes a “violent felony” under the residual clause of the ACCA. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA). . . . Stat. § 316.1935(3) is a “crime of violence” as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) for purposes of the career . . .

UNITED STATES v. PILOTO,, 562 F. App'x 907 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . In Petite, we held that a Florida conviction under § 316.1935(2) is categorically a violent felony under . . .

UNITED STATES v. TRAVIS,, 747 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . Stat. § 316.1935(1). . . . Id. § 316.1935(2). . . . Id. § 316.1935(3). The Supreme Court’s decision in Sykes v. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) is a violent felony under the ACCA. 703 F.3d at 1301. . . . That § 316.1935(1), unlike § 316.1935(2), does not require that the offender flee from a marked patrol . . .

JOHNSON, v. STATE, 137 So. 3d 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 316.1935, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . enforcement officer is a third degree felony (even if the officer did not activate lights and siren). § 316.1935 . . .

UNITED STATES v. SMITH,, 742 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . Stat. § 316.1935(2), as a violent felony. . . . Section 316.1935(2) is the lesser-included-offense of aggravated vehicle flight defined in section 316.1935 . . . Stat. § 316.1935(3). . . . Id. § 316.1935(7). . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2), qualifies as a violent felony. . . .

UNITED STATES v. DANIELS,, 554 F. App'x 885 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . Under Florida Statute § 316.1935(1), simple fleeing and eluding occurs when “any person ... willfully . . . Stat. § 316.1935(1). . . . Under Florida Statute § 316.1935(4), a person commits aggravated fleeing or eluding when that person: . . . Stat. § 316.1935(4). In United States v. . . .

MASTERSON, v. STATE, 133 So. 3d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . The State’s information charged Appellant with a violation of section 316.1935(3)(a), Florida Statutes . . . that Appellant was charged with, and found guilty of, the non-aggravated offense proscribed by section 316.1935 . . .

UNITED STATES v. JACKSON, a. k. a., 551 F. App'x 499 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . erred in sentencing him as a career offender because his prior conviction under Florida Statutes § 316.1935 . . . This court has held that “vehicle flight in violation of [Florida Statutes] § 316.1935(2) qualifies as . . . After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that a conviction under § 316.1935 . . . Like the statutes in Sykes and Petite, § 316.1935(1) makes it a felony for the operator of a vehicle . . . by the crimes of burglary and arson, id. at 1301, we hold that a conviction under Florida Statutes § 316.1935 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 131 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1935. . . .

WHITE, v. STATE, 135 So. 3d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1935, Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

UNITED STATES v. ORTIZ,, 536 F. App'x 893 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . Id. § 316.1935(2) (2006); see United States v. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a); see Petite, 703 F.3d at 1292-93 (referring to an offense under § 316.1935(3) . . . than convicted of) a violation of § 316.1935(2). . . . Stat. § 316.1935(1). . . . . § 316.1935 as evidence that a conviction under § 316.1935(1), which could carry a less severe penalty . . .

UNITED STATES v. SANDERS,, 536 F. App'x 879 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1935(3). . . . Stat. § 316.1935(3) are violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)); United States v . . . Stat. § 316.1935(3), is a “crime of violence” under the career offender enhancement, § 4B1.1). . . .

GILLESPIE, v. UNITED STATES, 537 F. App'x 832 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1935(2), was a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) We affirm. I. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2); United States v. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(3); Petite, 703 F.3d at 1293. . . . Stat. §§ 316.1935(3); 775.082(3)(b)-(c). . . . In Petite, we held that a conviction under § 316.1935(2) constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. . . .

RIVERS, v. STATE, 124 So. 3d 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1935(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . .

STATE v. KIRER,, 120 So. 3d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Appellant was charged with violating section 316.1935(1), Florida Statutes (2012), which, in pertinent . . . continued to drive for nearly two miles, providing probable cause to stop him for violating section 316.1935 . . . verbal orders to stop from the police, “[h]is stop for fleeing a police officer pursuant to section 316.1935 . . . Lastly, though in a different context, this court has interpreted section 316.1935, Florida Statutes, . . . probable cause that appellee committed the crime of fleeing or attempting to elude in violation of section 316.1935 . . .

T. K. a v. STATE, 125 So. 3d 970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . alcohol by a minor, the juvenile was charged with aggravated fleeing and eluding pursuant to section 316.1935 . . . But, we agree that the plain meaning of the word “violent” is not applicable to the section 316.1935( . . . injury or death to another person,” which would have raised the offense to a first degree felony, § 316.1935 . . .

UNITED STATES v. LEAKS,, 518 F. App'x 860 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1935(2), qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA. Id. at 1301. . . .

UNITED STATES v. SMITH,, 518 F. App'x 774 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1935(2), did not qualify as a violent felony under the Act. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2). . . . unlawfully and willfully flee or attempt to elude a law enforcement officer ... in violation of [§ ] 316.1935 . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act.” . . .

UNITED STATES v. THERAMENE,, 517 F. App'x 789 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1935(2) was not a violent felony. . . . . § 316.1935(2). The court determined that Sykes effectively overruled Harrison. . . . . § 316.1935(2) from the Indiana statute at issue in Sykes, and thus, it determined that his offense . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2), as opposed to aggravated vehicle flight under § 316.1935(3), was not a violent felony . . . , an offense under § 316.1935(2) was a violent felony under the ACCA. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CORONADO- CURA,, 713 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1935(2) is an “aggravated felony” under § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C) of the sentencing guidelines. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2). . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2). . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) falls within the definition of “violent felony” under the ACCA. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) is a violent felony for ACCA purposes. Id. at 1300. . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. GANDY, a. k. a. a. k. a., 710 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) is a predicate offense under the ACCA. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) was not a violent felony under the ACCA. See United States v. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) qualifies as a violent felony under the residual clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2). . . . flight” (Fla.Stat. § 316.1935(3)). . . .

GARVIN, v. STATE, 106 So. 3d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 316.1935(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). . See § 812.014(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

UNITED STATES v. PETITE,, 703 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 316.1935(2) is a violent felony for ACCA purposes. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) on May 22, 2006. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(3). We refer to this offense as “aggravated vehicle flight.” . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2). . . . a violation of the base offense in § 316.1935(2), it does not follow that a violation of § 316.1935(2 . . .

GORDON, v. STATE, 103 So. 3d 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . because the judge was under the mistaken belief that he was being sentenced for a violation of section 316.1935 . . . eluding a marked law enforcement vehicle with sirens flashing), rather than a violation of section 316.1935 . . . The judgment of conviction admittedly reflects a conviction for section 316.1935(2), rather than a conviction . . . for section 316.1935(1). . . . of a violation of subsection (1) and was before the court to be sentenced for a violation of section 316.1935 . . .

R. KNITE, v. STATE, 102 So. 3d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . A violation of subsection (1) of 316.1935 is a misdemean- or; a violation of subsection (2) a third degree . . .

E. BYNES, v. STATE, 127 So. 3d 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Appellant was convicted of aggravated fleeing and eluding pursuant to section 316.1935(3), Florida Statutes . . .

McDUFFIE, v. STATE, 135 So. 3d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . State, 81 So.3d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (reversing conviction for fleeing to elude under section 316.1935 . . . (3) and remanding for entry of judgment on the original charge of fleeing to elude under section 316.1935 . . .

ROCHESTER, v. STATE, 95 So. 3d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Although the aggravated fleeing and eluding statute — section 316.1935, Florida Statutes (2007) — stated . . . In reaching its holding, this Court reasoned: Section 316.1935(6) clearly prohibits a withhold of adjudication . . . for a section 316.1935 violation. . . . Section 316.1935(6) was enacted in 2004, while section 921.0026 was passed in 1998. . . . Because it is the later promulgated statute, section 316.1935(6) should prevail “as the last expression . . .

HANSON, v. STATE, 92 So. 3d 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . insignia and other jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle” as required by section 316.1935 . . . evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense set forth in section 316.1935 . . .

POPE, v. STATE, 95 So. 3d 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . He also was convicted of fleeing or attempting to elude under section 316.1935(2), Florida Statutes. . . .

HENDERSON, v. STATE, 88 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . District affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, finding that the stop was valid under section 316.1935 . . . continued to drive for nearly two miles, providing probable cause to stop him for violating section 316.1935 . . . Section 316.1935(2), Florida Statutes (2010), provides: "Any person who willfully flees or attempts to . . .

UNITED STATES v. DOYLE,, 678 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 316.1935(3)(a))); Ethingor, 388 Fed.Appx. at 861-62 (same). . . . Slat. § 316.1935(3)). . . .

DUTTON, Jr. v. STATE, 89 So. 3d 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . However, because the trial court was required by section 316.1935(3)(b), Florida Statutes, to impose . . . judgment and sentence to reflect that the minimum mandatory term was in fact imposed pursuant to section 316.1935 . . .

KITTLES, v. STATE, 83 So. 3d 958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . . § 316.1935(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HUDSON,, 673 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 316.1935(2) (punishing one who “willfully flees or attempts to elude a ... . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2). . . . Nonetheless, applying the Sykes analysis to the base offense at issue here, § 316.1935(2), inevitably . . . )(a) and 316.1935(3)(b), it correspondingly defined a minimal risk crime in § 316.1935(2), which criminalizes . . . While it may be true that the conduct underlying violations of §§ 316.1935(3)(a) and 316.1935(3)(b) presents . . .

WHITEHALL, v. STATE, 81 So. 3d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Here, the plain language of section 316.1935(3) contains additional elements that subsection (1) does . . . See § 316.1935(3). . . . jury found all elements of the necessarily-included lesser offense of fleeing to elude under section 316.1935 . . . (Crim.) 28.8 (designating an offense under section 316.1935(1) as a necessarily lesser-included offense . . . of one under section 316.1935(3)). . . .

E. TERRELL, F. F. v. SMITH, a, 668 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 316.1935(1) reads in relevant part this way: It is unlawful for the operator of any vehicle, having . . .

ORSO, v. UNITED STATES, 452 F. App'x 912 (11th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 316.1935(2). . . . . Stat. § 316.1935(2) — the fleeing subsection forming the basis of Orso's felony-fleeing conviction — . . .

LOTT, v. STATE, 74 So. 3d 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . The alternative element of “serious bodily injury” contained in section 316.1935(3)(b) distinguishes . . .

JONES, v. STATE, 74 So. 3d 149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Jones was charged with fleeing at high speed to elude, a second-degree felony in violation of section 316.1935 . . .

ADRIEN, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 446 F. App'x 172 (11th Cir. 2011)

. . . including two convictions for fleeing and eluding a police officer, in violation of Florida Statutes § 316.1935 . . .

FORD, v. STATE, 69 So. 3d 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See §§ 316.1935, 322.34(2)(a), 893.13, and 893.147, Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 73 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 2011)

. . . APPENDIX 28.6 FLEEING TO ELUDE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER § 316.1935(1), Fla. Stat. . . . So.2d 1081] and 2011. 28.7 FLEEING TO ELUDE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER (Siren and Lights Activated) § 316.1935 . . . ELUDE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER (Siren and Lights Activated with High Speed or Reckless Driving) § 316.1935 . . . and Lights Activated with High Speed or Reckless Driving Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) § 316.1935 . . . OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death then Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) § 316.1935 . . .

M. SANNER, v. STATE, 63 So. 3d 934 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Appellant challenges his conviction for fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer under section 316.1935 . . . We therefore reverse with directions to reduce the conviction to a third degree felony under 316.1935 . . .

STATE v. CULVER,, 63 So. 3d 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . no contest plea to a charge of fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer in violation of section 316.1935 . . . Section' 316.1935(6) expressly prohibits the court from "withholding adjudication of guilt for any violation . . . of section 316.1935. . . .

GALLEGOS, v. STATE, 62 So. 3d 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 316.1935(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . .

SYKES v. UNITED STATES, 564 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2011)

. . . . §316.1935 (2010); Mich. Comp. Laws Aim. § 257.602a (West 2010); Minn. Stat. §609.487 (2010); N. . . .

MARCUS SYKES, v. UNITED STATES, 180 L. Ed. 2d 60 (U.S. 2011)

. . . . § 316.1935 (2010); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.602a (West 2010); Minn. . . .

WARD, v. STATE, 59 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 316.1935(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . . § 316.1935(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. LEE, a. k. a. a. k. a. a. k. a. a. k. a. a. k. a., 631 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 316.1935(3)(a)). . . . Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a) and Begay v. . . . Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b. . . .

T. McKINNEY, v. STATE, 51 So. 3d 645 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Section 316.1935, Florida Statutes, proscribes the offense of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement . . . The alternative element of “serious bodily injury” contained in section 316.1935(3)(b) distinguishes . . . otherwise attempting to effect a stop of the person’s vehicle, commits a felony of the first degree.... § 316.1935 . . .

UNITED STATES v. NIX,, 628 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 316.1935(3). . . . Nix’s challenge to the § 316.1935(3) conviction is foreclosed by United States v. . . .