O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) Disposition. A filed financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral that is sold, exchanged, leased, licensed, or other856
wise disposed of and in which a security interest or agricultural lien continues, even if the secured party knows of or consents to the disposition. (b) Information becoming seriously misleading. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this Code section and Code Section 11-9-508, a financing statement is not rendered ineffective if, after the financing statement is filed, the information provided in the financing statement becomes seriously misleading under Code Section (c) Change in debtor’s name. If the name that a filed financing statement provides for a debtor becomes insufficient as the name of the debtor under subsection (a) of Code Section 11-9-503 so that the financing statement becomes seriously misleading under Code Section 11-9-506: (1) The financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor before, or within four months after, the filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading; and (2) The financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading, unless an amendment to the financing statement which renders the financing statement not seriously misleading is filed within four months after the financing statement became seriously misleading.
History
Code 1981, § 11-9-507, enacted by Ga.
L. 2001, p. 362, § 1; Ga. L. 2013, p. 690, § 12/SB 185.
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Change in debtor’s name. - Examination of the language of the statute reveals that O.C.G.A. § 11-9-507(c)(1) applies only when a debtor changes the debtor’s name after a valid financing statement is filed, rendering an otherwise properly recorded financing statement seriously misleading. Here, however, the debtor’s name change happened before
the filing of the financing statement, rendering the financing statement ineffective ab initio; therefore, O.C.G.A. § 11-9507(c)(1) did not apply in this case. Scarver v. Silverline Servs. (In re Wastetech, LLC), 605 B.R. 264, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2019).
RESEARCH REFERENCES U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9507.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
34
cases, 1983–2019 · leading case:
Emmons v. Burkett, 353 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. 1987).
Emmons v. Burkett, 353 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. 1987).
· cites it 7× “Moreover, OCGA § 11-9-507 explicitly provides a remedy for a creditor’s noncompliance with the requirements of OCGA § 11-9-504 (3).”
Davis v. Concord Com. Corp., 434 S.E.2d 571 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 8× “OCGA § 11-9-507 (2) provides definitive but not exclusive examples of commercial reasonableness: “If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current in such market at the time of his sale or…”
Ogletree v. Brokers South, Inc., 383 S.E.2d 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 8× “They sought damages under OCGA § 10-1-38 (c) and OCGA § 11-9-507, and for the alleged conversion.”
Clark v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 363 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 4× “Appellant’s response is that there remains a question of fact as to whether the letter’s contents constituted a reasonable attempt at notification, thus precluding summary judgment on the issue.”
Carlton Mfg., Inc. v. Bauer, 429 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 6× “OCGA § 11-9-507 (2) provides in pertinent part: “A disposition which has been approved in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors’ committee or representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable.”
Metter Banking Co. v. Millen Lumber & Supply Co., 382 S.E.2d 624 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 2× “llen may eventually be successful in persuading a jury that, for one or more of various reasons, it is not liable for repayment of the notes it executed in favor of the Bank, and may also have a claim against the Bank for impairing Bowen’s collateral by failing to make a prompt…”
Se. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Northen, 565 S.E.2d 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 2× “When a secured party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or when he has otherwise sold the property in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold, the secured party has sold the…”
Bradford v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. of Georgia, 359 S.E.2d 757 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 3× “OCGA § 11-9-507 (1) afforded appellants a “pre-rebuttable presumption rule” means by which they might recover any loss they sustained due to appellee’s insufficient notice.”
Chen v. Profit Sharing Plan of Bohne, 456 S.E.2d 237 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 2× “The trial court erred in finding that the letter allegedly posted to Chen on August 6, 1990, complied with the notice requirements of OCGA § 11-9-505 (2) and in granting summary judgment in favor of the Profit Sharing Plan.”
— 11-9-507(2) — 2 cases
— 11-9-507(c) — 1 case
— 11-9-507(c)(1) — 1 case
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