Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 440.19 (2025)
Time bars to filing petitions for benefits.
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440.19 Time bars to filing petitions for benefits.—
(1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee’s estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death pursuant to s. 440.185(1) and the petition is filed within 2 years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.
(2) Payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to either a notice of injury or a petition for benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment. This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment.
(3) The filing of a petition for benefits does not toll the limitations period set forth in this section unless the petition meets the specificity requirements set forth in s. 440.192.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee’s claim unless the carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial response to the petition for benefits. If a claimant contends that an employer or its carrier is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense and the carrier demonstrates that it has provided notice to the employee in accordance with s. 440.185 and that the employer has posted notice in accordance with s. 440.055, the employee must demonstrate estoppel by clear and convincing evidence.
(5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the period shall begin to run from the date of appointment of such guardian or other representative, or in the case of a minor, if no guardian is appointed before the minor becomes of age, from the date the minor becomes of age.
(6) When recovery is denied to any person in a suit brought at law or in admiralty to recover damages for injury or death on the ground that such person was an employee, that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of this chapter, and that such employer had secured compensation of such employee under this chapter, the limitations period set forth in this section shall begin to run from the date of termination of such suit; however, in such an event, the employer is allowed a credit of his or her actual cost of defending such suit in an amount not to exceed $250, which amount must be deducted from any compensation allowed or awarded to the employee under this chapter.
History.—s. 19, ch. 17481, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(19); s. 1, ch. 23908, 1947; s. 10, ch. 26484, 1951; s. 4, ch. 29778, 1955; s. 1, ch. 57-192; s. 1, ch. 65-120; s. 2, ch. 67-554; ss. 17, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 23, ch. 78-300; ss. 15, 124, ch. 79-40; ss. 11, 21, ch. 79-312; s. 7, ch. 80-236; s. 7, ch. 83-305; ss. 15, 43, ch. 89-289; ss. 23, 56, ch. 90-201; ss. 21, 52, ch. 91-1; s. 23, ch. 93-415; s. 113, ch. 97-103.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 270
cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1944–2026 · leading case: Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). “1st DCA 1998), as that case addressed a previous version of section 440.19, Florida Statutes. I, therefore, join the majority in reversing the JCC's order.”
McBride v. Pratt & Whitney, 909 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994).”
Holder v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets, 610 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1992). “See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). This amendment removed the limitation restricting the exception to the two-year limitation period for filing a claim for compensation to situations where payment of compensation or remedial treatment was voluntarily provided.”
Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). “§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] Subsections (5) and (6) provide: (5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the…”
Keller Kitchen Cabinets v. Holder, 586 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “The current order before us resolves the claim on the ground that only the limitations period in Section 440.19 need be applied, which conclusion we now reverse.”
Roe v. City investing/Gen. Dev. Corp., 587 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1991). “When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the…”
Gaines v. Orange Cnty. Pub. Utils., 710 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “1994), provides: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death…”
Punsky v. Clay Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 60 So. 3d 1088 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “In his first point on appeal, claimant contends that section 440.19(6) permits an award of either zero costs or, at most, 0 in costs against a claimant in a case where compensability is denied because there is no fund of money from which to deduct the 0.”
Palmer v. McKesson Corp., 7 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “Although it can be inferred from our prior decisions that we have concluded (without expressly saying so) that a workers’ compensation claimant carries the burden of proving the applicability of the tolling exception contained in section 440.”
City of Orlando v. Blackburn, 519 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). “We decline to interpret the word "remedial" as used in section 440.19 in such a narrow manner to mean strictly curative care to the exclusion of treatment which is not curative but which nevertheless mitigates the conditions or effects of the injury.”
Gore v. Lee Cnty. Sch. Bd., 43 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “The JCC reasoned that the Legislature made a substantive change to the law when it amended section 440.19, Florida Statutes, regarding the application of the statute of limitations to prosthetic devices, and therefore intended a specific alteration of the law.”
Airey v. Wal-mart/sedgwick, 24 So. 3d 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “In this workers’ compensation case, claimant seeks review of a final order dismissing his petition for benefits filed on February 15, 2007, as time-barred pursuant to section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2003). Because we conclude that the judge of compensation claims erred as a…”
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). “See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). 5 Like the statutory limit on temporary disability benefits, the statute of limitations must be given effect.”
Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1952). “) Since the legislature in clear and unambiguous language has defined the expression "time of injury" to mean the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury, there is no room for us to theorize; nor are we authorized to place a different construction upon the…”
Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). “See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2006) (barring employee petitions for workers’ compensation benefits unless the petition is filed within two years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known the injury arose out of work performed in the course and scope of…”
Ardmore Farms v. Smith, 423 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “The original filing of LES Form BCL-13b with the employer or carrier does not constitute the filing of a formal claim for benefits or claim for compensation as contemplated in subsection 440.19 or 440.25, Florida Statutes.”
Fontanills v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., 913 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “Although Hanssen held that a claimant who was fully aware of his entitlement to medical benefits, but failed to request them within the requisite two-year period then required by law, was barred by the limitation period, despite the failure of the E/C to advise him of the time…”
Timmeny v. Tropical Botanicals Corp., 615 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). “Because he filed his claim within the same year, the bar of the limitation period in section 440.19 is inapplicable. Appellee also argues that appellant has failed to preserve his estoppel argument in that he raised it for the first time by motion for rehearing following the…”
Straw v. Steve Moore Chevrolet, 651 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1991) provides in pertinent part: (l)(a) The right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor which meets the requirements of paragraph (e) is filed within…”
Universal Rivet, Inc. v. Cash, 598 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “" To the extent relevant to this appeal, Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that "[t]he right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss .”
Loziane O. Moise v. Disney Pop Century Resort, & Walt Disney World etc., 244 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). “25(4)(i), Florida Statutes (2011), permitting motions to dismiss for lack of prosecution, and section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2011), the statute of limitations (“SOL”) provision.”
Dufrene v. Video Co-op, La. Workers'comp., 843 So. 2d 1066 (La. 2003). “[11] Like Louisiana, Florida has a separate statutory provision governing when an employee must file a claim for benefits, Fla. Stat. 440.19. [12] In Wood v. McTyre Trucking, 526 So.”
Rebich v. Burdine's & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “Fabric, the claimant's treating physician, appeals from a workers' compensation order finding that certain of his claims for payment of services rendered to the claimant are barred by the two year statute of limitations of Section 440.19, Florida Statutes. Fabric essentially…”
Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 490 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 1986). “§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1985). [2] The judge of industrial claims initially found a gap of over two years and denied relief on that basis.”
Jeffrey's Steel v. Conibear Equip., Inc., 854 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Payment of indemnity benefits or furnishing remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to a notice of injury or a PFB will toll the limitations period for one year from the date of payment.”
Bassett's Dairy v. Thomas, 429 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “28, Florida Statutes, or was properly allowed to proceed under Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1969), current version found at Section 440.”
Solar Pane Insulating Glass v. HANSEEN, 727 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “, here section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1985). Claims Center is, moreover, in the situation of the insurance carrier in Nebenhaus v.”
Herb's Exxon v. Whatmough, 487 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “In response to the deputy's finding of two accidents, the employer/carrier filed a motion for rehearing, raising a statute of limitations defense under section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980).”
Wood v. McTyre Trucking Co., Inc., 526 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Because claimant filed his claim for benefits more than two years after July 8, 1982, the DC denied all claims and dismissed the case finding that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 440.”
Gauthier v. Florida Int'l Univ., 38 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “ANALYSIS Claimant’s petition was untimely under section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2005), because her claim was made more than two years after her injury and more than one year after her last receipt of benefits.”
Turner v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets, S., Inc., 247 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1971). “The paramount issue was whether the statute of limitations provided by Fla. Stat. § 440.19 (1) (a), F.S.A. and Fla.”
McNeilly v. Farm Stores, Inc., 553 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). “McNeilly has appealed an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying his claim for benefits and medical expenses based on the running of the statute of limitations, Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985).”
Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp., P.A. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “§ 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (1997 and 2001). The next subsection of the statute allows for a one-year extension of this period based on the payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of treatment pursuant to a notice of injury or petition for benefits (PFB).”
Cash v. Universal Rivet, Inc., 616 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993). “The employer and carrier denied the claim on the ground that, pursuant to subsection 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), the two-year statute of limitations had run.”
Univ. of Florida v. McLarthy, 483 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “NOTES [1] Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), provides: The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made or…”
Baptist Manor Nursing Home v. Madison, 658 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “1990), is substantive and the 1994 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law significantly change the substantive right to have the employer pay attorney's fees, and because the E/C failed to accept the claimant as PTD within 21 days of service of a claim which met the…”
Allen v. City of St. Augustine, 500 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “The parties apparently ignored Aris , in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld the ruling of a Judge of Industrial Claims that section 440.19(1) would not apply to an incompetent until a guardian or other authorized representative had been appointed to protect his interests.”
Ellis v. Galloway's Inc., 794 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). “1994) (stating the one-year SOL); § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991) (stating the two-year SOL).”
Hall v. Seaboard Mar. Corp., 104 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). “[1] Claimant sought to avoid this defense by a plea of mental incompetency under F.S. § 440.19 (3), F.S.A., which provided that F.”
Ricardo Sanchez v. Am. Airlines & Sedgwick CMS, 169 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). “In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in finding that his April 2014 petition for' benefits (PFB) was barred by the statute of limitations in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2011). Finding no error in the JCC’s…”
Certain v. Big Johnson Concrete Pumping, Inc., 34 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “§ 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (2005). The JCC determined the Employer/Carrier’s Notice of Denial sufficiently raised the statute of limitations as a basis for denying Certain’s claim.”
Deere v. Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd., 880 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Spann, 479 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
AB Taff & Sons v. Clark, 110 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). “34(1), supra, and from a "claim" as referred to in Section 440.19(1) (a), (c), also to be considered in pari materia and upon which the employer relies, providing as follows: "(1) (a) The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim…”
Tower Chem. Co. v. Hubbard, 527 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations applicable to this claim, states: All rights for remedial attention under this section shall be barred unless a claim therefor which meets the requirements of paragraph (d) is filed with the division within 2…”
Devilling v. Rimes, Inc., 591 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Budget Luxury Inns, Inc. v. Boston, 407 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Patco Transp., Inc. v. Estupinan, 917 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “See § 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee's claim unless the carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial…”
Watson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 288 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1973).
Houston-Miller v. U.S. Fire Ins., 668 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “The appellant, June Houston-Miller, appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (“JCC”) dismissing her petition for benefits on the ground that her petition for benefits was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 440.19(l)(b), Florida…”
ABC Liquors, Inc. v. Creed, 573 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Aris v. Big Ten Taxi Corp., 330 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1976). “Section 440.19(3), Florida Statutes (1973).”
Garza v. Jordan Farms, 532 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: The right to compensation .”
City of St. Augustine v. Allen, 404 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Sanchez v. Acapulco Plasters & Stucco, 668 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Johnson v. Div. of Forestry, 397 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Lee v. City of Jacksonville, 616 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1993).
Jackson v. Comput. Sci. Raytheon, 36 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “§ 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (2008) (statutory provision allowing employee to avoid statute of limitations defense where estoppel is proven).”
Estes v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., Davies Claims North Am., Inc. (Fla. 1st DCA 2026). “§440.19(5), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphases added).”
Adelman Steel Corp. v. Winter, 610 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Rice v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 924 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Taylor v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 596 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Fla. Erection Serv. Inc. v. Mcdonald, 395 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Townsley v. Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 79 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1955).
City of Miami v. Bell, 606 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Turner v. G. Pierce Wood Mem'l Hosp., 600 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Hoppe v. City of Lakeland, 691 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
City investing/Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Roe, 566 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Ozment, 440 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Diamond R. Fertilizer v. Davis, 567 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). “Bell, to pay attendant care costs to claimant's sister for her past service, and to pay attorney fees of 0,000 and costs.”
Munroe Mem'l Hosp. v. Thompson, 388 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
Chemstrand Co. v. Enfinger, 231 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1970).
Thomas v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 536 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Varitimidis v. WALGREEN Co., 58 So. 3d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
Gilman v. South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 584 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “First, section 440.19(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), the provision cited and relied on in the order, requires that the order “state with particularity why the claim is not in compliance” with section 440.”
Florida Hosp. v. Williams, 689 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Bailey's Auto Serv. v. Mitchell, 85 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1956).
Walter Denson & Son v. Nelson, 88 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1956).
Fuster v. E. Airlines, Inc., 545 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
United States Steel Corp. v. Green, 353 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1977). “Steel of "the nature of [Green's] claim" for permanent and total disability benefits, as required by Section 440.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1973).”
Food Mach. Corp. v. Shook, 425 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Foster Wheeler Energy Grp. v. Fairhurst, 405 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). “Upon consideration, we have concluded that the carrier's payment on January 4, 1978 of interest on compensation payable under a worker's compensation order should be deemed "compensation" within the meaning of that term as used in the two year statute of limitations provision of…”
Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Dunn, 85 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1956).
Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 438 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “Testimony establishes that medical care will be required due to the industrial accident, but at a time in the future probably beyond the two-year statute of limitations of Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes. Claimant, an 18-year-old, suffered 80 percent loss of vision in his…”
Ginsberg v. ChemMED Corp., 929 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Denestan v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 789 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
BORNEISEN v. Home Depot, 917 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Bell v. Com. Carriers, 603 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “Section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), bars claims unless they are: "filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that, if payment of compensation has been made or remedial treatment or rehabilitation services have been furnished by the employer on account of…”
Sauer Indus. Contracting Inc. v. Ditch, 547 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
North River Ins. Co. v. Wuelling, 683 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “192(8) "act to revive a claim previously barred by the statute of limitations under F.S. 440.19(2)(a)." He ordered the E/C to pay the medical bills detailed in the petition for benefits, plus interest, costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.”
Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. Philip, 746 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
Roemhildt v. Gresser Companies, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 2007).
Gunter v. Sauer, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “34(3)(b) attorney's fee provision was created in chapter 89-289, section 19, Laws of Florida, neither section 440.19(1)(d) nor (e) made any mention of an acknowledged claim.”
Gunn's Quality Glass & Mirrors, Inc. v. Strode, 425 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “Thus, the November 1, 1979 request for an operation submitted to the E/C, but not filed as a claim in accordance with Section 440.19(2)(d), did not qualify as a claim.”
Seamco Labs., Inc. v. Pearson, 424 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Ortiz v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., Travelers Ins., & Sedgwick CMS (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
Krajenta v. Div. of Workers' Comp., Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec., 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). “The claim was filed pursuant to Section 440.19(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1977), 1 Fla.”
Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 174 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1965).
Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n v. McKaughan, 668 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1996).
City of Hollywood v. Pisseri, 504 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). “Pisseri noticed the date of his injury in his claim as mandated by Section 440.19(1)(d). Continental was adequately apprised that the issue of carrier responsibility was to be determined, by the deputy, through the notice of hearing.”
Tallahassee Mem'l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 743 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Daytona Beach Geriatric Ctr. v. Linehan, 673 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “" Section 440.19(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), provides, in part, that a "claim may contain a claim for both past benefits and continuing benefits in any benefit category, but is limited to those in default and ripe, due, and owing on the date the claim is filed.”
Jones v. K & L Contractors, 392 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). “Section 440.19(2)(d), Fla.Stat. (1979), sets out the requirements for a claim as follows: Such claim shall be filed with the Division at its office in Tallahassee and shall contain the name and address of the employee, the name and address of the employer, and a statement of the…”
Wright v. Douglas N. Higgins, Inc., 617 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
City of West Palm Beach v. Burbaum, 632 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Austin Co. v. Lindenberger, 410 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “To prevent surprise and prejudice, Section 440.19(2)(d) requires any claim for benefits filed with the division be specific as to the particular benefits being claimed.”
S. Bell v. MacDonald, 671 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Lafave v. Bay Consol. Distributors, 546 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Escambia Cnty. Transit v. Stallworth, 652 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Riggs v. Al Raska contracting/mission Nat. Ins. co./figa, 573 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Iuen v. Live Wire Elec. Co., 538 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). “Claimant Todd Iuen has appealed from a determination by the deputy commissioner that his claim for medical benefits was barred by the statute of limitations, Section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985).”
Gilbert v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 674 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “Section 440.19(8), Florida Statutes (1985), provides in part: If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the provisions of subsection (1) shall not be applicable so long as such person has no guardian or other authorized…”
Catalano v. Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 249 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1971).
Colonial Oaks Apt. v. Hood, 680 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “Colonial Oaks Apartments, the employer, and Continental Loss Adjusting Services, the servicing agent (together, the E/SA) appeal a workers’ compensation order wherein the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found that a penetrating keratoplasty or corneal graft constituted a…”
Fort v. Hood's Dairy, Inc., 143 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1962).
Piezo Tech. v. Smith, 413 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Paulk v. Berkeley Florist Supply, 574 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
City of Miami v. Tomberlin, 492 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Ken Lones Landscaping, Inc. v. Tucker, 382 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
Wright v. Indus. Auto., 662 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Parkway Gen. Hosp. v. Ogletree, 629 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). “The E/C filed a motion to dismiss on April 4, 1991, asserting the claim for benefits failed to comply with section 440.19(l)(e), Florida Statutes, which requires a claim to be filed with specificity.”
Corbett v. Gen. Eng'g & Mach. Co., 37 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1948).
Troche v. Geico, 966 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
City of West Palm Beach v. Stevens, 408 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Escribano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 453 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Cameron v. City of Miami Beach, 152 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1963).
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fuchs Baking Co., 577 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Nieves v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 583 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “Section 440.19(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1983), the statute in effect at the time the claim for benefits was filed in this case, required that the claim set forth "the type or nature of medical treatment sought.”
Albertson's Southco v. Williams, 402 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). “Section 440.19(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), requires a claimant to file a claim for all specific benefits due him under Chapter 440.”
Cleveland v. Everson, 415 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 471 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). “Once a two year period runs, however, voluntary treatment or compensation does not revive the claim.”
Newport Trucking v. Gonzalez, 497 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Borges v. Osceola Farms Co., 651 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “Moreover, we note the E/C fulfilled its duty under section 440.19(1)(f)7, Florida Statutes (Supp.”
medpartners/diagnostic v. Zenith Ins., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Proctor v. Swing Set Day Care Ctr., 498 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Robinson v. Johnson, 110 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959).
City of Fort Lauderdale v. St. Louis, 917 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
St. Joseph Hosp. v. Causey, 667 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Ford v. Alexander Cabinet Co., 467 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
McLean v. Mundy, 81 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1955).
Barnett v. Emr Telemetry, 396 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Kraft Dairy Grp. v. Sorge, 634 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “§ 440.19(1)(e)1.i., Fla. Stat. (1991). Clearly, the burden is on the claimant to plead and prove both entitlement to, and the appropriate amount of, a fee award.”
Car Stop Unlimited v. Salmon, 404 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Mcwilliams v. Am. Dutch Hotel, 595 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Brent v. Brent, 107 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).
Faulk v. Harper, 62 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1952).
Hartzog v. New York Yankees, 847 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “, received skilled services provided by a physician in October 1999, and therefore, he received “remedial treatment or attention” as defined by the relevant workers’ compensation statute in effect at the time he was injured, section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1991).”
Daniel Murphy v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, & Com. Risk Mgmt. (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).
Gulledge v. Dion Oil Co., 605 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “Claimant initiated a proceeding by filing a claim pursuant to subsection 440.19(1)(d) with the Division of Workers' Compensation in Tallahassee on September 20, 1990.”
Whiteman v. United Parcel Serv., 438 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Workers' Comp. Procedure, 674 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1996).
Batista v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 993 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
Panzer Law, P. A. v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., 150 So. 3d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
In re Florida Workers' Comp. Rules of Procedure, 374 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1979).
Carillon Hotel v. Rodriguez, 124 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1960).
Howanitz v. Biscayne Elec., Inc., 139 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1962).
Am. Airlines Grp. Am. Airlines & Sedgwick CMS v. Alejandro Lopez (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
Skip's Shoes & W. Boots v. Green, 578 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
Shafer & Miller, Inc. v. Moore, 499 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Plant City Steel v. Grace, 381 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
City of St. Augustine v. Allen, 424 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Dump All, Inc. v. Grossman, 475 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Brunswick Corp. v. Cummings, 648 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “19(l)(a) & (b) bar disability compensation and remedial attention claims filed more than two years after the last payment of compensation.”
Perry v. W. R. Robbins & Son Roofing Co., 145 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1962).
Thomas v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 36 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1948).
Shannon v. Cheney Bros. Inc., 98 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). “See § 440.19(l)-(6), Fla. Stat. (1979) (providing the right to disability and remedial medical attention can be time-barred for failure to file a “claim” with “the division at its office in Tallahassee”).”
Leighton v. Kratos Logistics, LLC, Ascendant Claims Servs. (Fla. 1st DCA 2026).
Anne Marie Limith v. Lenox on the Lake dba FTMI Operator etc., 163 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
Dixie Transp., Inc. v. Kellom, 507 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Morris Canning Corp. v. Blanchard, 528 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Finding as we do that the 1981 and 1982 claims should have been dismissed for lack of record activity, the two-year statute of limitations set out in section 440.19(b), Florida Statutes, clearly barred the 1987 claim.”
Lee v. City of Jacksonville, 598 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
W. Liquors Corp. v. Studer, 391 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
Bowman v. Food Fair Stores, 400 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
McCray v. Beverly Hills Plantation, 437 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Gulfstream Press, Inc. v. Acle, 697 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Robert Schiano v. City of Hollywood Police Deparment/ Emp.'s Mut., Inc. (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Krajenta v. Div., Wkrs'Comp., 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). “§ 440.19(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1977). [2] Fla.”
Childers v. Clay Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 128 So. 3d 201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
Camus v. Manatee Cnty. Sch. Bd., 923 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Anderson v. Jarrell, 25 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1946).
Sargent v. Evening Indep., Inc., 62 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1952).
Davis v. Kyle, 529 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Betham v. City of Orlando, 556 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Cecil W. Perry, Inc. v. Lopez, 425 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “Section 440.19(l)(c) clearly mandates that the claim “shall be filed with the Division at its office in Tallahassee.”
Eagle Point Mobile Home Estates v. Smith, 475 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Ferguson v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 495 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Bay Plumbing Co. v. Harbin, 337 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1976). “” (Emphasis supplied) The same filing requirement is contained in Section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1975).”
Orin Cummings Constr. Co. v. Beckman, 395 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Boyd v. Florida Mem'l Coll., 475 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Grieco v. Lehigh Corp., 549 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). “The only statutory authority for dismissal of a workers’ compensation claim is section 440.19(l)(d), which authorizes dismissal of a claim for failure to comply with the procedural requirements contained in that section upon motion of an interested party.”
Florida Indus. Comm'n v. Felda Lumber Co., 18 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1944).
Williams v. Duggan, 140 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962).
Ring Power Corp. & United Self etc. v. Andrew Murphy, 238 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
Colvin v. Colvin, 544 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Kennedy v. Orlando Shader Realty, 711 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). “In the instant ease, the merits of the petition for benefits were not litigated and the employer/earrier accepted the claimant as permanently and totally disabled within the 14-day time period provided by section 440.”
Ridge Pallets, Inc. v. John, 406 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Dale, 439 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Stromberg-Carlson v. Jackson, 488 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
D'AMICO v. Marina Inn & Yacht Harbor, Inc., 444 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Canestrelli v. Torneos Medievales, 579 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “The undisputed facts of this case show quite clearly that section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes, 1 the only portion of section 440.”
Mays v. Packers, 677 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “The reason the judge of compensation claims (JCC) gave for the denial was that the medical benefits claim contained an incorrect date of injury, contrary to the provisions of section 440.19(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1989).”
Stahl v. Mike Gordon's Seafood Restaurant, 408 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Benton v. ICR Elec., 852 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “Pursuant to section 440.19(5), Florida Statutes (1997), the two-year limitations period is tolled while a minor or mentally incompetent person has no guardian or authorized representative: If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or…”
Kurtz v. Wall, 182 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1966).
Hyatt v. Armstrong Cork Co., 121 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1960).
Univ. of Miami, Inc. v. Matthews, 97 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1957).
Cenvill Communities, Inc. v. Pierre, 393 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
McGuire v. Spinoza, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Ramada Inn v. Foster, 409 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Roy T. Brinson Lathing & Drywall v. Thomas, 530 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Raymond v. Rapid Express Parcel Delivery of Tampa, 548 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Iafornaro v. Charter Builders, 557 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). “1st DCA 1989), that a workers’ compensation claim can only be dismissed pursuant to Section 440.19(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), or Rule 4.”
Hardee Cnty. Plumbing v. Heflin, 567 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Com. Roof Decks v. Flippo, 616 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Tauben v. Joe's Stone Crabs, Inc., 632 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Rabon v. Hardaway Constr., 651 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Ashburn v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 8 Fla. Supp. 68 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1955).
City of North Bay Vill. v. Guevara, 129 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
City of Pembroke Pines v. Villasenor, 894 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Hanson v. Florida Hosp., 946 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
In Re Fla. Wkrs.'Comp. Rules, Etc., 374 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1979).
Fla., Birth-related Nica v. Mckaughan, 668 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1996).
Jermaine Davis v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off./USIS, 196 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
City of Dania Beach & PGCS v. David Zipoli, 204 So. 3d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
Teresita De Jesus Abreu v. Riverland Elementary Sch. & Broward Cnty. etc. (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).
State, Dep't of Agric. v. Hinote, 442 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Cont'l Can Co. v. Bailey, 668 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Miranda v. Azul Plastering Corp., 74 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
Pomerantz v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off. & USIS, 131 So. 3d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Russ, 88 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).
Cullinane v. Crown Can Co., 24 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1945).
Berke Displays, Inc. v. Mick, 114 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959).
Collins v. Town of Palm Beach, 272 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1973). “Jurisdiction and proper notice were stipulated in the hearing and the statute of limitations has not been raised as a defense, so that there has been no showing that the date of the accident is a material fact or that the failure to support the fixing of a specific date has…”
McConnell Wetenhall Citrus Props. v. Special Disability Trust Fund, 304 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1974).
Performing Arts, Inc. v. Gardner, 394 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Watkins v. Wolf, 626 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Smith v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 634 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Bravo v. Gulf & W. Food Prods., 637 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Mello v. K-Mart, 542 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Padilla v. Collins Contracting, 22 So. 3d 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Coburn v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 51 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Tampa Bay Performing Arts Ctr. v. Campbell, 789 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Sodpolis, Inc. v. Banegas, 799 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
Kimmins Corp. v. Truc, 941 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Juarez v. Burger King 22, 638 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Scott v. Newport Indus., Inc., 6 Fla. Supp. 194 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1954).
St. Joe Ice Co. v. Frazier, 103 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958).
Shaw v. Cadillac S. Dev., 431 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
City of Clearwater v. Donahue, 450 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Cabell v. Spirco Env't, Inc., 579 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Himes v. Weitz Co., 605 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
City of Miami v. Beall, 610 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Peo v. Maas Bros., 634 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Nelson v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 641 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Holder v. Waldrop, 654 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “02, the Definitions section of the statute, that term is adequately defined in section 440.19(l)(e)l which provides that a “claim” shall: (1) be filed with the Division; (2) contain names and addresses of the employer and employee; (3) contain a statement of the time, date,…”
United Way of Am. v. Merlo, 659 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Regency Kawasaki & Sea Doo, Inc. v. Sheppard, 674 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). “192 took effect on January 1, 1994. Ch. 93-415, §§ 25 & 112, at 137 & 215, Laws of Fla.”
Arboleda v. Premier Beverage Co., 739 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Parry v. South Miami Hosp., 778 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Brinn v. Pioneer Co., 6 Fla. Supp. 148 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1954).
Buchan v. Pat's Plumbing, 4 Fla. Supp. 12 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1952).
Makela v. Azalea Homes, Inc., 6 Fla. Supp. 196 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1954).
Mitchell v. Bailey's Auto Serv., 7 Fla. Supp. 185 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1955).
Wallace v. Walton Context Bldg., 379 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
Hall v. Div. of Workers' Comp., Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec., 381 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
City of Clearwater v. Holzhauer, 497 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Gold Coast Med. Grp. v. Fasano, 634 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “The JCC awarded penalties on grounds that appellant’s notice to controvert was untimely under section 440.19(l)(e)7, Florida Statutes (1991).”
Stallings v. F.M.C. Corp., 651 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “Section 440.19(l)(d) bars the right to compensation for death benefits “unless a claim therefor .”
Williamson v. Plymouth Citrus Prods., 4 Fla. Supp. 82 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1953).
— 440.19(1) — 74 cases
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). “See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). 5 Like the statutory limit on temporary disability benefits, the statute of limitations must be given effect.”
Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1952). “) Since the legislature in clear and unambiguous language has defined the expression "time of injury" to mean the time of the occurrence of the accident resulting in the injury, there is no room for us to theorize; nor are we authorized to place a different construction upon the…”
AB Taff & Sons v. Clark, 110 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). “34(1), supra, and from a "claim" as referred to in Section 440.19(1) (a), (c), also to be considered in pari materia and upon which the employer relies, providing as follows: "(1) (a) The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim…”
Palmer v. McKesson Corp., 7 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “Although it can be inferred from our prior decisions that we have concluded (without expressly saying so) that a workers’ compensation claimant carries the burden of proving the applicability of the tolling exception contained in section 440.”
Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). “§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] Subsections (5) and (6) provide: (5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the…”
Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). “See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2006) (barring employee petitions for workers’ compensation benefits unless the petition is filed within two years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known the injury arose out of work performed in the course and scope of…”
Hall v. Seaboard Mar. Corp., 104 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). “[1] Claimant sought to avoid this defense by a plea of mental incompetency under F.S. § 440.19 (3), F.S.A., which provided that F.”
Fla. Erection Serv. Inc. v. Mcdonald, 395 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Ozment, 440 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Jeffrey's Steel v. Conibear Equip., Inc., 854 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Payment of indemnity benefits or furnishing remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to a notice of injury or a PFB will toll the limitations period for one year from the date of payment.”
Solar Pane Insulating Glass v. HANSEEN, 727 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “, here section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1985). Claims Center is, moreover, in the situation of the insurance carrier in Nebenhaus v.”
Hoppe v. City of Lakeland, 691 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp., P.A. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “§ 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (1997 and 2001). The next subsection of the statute allows for a one-year extension of this period based on the payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of treatment pursuant to a notice of injury or petition for benefits (PFB).”
Allen v. City of St. Augustine, 500 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “The parties apparently ignored Aris , in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld the ruling of a Judge of Industrial Claims that section 440.19(1) would not apply to an incompetent until a guardian or other authorized representative had been appointed to protect his interests.”
Patco Transp., Inc. v. Estupinan, 917 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “See § 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee's claim unless the carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial…”
Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). “1st DCA 1998), as that case addressed a previous version of section 440.19, Florida Statutes. I, therefore, join the majority in reversing the JCC's order.”
Chemstrand Co. v. Enfinger, 231 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1970).
Certain v. Big Johnson Concrete Pumping, Inc., 34 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “§ 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (2005). The JCC determined the Employer/Carrier’s Notice of Denial sufficiently raised the statute of limitations as a basis for denying Certain’s claim.”
Gore v. Lee Cnty. Sch. Bd., 43 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “The JCC reasoned that the Legislature made a substantive change to the law when it amended section 440.19, Florida Statutes, regarding the application of the statute of limitations to prosthetic devices, and therefore intended a specific alteration of the law.”
Wright v. Douglas N. Higgins, Inc., 617 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
Lafave v. Bay Consol. Distributors, 546 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Aris v. Big Ten Taxi Corp., 330 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1976). “Section 440.19(3), Florida Statutes (1973).”
Troche v. Geico, 966 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Ardmore Farms v. Smith, 423 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “The original filing of LES Form BCL-13b with the employer or carrier does not constitute the filing of a formal claim for benefits or claim for compensation as contemplated in subsection 440.19 or 440.25, Florida Statutes.”
Paulk v. Berkeley Florist Supply, 574 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Cleveland v. Everson, 415 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Sanchez v. Acapulco Plasters & Stucco, 668 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Varitimidis v. WALGREEN Co., 58 So. 3d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
Gunn's Quality Glass & Mirrors, Inc. v. Strode, 425 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “Thus, the November 1, 1979 request for an operation submitted to the E/C, but not filed as a claim in accordance with Section 440.19(2)(d), did not qualify as a claim.”
Bailey's Auto Serv. v. Mitchell, 85 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1956).
Car Stop Unlimited v. Salmon, 404 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Gilbert v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 674 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “Section 440.19(8), Florida Statutes (1985), provides in part: If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the provisions of subsection (1) shall not be applicable so long as such person has no guardian or other authorized…”
Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. Philip, 746 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
Estes v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., Davies Claims North Am., Inc. (Fla. 1st DCA 2026). “§440.19(5), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphases added).”
Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Dunn, 85 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1956).
Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 174 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1965).
Howanitz v. Biscayne Elec., Inc., 139 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1962).
Skip's Shoes & W. Boots v. Green, 578 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
Jones v. K & L Contractors, 392 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). “Section 440.19(2)(d), Fla.Stat. (1979), sets out the requirements for a claim as follows: Such claim shall be filed with the Division at its office in Tallahassee and shall contain the name and address of the employee, the name and address of the employer, and a statement of the…”
Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 471 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). “Once a two year period runs, however, voluntary treatment or compensation does not revive the claim.”
Gunter v. Sauer, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “34(3)(b) attorney's fee provision was created in chapter 89-289, section 19, Laws of Florida, neither section 440.19(1)(d) nor (e) made any mention of an acknowledged claim.”
Carillon Hotel v. Rodriguez, 124 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1960).
McCray v. Beverly Hills Plantation, 437 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Straw v. Steve Moore Chevrolet, 651 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1991) provides in pertinent part: (l)(a) The right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor which meets the requirements of paragraph (e) is filed within…”
Brent v. Brent, 107 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).
Faulk v. Harper, 62 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1952).
Ortiz v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., Travelers Ins., & Sedgwick CMS (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
medpartners/diagnostic v. Zenith Ins., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Sargent v. Evening Indep., Inc., 62 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1952).
Ginsberg v. ChemMED Corp., 929 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
— 440.19(1)(a) — 34 cases
Holder v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets, 610 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1992). “See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). This amendment removed the limitation restricting the exception to the two-year limitation period for filing a claim for compensation to situations where payment of compensation or remedial treatment was voluntarily provided.”
Roe v. City investing/Gen. Dev. Corp., 587 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1991). “When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the…”
Timmeny v. Tropical Botanicals Corp., 615 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). “Because he filed his claim within the same year, the bar of the limitation period in section 440.19 is inapplicable. Appellee also argues that appellant has failed to preserve his estoppel argument in that he raised it for the first time by motion for rehearing following the…”
Univ. of Florida v. McLarthy, 483 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “NOTES [1] Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), provides: The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that if payment of compensation has been made or…”
Bassett's Dairy v. Thomas, 429 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “28, Florida Statutes, or was properly allowed to proceed under Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1969), current version found at Section 440.”
Ellis v. Galloway's Inc., 794 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). “1994) (stating the one-year SOL); § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991) (stating the two-year SOL).”
Budget Luxury Inns, Inc. v. Boston, 407 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Johnson v. Div. of Forestry, 397 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Lee v. City of Jacksonville, 616 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1993).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Spann, 479 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 490 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 1986). “§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1985). [2] The judge of industrial claims initially found a gap of over two years and denied relief on that basis.”
Devilling v. Rimes, Inc., 591 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). “1st DCA 1998), as that case addressed a previous version of section 440.19, Florida Statutes. I, therefore, join the majority in reversing the JCC's order.”
Turner v. G. Pierce Wood Mem'l Hosp., 600 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Keller Kitchen Cabinets v. Holder, 586 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “The current order before us resolves the claim on the ground that only the limitations period in Section 440.19 need be applied, which conclusion we now reverse.”
Watson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 288 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1973).
City of St. Augustine v. Allen, 404 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Cash v. Universal Rivet, Inc., 616 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993). “The employer and carrier denied the claim on the ground that, pursuant to subsection 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), the two-year statute of limitations had run.”
Solar Pane Insulating Glass v. HANSEEN, 727 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “, here section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1985). Claims Center is, moreover, in the situation of the insurance carrier in Nebenhaus v.”
Seamco Labs., Inc. v. Pearson, 424 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Gaines v. Orange Cnty. Pub. Utils., 710 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “1994), provides: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death…”
Ken Lones Landscaping, Inc. v. Tucker, 382 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
City investing/Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Roe, 566 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fuchs Baking Co., 577 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Tallahassee Mem'l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 743 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Universal Rivet, Inc. v. Cash, 598 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “" To the extent relevant to this appeal, Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that "[t]he right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss .”
Barnett v. Emr Telemetry, 396 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Mcwilliams v. Am. Dutch Hotel, 595 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Batista v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 993 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
Bowman v. Food Fair Stores, 400 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
medpartners/diagnostic v. Zenith Ins., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Estes v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., Davies Claims North Am., Inc. (Fla. 1st DCA 2026). “§440.19(5), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphases added).”
Betham v. City of Orlando, 556 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Ortiz v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., Travelers Ins., & Sedgwick CMS (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
— 440.19(1)(b) — 12 cases
Gaines v. Orange Cnty. Pub. Utils., 710 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “1994), provides: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death…”
Universal Rivet, Inc. v. Cash, 598 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “" To the extent relevant to this appeal, Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that "[t]he right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss .”
McNeilly v. Farm Stores, Inc., 553 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). “McNeilly has appealed an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying his claim for benefits and medical expenses based on the running of the statute of limitations, Section 440.19(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985).”
Roe v. City investing/Gen. Dev. Corp., 587 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1991). “When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the…”
Cash v. Universal Rivet, Inc., 616 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993). “The employer and carrier denied the claim on the ground that, pursuant to subsection 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), the two-year statute of limitations had run.”
ABC Liquors, Inc. v. Creed, 573 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Gore v. Lee Cnty. Sch. Bd., 43 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “The JCC reasoned that the Legislature made a substantive change to the law when it amended section 440.19, Florida Statutes, regarding the application of the statute of limitations to prosthetic devices, and therefore intended a specific alteration of the law.”
Sauer Indus. Contracting Inc. v. Ditch, 547 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
City investing/Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Roe, 566 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
S. Bell v. MacDonald, 671 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Ford v. Alexander Cabinet Co., 467 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
BORNEISEN v. Home Depot, 917 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
— 440.19(1)(c) — 2 cases
United States Steel Corp. v. Green, 353 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1977). “Steel of "the nature of [Green's] claim" for permanent and total disability benefits, as required by Section 440.19(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1973).”
Krajenta v. Div., Wkrs'Comp., 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). “§ 440.19(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1977). [2] Fla.”
— 440.19(1)(d) — 5 cases
Nieves v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 583 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “Section 440.19(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1983), the statute in effect at the time the claim for benefits was filed in this case, required that the claim set forth "the type or nature of medical treatment sought.”
Gulledge v. Dion Oil Co., 605 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “Claimant initiated a proceeding by filing a claim pursuant to subsection 440.19(1)(d) with the Division of Workers' Compensation in Tallahassee on September 20, 1990.”
City of Hollywood v. Pisseri, 504 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). “Pisseri noticed the date of his injury in his claim as mandated by Section 440.19(1)(d). Continental was adequately apprised that the issue of carrier responsibility was to be determined, by the deputy, through the notice of hearing.”
Gunter v. Sauer, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “34(3)(b) attorney's fee provision was created in chapter 89-289, section 19, Laws of Florida, neither section 440.19(1)(d) nor (e) made any mention of an acknowledged claim.”
Iafornaro v. Charter Builders, 557 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). “1st DCA 1989), that a workers’ compensation claim can only be dismissed pursuant to Section 440.19(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), or Rule 4.”
— 440.19(1)(e) — 6 cases
Baptist Manor Nursing Home v. Madison, 658 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “1990), is substantive and the 1994 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law significantly change the substantive right to have the employer pay attorney's fees, and because the E/C failed to accept the claimant as PTD within 21 days of service of a claim which met the…”
McBride v. Pratt & Whitney, 909 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994).”
Daytona Beach Geriatric Ctr. v. Linehan, 673 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “" Section 440.19(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), provides, in part, that a "claim may contain a claim for both past benefits and continuing benefits in any benefit category, but is limited to those in default and ripe, due, and owing on the date the claim is filed.”
Gunter v. Sauer, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “34(3)(b) attorney's fee provision was created in chapter 89-289, section 19, Laws of Florida, neither section 440.19(1)(d) nor (e) made any mention of an acknowledged claim.”
City of West Palm Beach v. Burbaum, 632 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Kraft Dairy Grp. v. Sorge, 634 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “§ 440.19(1)(e)1.i., Fla. Stat. (1991). Clearly, the burden is on the claimant to plead and prove both entitlement to, and the appropriate amount of, a fee award.”
— 440.19(1)(f) — 1 case
Borges v. Osceola Farms Co., 651 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “Moreover, we note the E/C fulfilled its duty under section 440.19(1)(f)7, Florida Statutes (Supp.”
— 440.19(2) — 37 cases
Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). “§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] Subsections (5) and (6) provide: (5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the…”
City of Orlando v. Blackburn, 519 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). “We decline to interpret the word "remedial" as used in section 440.19 in such a narrow manner to mean strictly curative care to the exclusion of treatment which is not curative but which nevertheless mitigates the conditions or effects of the injury.”
Wood v. McTyre Trucking Co., Inc., 526 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Because claimant filed his claim for benefits more than two years after July 8, 1982, the DC denied all claims and dismissed the case finding that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 440.”
Palmer v. McKesson Corp., 7 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “Although it can be inferred from our prior decisions that we have concluded (without expressly saying so) that a workers’ compensation claimant carries the burden of proving the applicability of the tolling exception contained in section 440.”
Gore v. Lee Cnty. Sch. Bd., 43 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “The JCC reasoned that the Legislature made a substantive change to the law when it amended section 440.19, Florida Statutes, regarding the application of the statute of limitations to prosthetic devices, and therefore intended a specific alteration of the law.”
McBride v. Pratt & Whitney, 909 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994).”
Rice v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 924 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Jeffrey's Steel v. Conibear Equip., Inc., 854 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Payment of indemnity benefits or furnishing remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to a notice of injury or a PFB will toll the limitations period for one year from the date of payment.”
Estes v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., Davies Claims North Am., Inc. (Fla. 1st DCA 2026). “§440.19(5), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphases added).”
Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp., P.A. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “§ 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (1997 and 2001). The next subsection of the statute allows for a one-year extension of this period based on the payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of treatment pursuant to a notice of injury or petition for benefits (PFB).”
Fontanills v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., 913 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “Although Hanssen held that a claimant who was fully aware of his entitlement to medical benefits, but failed to request them within the requisite two-year period then required by law, was barred by the limitation period, despite the failure of the E/C to advise him of the time…”
Ellis v. Galloway's Inc., 794 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). “1994) (stating the one-year SOL); § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991) (stating the two-year SOL).”
Ginsberg v. ChemMED Corp., 929 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Ricardo Sanchez v. Am. Airlines & Sedgwick CMS, 169 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). “In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in finding that his April 2014 petition for' benefits (PFB) was barred by the statute of limitations in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2011). Finding no error in the JCC’s…”
Varitimidis v. WALGREEN Co., 58 So. 3d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
Townsley v. Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 79 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1955).
Escribano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 453 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Bell v. Com. Carriers, 603 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “Section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), bars claims unless they are: "filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that, if payment of compensation has been made or remedial treatment or rehabilitation services have been furnished by the employer on account of…”
Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. Philip, 746 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
Ortiz v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., Travelers Ins., & Sedgwick CMS (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
Am. Airlines Grp. Am. Airlines & Sedgwick CMS v. Alejandro Lopez (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
Parkway Gen. Hosp. v. Ogletree, 629 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). “The E/C filed a motion to dismiss on April 4, 1991, asserting the claim for benefits failed to comply with section 440.19(l)(e), Florida Statutes, which requires a claim to be filed with specificity.”
Leighton v. Kratos Logistics, LLC, Ascendant Claims Servs. (Fla. 1st DCA 2026).
medpartners/diagnostic v. Zenith Ins., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Hartzog v. New York Yankees, 847 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “, received skilled services provided by a physician in October 1999, and therefore, he received “remedial treatment or attention” as defined by the relevant workers’ compensation statute in effect at the time he was injured, section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1991).”
Perry v. W. R. Robbins & Son Roofing Co., 145 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1962).
Daniel Murphy v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, & Com. Risk Mgmt. (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).
Camus v. Manatee Cnty. Sch. Bd., 923 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Ring Power Corp. & United Self etc. v. Andrew Murphy, 238 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
McGuire v. Spinoza, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Shannon v. Cheney Bros. Inc., 98 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). “See § 440.19(l)-(6), Fla. Stat. (1979) (providing the right to disability and remedial medical attention can be time-barred for failure to file a “claim” with “the division at its office in Tallahassee”).”
Robert Schiano v. City of Hollywood Police Deparment/ Emp.'s Mut., Inc. (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Childers v. Clay Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 128 So. 3d 201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
Coburn v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 51 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Tampa Bay Performing Arts Ctr. v. Campbell, 789 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Ashburn v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 8 Fla. Supp. 68 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1955).
Hanson v. Florida Hosp., 946 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
— 440.19(2)(a) — 17 cases
Holder v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets, 610 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1992). “See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). This amendment removed the limitation restricting the exception to the two-year limitation period for filing a claim for compensation to situations where payment of compensation or remedial treatment was voluntarily provided.”
Keller Kitchen Cabinets v. Holder, 586 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “The current order before us resolves the claim on the ground that only the limitations period in Section 440.19 need be applied, which conclusion we now reverse.”
Roe v. City investing/Gen. Dev. Corp., 587 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1991). “When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the…”
North River Ins. Co. v. Wuelling, 683 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “192(8) "act to revive a claim previously barred by the statute of limitations under F.S. 440.19(2)(a)." He ordered the E/C to pay the medical bills detailed in the petition for benefits, plus interest, costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.”
Garza v. Jordan Farms, 532 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: The right to compensation .”
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Spann, 479 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Riggs v. Al Raska contracting/mission Nat. Ins. co./figa, 573 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Bassett's Dairy v. Thomas, 429 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “28, Florida Statutes, or was properly allowed to proceed under Section 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1969), current version found at Section 440.”
Proctor v. Swing Set Day Care Ctr., 498 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Thomas v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 536 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
City investing/Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Roe, 566 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Escribano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 453 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Whiteman v. United Parcel Serv., 438 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Davis v. Kyle, 529 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Colvin v. Colvin, 544 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
D'AMICO v. Marina Inn & Yacht Harbor, Inc., 444 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Shaw v. Cadillac S. Dev., 431 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
— 440.19(2)(b) — 19 cases
Tower Chem. Co. v. Hubbard, 527 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations applicable to this claim, states: All rights for remedial attention under this section shall be barred unless a claim therefor which meets the requirements of paragraph (d) is filed with the division within 2…”
Foster Wheeler Energy Grp. v. Fairhurst, 405 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). “Upon consideration, we have concluded that the carrier's payment on January 4, 1978 of interest on compensation payable under a worker's compensation order should be deemed "compensation" within the meaning of that term as used in the two year statute of limitations provision of…”
Herb's Exxon v. Whatmough, 487 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “In response to the deputy's finding of two accidents, the employer/carrier filed a motion for rehearing, raising a statute of limitations defense under section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980).”
Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 438 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “Testimony establishes that medical care will be required due to the industrial accident, but at a time in the future probably beyond the two-year statute of limitations of Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes. Claimant, an 18-year-old, suffered 80 percent loss of vision in his…”
Wood v. McTyre Trucking Co., Inc., 526 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Because claimant filed his claim for benefits more than two years after July 8, 1982, the DC denied all claims and dismissed the case finding that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 440.”
Ardmore Farms v. Smith, 423 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “The original filing of LES Form BCL-13b with the employer or carrier does not constitute the filing of a formal claim for benefits or claim for compensation as contemplated in subsection 440.19 or 440.25, Florida Statutes.”
Austin Co. v. Lindenberger, 410 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “To prevent surprise and prejudice, Section 440.19(2)(d) requires any claim for benefits filed with the division be specific as to the particular benefits being claimed.”
Shafer & Miller, Inc. v. Moore, 499 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Dump All, Inc. v. Grossman, 475 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Dixie Transp., Inc. v. Kellom, 507 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
W. Liquors Corp. v. Studer, 391 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
Whiteman v. United Parcel Serv., 438 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Eagle Point Mobile Home Estates v. Smith, 475 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Boyd v. Florida Mem'l Coll., 475 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Dale, 439 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Rabon v. Hardaway Constr., 651 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
State, Dep't of Agric. v. Hinote, 442 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Watkins v. Wolf, 626 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
United Way of Am. v. Merlo, 659 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
— 440.19(2)(d) — 14 cases
Ardmore Farms v. Smith, 423 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “The original filing of LES Form BCL-13b with the employer or carrier does not constitute the filing of a formal claim for benefits or claim for compensation as contemplated in subsection 440.19 or 440.25, Florida Statutes.”
Jones v. K & L Contractors, 392 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). “Section 440.19(2)(d), Fla.Stat. (1979), sets out the requirements for a claim as follows: Such claim shall be filed with the Division at its office in Tallahassee and shall contain the name and address of the employee, the name and address of the employer, and a statement of the…”
Albertson's Southco v. Williams, 402 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). “Section 440.19(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), requires a claimant to file a claim for all specific benefits due him under Chapter 440.”
Gunn's Quality Glass & Mirrors, Inc. v. Strode, 425 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “Thus, the November 1, 1979 request for an operation submitted to the E/C, but not filed as a claim in accordance with Section 440.19(2)(d), did not qualify as a claim.”
Austin Co. v. Lindenberger, 410 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “To prevent surprise and prejudice, Section 440.19(2)(d) requires any claim for benefits filed with the division be specific as to the particular benefits being claimed.”
In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Workers' Comp. Procedure, 674 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1996).
In re Florida Workers' Comp. Rules of Procedure, 374 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1979).
Krajenta v. Div. of Workers' Comp., Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec., 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). “The claim was filed pursuant to Section 440.19(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1977), 1 Fla.”
Orin Cummings Constr. Co. v. Beckman, 395 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Cenvill Communities, Inc. v. Pierre, 393 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Ramada Inn v. Foster, 409 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
In Re Fla. Wkrs.'Comp. Rules, Etc., 374 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1979).
Krajenta v. Div., Wkrs'Comp., 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). “§ 440.19(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1977). [2] Fla.”
Hall v. Div. of Workers' Comp., Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec., 381 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
— 440.19(3) — 13 cases
McBride v. Pratt & Whitney, 909 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994).”
Airey v. Wal-mart/sedgwick, 24 So. 3d 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “In this workers’ compensation case, claimant seeks review of a final order dismissing his petition for benefits filed on February 15, 2007, as time-barred pursuant to section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2003). Because we conclude that the judge of compensation claims erred as a…”
Allen v. City of St. Augustine, 500 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “The parties apparently ignored Aris , in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld the ruling of a Judge of Industrial Claims that section 440.19(1) would not apply to an incompetent until a guardian or other authorized representative had been appointed to protect his interests.”
Diamond R. Fertilizer v. Davis, 567 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). “Bell, to pay attendant care costs to claimant's sister for her past service, and to pay attorney fees of 0,000 and costs.”
Aris v. Big Ten Taxi Corp., 330 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1976). “Section 440.19(3), Florida Statutes (1973).”
Bailey's Auto Serv. v. Mitchell, 85 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1956).
Escambia Cnty. Transit v. Stallworth, 652 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Faulk v. Harper, 62 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1952).
City of St. Augustine v. Allen, 424 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Daniel Murphy v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, & Com. Risk Mgmt. (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).
Ortiz v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., Travelers Ins., & Sedgwick CMS (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
Buchan v. Pat's Plumbing, 4 Fla. Supp. 12 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1952).
Mitchell v. Bailey's Auto Serv., 7 Fla. Supp. 185 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1955).
— 440.19(4) — 28 cases
Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). “1st DCA 1998), as that case addressed a previous version of section 440.19, Florida Statutes. I, therefore, join the majority in reversing the JCC's order.”
Gauthier v. Florida Int'l Univ., 38 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “ANALYSIS Claimant’s petition was untimely under section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2005), because her claim was made more than two years after her injury and more than one year after her last receipt of benefits.”
Jackson v. Comput. Sci. Raytheon, 36 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “§ 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (2008) (statutory provision allowing employee to avoid statute of limitations defense where estoppel is proven).”
Patco Transp., Inc. v. Estupinan, 917 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “See § 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee's claim unless the carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial…”
Certain v. Big Johnson Concrete Pumping, Inc., 34 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “§ 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (2005). The JCC determined the Employer/Carrier’s Notice of Denial sufficiently raised the statute of limitations as a basis for denying Certain’s claim.”
Deere v. Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd., 880 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
Jeffrey's Steel v. Conibear Equip., Inc., 854 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Payment of indemnity benefits or furnishing remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to a notice of injury or a PFB will toll the limitations period for one year from the date of payment.”
Palmer v. McKesson Corp., 7 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “Although it can be inferred from our prior decisions that we have concluded (without expressly saying so) that a workers’ compensation claimant carries the burden of proving the applicability of the tolling exception contained in section 440.”
Denestan v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 789 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Fontanills v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., 913 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “Although Hanssen held that a claimant who was fully aware of his entitlement to medical benefits, but failed to request them within the requisite two-year period then required by law, was barred by the limitation period, despite the failure of the E/C to advise him of the time…”
Gaines v. Orange Cnty. Pub. Utils., 710 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “1994), provides: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death…”
Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n v. McKaughan, 668 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1996).
Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). “§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] Subsections (5) and (6) provide: (5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the…”
Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp., P.A. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “§ 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (1997 and 2001). The next subsection of the statute allows for a one-year extension of this period based on the payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of treatment pursuant to a notice of injury or petition for benefits (PFB).”
Tallahassee Mem'l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 743 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
City of Fort Lauderdale v. St. Louis, 917 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Robert Schiano v. City of Hollywood Police Deparment/ Emp.'s Mut., Inc. (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Stromberg-Carlson v. Jackson, 488 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
Childers v. Clay Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 128 So. 3d 201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
Williams v. Duggan, 140 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962).
medpartners/diagnostic v. Zenith Ins., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Fla., Birth-related Nica v. Mckaughan, 668 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1996).
Teresita De Jesus Abreu v. Riverland Elementary Sch. & Broward Cnty. etc. (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).
Ortiz v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., Travelers Ins., & Sedgwick CMS (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Russ, 88 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).
Estes v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., Davies Claims North Am., Inc. (Fla. 1st DCA 2026). “§440.19(5), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphases added).”
Miranda v. Azul Plastering Corp., 74 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
Hanson v. Florida Hosp., 946 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
— 440.19(5) — 2 cases
Benton v. ICR Elec., 852 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “Pursuant to section 440.19(5), Florida Statutes (1997), the two-year limitations period is tolled while a minor or mentally incompetent person has no guardian or authorized representative: If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or…”
Estes v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., Davies Claims North Am., Inc. (Fla. 1st DCA 2026). “§440.19(5), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphases added).”
— 440.19(6) — 1 case
Punsky v. Clay Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 60 So. 3d 1088 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “In his first point on appeal, claimant contends that section 440.19(6) permits an award of either zero costs or, at most, 0 in costs against a claimant in a case where compensability is denied because there is no fund of money from which to deduct the 0.”
— 440.19(8) — 1 case
Gilbert v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 674 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “Section 440.19(8), Florida Statutes (1985), provides in part: If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the provisions of subsection (1) shall not be applicable so long as such person has no guardian or other authorized…”
— 440.19(I) — 1 case
Aris v. Big Ten Taxi Corp., 330 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1976). “Section 440.19(3), Florida Statutes (1973).”
— 440.19(b) — 2 cases
Morris Canning Corp. v. Blanchard, 528 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Finding as we do that the 1981 and 1982 claims should have been dismissed for lack of record activity, the two-year statute of limitations set out in section 440.19(b), Florida Statutes, clearly barred the 1987 claim.”
Collins v. Town of Palm Beach, 272 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1973). “Jurisdiction and proper notice were stipulated in the hearing and the statute of limitations has not been raised as a defense, so that there has been no showing that the date of the accident is a material fact or that the failure to support the fixing of a specific date has…”
— 440.19(d) — 1 case
Keller Kitchen Cabinets v. Holder, 586 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “The current order before us resolves the claim on the ground that only the limitations period in Section 440.19 need be applied, which conclusion we now reverse.”
— 440.19(l) — 2 cases
Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp., P.A. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “§ 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (1997 and 2001). The next subsection of the statute allows for a one-year extension of this period based on the payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of treatment pursuant to a notice of injury or petition for benefits (PFB).”
Shannon v. Cheney Bros. Inc., 98 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). “See § 440.19(l)-(6), Fla. Stat. (1979) (providing the right to disability and remedial medical attention can be time-barred for failure to file a “claim” with “the division at its office in Tallahassee”).”
— 440.19(l)(a) — 19 cases
Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). “See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2006) (barring employee petitions for workers’ compensation benefits unless the petition is filed within two years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known the injury arose out of work performed in the course and scope of…”
Bell v. Com. Carriers, 603 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “Section 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), bars claims unless they are: "filed within 2 years after the time of injury, except that, if payment of compensation has been made or remedial treatment or rehabilitation services have been furnished by the employer on account of…”
Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp., P.A. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “§ 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (1997 and 2001). The next subsection of the statute allows for a one-year extension of this period based on the payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of treatment pursuant to a notice of injury or petition for benefits (PFB).”
Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 471 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). “Once a two year period runs, however, voluntary treatment or compensation does not revive the claim.”
Brunswick Corp. v. Cummings, 648 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “19(l)(a) & (b) bar disability compensation and remedial attention claims filed more than two years after the last payment of compensation.”
Lee v. City of Jacksonville, 598 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
St. Joseph Hosp. v. Causey, 667 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Ferguson v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 495 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
City of St. Augustine v. Allen, 424 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Newport Trucking v. Gonzalez, 497 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Betham v. City of Orlando, 556 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Shannon v. Cheney Bros. Inc., 98 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). “See § 440.19(l)-(6), Fla. Stat. (1979) (providing the right to disability and remedial medical attention can be time-barred for failure to file a “claim” with “the division at its office in Tallahassee”).”
Cecil W. Perry, Inc. v. Lopez, 425 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “Section 440.19(l)(c) clearly mandates that the claim “shall be filed with the Division at its office in Tallahassee.”
Raymond v. Rapid Express Parcel Delivery of Tampa, 548 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Hardee Cnty. Plumbing v. Heflin, 567 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Bravo v. Gulf & W. Food Prods., 637 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Kimmins Corp. v. Truc, 941 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
City of Miami v. Beall, 610 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Juarez v. Burger King 22, 638 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
— 440.19(l)(b) — 12 cases
Houston-Miller v. U.S. Fire Ins., 668 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “The appellant, June Houston-Miller, appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (“JCC”) dismissing her petition for benefits on the ground that her petition for benefits was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 440.19(l)(b), Florida…”
Ricardo Sanchez v. Am. Airlines & Sedgwick CMS, 169 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). “In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in finding that his April 2014 petition for' benefits (PFB) was barred by the statute of limitations in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2011). Finding no error in the JCC’s…”
Iuen v. Live Wire Elec. Co., 538 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). “Claimant Todd Iuen has appealed from a determination by the deputy commissioner that his claim for medical benefits was barred by the statute of limitations, Section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985).”
Colonial Oaks Apt. v. Hood, 680 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “Colonial Oaks Apartments, the employer, and Continental Loss Adjusting Services, the servicing agent (together, the E/SA) appeal a workers’ compensation order wherein the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found that a penetrating keratoplasty or corneal graft constituted a…”
Garza v. Jordan Farms, 532 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: The right to compensation .”
Hartzog v. New York Yankees, 847 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “, received skilled services provided by a physician in October 1999, and therefore, he received “remedial treatment or attention” as defined by the relevant workers’ compensation statute in effect at the time he was injured, section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1991).”
Gulfstream Press, Inc. v. Acle, 697 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Com. Roof Decks v. Flippo, 616 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Cont'l Can Co. v. Bailey, 668 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Peo v. Maas Bros., 634 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Parry v. South Miami Hosp., 778 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
City of Clearwater v. Holzhauer, 497 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
— 440.19(l)(c) — 5 cases
Krajenta v. Div. of Workers' Comp., Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec., 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). “The claim was filed pursuant to Section 440.19(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1977), 1 Fla.”
Bay Plumbing Co. v. Harbin, 337 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1976). “” (Emphasis supplied) The same filing requirement is contained in Section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1975).”
Hartzog v. New York Yankees, 847 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “, received skilled services provided by a physician in October 1999, and therefore, he received “remedial treatment or attention” as defined by the relevant workers’ compensation statute in effect at the time he was injured, section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1991).”
Cecil W. Perry, Inc. v. Lopez, 425 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “Section 440.19(l)(c) clearly mandates that the claim “shall be filed with the Division at its office in Tallahassee.”
Canestrelli v. Torneos Medievales, 579 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “The undisputed facts of this case show quite clearly that section 440.19(l)(c), Florida Statutes, 1 the only portion of section 440.”
— 440.19(l)(d) — 5 cases
Gilman v. South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 584 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “First, section 440.19(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), the provision cited and relied on in the order, requires that the order “state with particularity why the claim is not in compliance” with section 440.”
Garza v. Jordan Farms, 532 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “Section 440.19(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: The right to compensation .”
Grieco v. Lehigh Corp., 549 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). “The only statutory authority for dismissal of a workers’ compensation claim is section 440.19(l)(d), which authorizes dismissal of a claim for failure to comply with the procedural requirements contained in that section upon motion of an interested party.”
Mays v. Packers, 677 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “The reason the judge of compensation claims (JCC) gave for the denial was that the medical benefits claim contained an incorrect date of injury, contrary to the provisions of section 440.19(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1989).”
Stallings v. F.M.C. Corp., 651 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “Section 440.19(l)(d) bars the right to compensation for death benefits “unless a claim therefor .”
— 440.19(l)(e) — 5 cases
Straw v. Steve Moore Chevrolet, 651 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1991) provides in pertinent part: (l)(a) The right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor which meets the requirements of paragraph (e) is filed within…”
Parkway Gen. Hosp. v. Ogletree, 629 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). “The E/C filed a motion to dismiss on April 4, 1991, asserting the claim for benefits failed to comply with section 440.19(l)(e), Florida Statutes, which requires a claim to be filed with specificity.”
Kennedy v. Orlando Shader Realty, 711 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). “In the instant ease, the merits of the petition for benefits were not litigated and the employer/earrier accepted the claimant as permanently and totally disabled within the 14-day time period provided by section 440.”
Gold Coast Med. Grp. v. Fasano, 634 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). “The JCC awarded penalties on grounds that appellant’s notice to controvert was untimely under section 440.19(l)(e)7, Florida Statutes (1991).”
Holder v. Waldrop, 654 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “02, the Definitions section of the statute, that term is adequately defined in section 440.19(l)(e)l which provides that a “claim” shall: (1) be filed with the Division; (2) contain names and addresses of the employer and employee; (3) contain a statement of the time, date,…”
— 440.19(l)(e)(7) — 1 case
Regency Kawasaki & Sea Doo, Inc. v. Sheppard, 674 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). “192 took effect on January 1, 1994. Ch. 93-415, §§ 25 & 112, at 137 & 215, Laws of Fla.”
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