O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 11-3-503 (2019)

Notice of dishonor

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The obligation of an indorser stated in subsection (a) of Code Section 11-3-415 and the obligation of a drawer stated in subsection (d) of Code Section 11-3-414 may not be enforced unless (i) the indorser or drawer is given notice of dishonor of the instrument complying with this Code section; or (ii) notice of dishonor is excused under subsection (b) of Code Section 11-3-504.

(b) Notice of dishonor may be given by any person. Notice of dishonor may be given by any commercially reasonable means, including an oral, written, or electronic communication. Notice of dishonor is sufficient if it reasonably identifies the instrument and indicates that the instrument has been dishonored or has not been paid or accepted. Return of an instrument given to a bank for collection is sufficient notice of dishonor. Upon request of any party to the instrument, the drawee shall provide a statement to the requesting party giving the specific reason for dishonor, and the drawee shall have no additional liability to the drawer as a result of such statement.

(c) Subject to subsection (c) of Code Section 11-3-504, with respect to an instrument taken for collection by a collecting bank, notice of dishonor must be given (i) by the bank before midnight of the next banking day following the banking day on which the bank receives notice of dishonor of the instrument; or (ii) by any other person within 30 days following the day on which the person receives notice of dishonor. With respect to any other instrument, notice of dishonor must be given within 30 days following the day on which dishonor occurs.

History

Code 1981, § 11-3-503, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1306, § 3.

Annotations

Law reviews. For article surveying developments in

Georgia commercial law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 33 (1981).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 14-508, 14-701, 14-801, and 109A-3-508 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Drawer and drawee as same legal entity. - It is not necessary for party suing on draft to show notice of dishonor to drawer where drawer and drawee are same legal entity, and drawer countermanded payment. Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barfield, 105 Ga. App. 266, 124 S.E.2d 294, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 909 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933, § 14508). Effect on provisions requiring that notice of dishonor be “sent.” - It is neither logical nor credible that legislature meant to defuse this provision, and to render meaningless other Art. 3 and 4 provisions dealing with discharge of endorser’s liability within specific time lim-

its of presentment and nonacceptance by providing that dishonor does not occur until written notice of it is “sent.” Clements v. Central Bank, 155 Ga. App. 27, 270 S.E.2d 194, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3235 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-508). Persons who constitute endorsers. - Where three individual defendants, joined in suit against the maker of promissory note, had placed their signatures on back of instrument without indicating an intention to be bound in capacity other than endorser, they are deemed to be endorsers in legal sense of the word, and are entitled to have note presented to person primarily liable, and, if it is not paid, to notice of dishonor. Massell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 57 Ga. App. 460, 196 S.E. 115, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 313 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 14-701 and 14-801).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks and Financial Institutions, §§ 987, 988, 990. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, § 361 et seq. C.J.S. 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, § 202 et seq. U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 3503. ALR. Insolvency or bankruptcy of party primarily liable on commercial paper, as excusing demand and notice of dishonor, 25 A.L.R. 962; 87 A.L.R. 1394. Necessity of protest and notice as between coindorsers of negotiable paper, 32 A.L.R. 190. Right of holder to sue bank in respect of deposit made, for payment of existing obligation other than check, 50 A.L.R. 1012.

Examining directory as sufficient diligence in locating drawer or endorser for purpose of notice of dishonor, 55 A.L.R. 673. Promise to pay at future time by party to whom presentment is made as excusing notice of dishonor, 62 A.L.R. 295. Liability of drawer of check as affected by failure to give or delay in giving him notice of its dishonor, 86 A.L.R. 463. Insolvency or bankruptcy of party primarily liable on commercial paper as excusing demand and notice of dishonor, 87 A.L.R. 1394. Liability of drawee bank in respect of forged check because of delay in returning it unpaid, 116 A.L.R. 687.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2 cases, 1983–1985 · leading case: Harris v. Harbin Lumber Co. of Royston (In Re Ellison), 31 B.R. 545 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983).
Harris v. Harbin Lumber Co. of Royston (In Re Ellison), 31 B.R. 545 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983). “Harbin stresses the continuity of the transaction and argues that the transfer should be viewed as a contemporaneous exchange on August 24, 1981, a date outside the preference period.”
Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Fulton Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 338 S.E.2d 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “Further, its legal obligation as to presentment of commercial paper “at a bank during its banking day” (OCGA § 11-3-503 (4)); acceptance without dishonor of commercial paper “until the close of the next business day following presentment” (OCGA § 11-3-506 (1)); delay in…”
— 11-3-503(2)(a) — 1 case
Harris v. Harbin Lumber Co. of Royston (In Re Ellison), 31 B.R. 545 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983). “Harbin stresses the continuity of the transaction and argues that the transfer should be viewed as a contemporaneous exchange on August 24, 1981, a date outside the preference period.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.