Editor's notes.

- Many of the following annotations should be examined in light of the amendment to Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) which took effect November 1, 1981.

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-15 and pre-2014 Code Sections 15-11-29 and 15-11-41, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

State as parens patriae created juvenile courts for protection of children. Robinson v. State, 227 Ga. 140, 179 S.E.2d 248 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2411).

Deprivation sufficiently alleged after petitioner alleged a child was committed to a state-run psychiatric institution in spite of contrary medical and psychological evaluations and that the child was denied care and education necessary for the child's physical, mental, and emotional health. In re A.V.B., 267 Ga. 728, 482 S.E.2d 275 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

Delinquency adjudication hearing serves same purpose as arraignment.

- Delinquency adjudication hearing merely serves the same purpose in the civil juvenile court proceeding as an arraignment under the criminal code. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101); D.C.E. v. State, 130 Ga. App. 724, 204 S.E.2d 481 (1974);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).

Adjudication proceeding is actually nothing more than pretrial hearing held in the county where the child was apprehended and in the custody of local authorities for committing the alleged unruly acts or delinquent behavior. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).

Order entered following a delinquency adjudicatory hearing under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-17 and15-11-490) was not a final judgment appealable under former Code 1933, § 6-701 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34) but was instead merely an order entered in a pretrial hearing similar to an arraignment. D.C.E. v. State, 130 Ga. App. 724, 204 S.E.2d 481 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).

County of parent's residence.

- Revision of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI), providing that venue in juvenile court cases may be determined by the provisions of the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia, removed any constitutional impediment to applying former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-17,15-11-270, and15-11-401) to parental termination proceedings when the parent resides in a different county from that in which an allegedly deprived child is found. In re R.A.S., 249 Ga. 236, 290 S.E.2d 34 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

Action to terminate parental rights on ground of deprivation need not be brought in county of parents' residence. In re S.H., 163 Ga. App. 419, 294 S.E.2d 621 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

County of child's foster home.

- Proceeding to terminate parental rights may be commenced in the county in which the child resides in a foster home. Cain v. Department of Human Resources, 166 Ga. App. 801, 305 S.E.2d 492 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

Because the child was placed into the Department of Family and Children Service's legal custody, a rebuttable presumption arose that the child obtained a Jones County legal residence for the purposes of determining venue; thus, by alleging that the child was in the department's custody, and by setting forth the department's address in Jones County, the department's petition provided sufficient information to establish that the child's residence was in Jones County, making venue therein, proper. In the Interest of A.J.M., 277 Ga. App. 646, 627 S.E.2d 399 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).

County where parent resides.

- For cases holding that venue for termination proceedings lies in the county where the parent resides, decided under prior constitutional provisions, see Quire v. Clayton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538 (1978), and Williams v. Department of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 610, 258 S.E.2d 288 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).

Determining legal residence.

- Juvenile proceeding for delinquency or unruly conduct may be tried either in the county where the child resides or in the county where the unruly or delinquent conduct occurred. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

In determining where a juvenile resides for purposes of venue, it is generally the legal residence that controls. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

In a proceeding against a juvenile for the status offense of unruliness, the juvenile's legal residence for purposes of venue was in the county of the Department of Family & Children Services having custody over the juvenile, even though the place of the offense and the juvenile's family residence were in other counties. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

Since the requirements for venue in a county were met, the fact that the childrens' mother was in the process of moving to another state when the county department of family and children services obtained custody of her children was insufficient to rebut the presumption that the children resided in the county. In re K.M.L., 237 Ga. App. 662, 516 S.E.2d 363 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

Former statute did not conflict with general venue provisions of Constitution insofar as delinquency proceedings were concerned. G.S.K. v. State, 147 Ga. App. 571, 249 S.E.2d 671 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).

Waiver of objection to venue.

- Since the case was transferred from the county, where it was originally filed, to another county pursuant to appellants' own motion, appellants waived any objection to venue in the subsequent county when the appellants moved that the venue be transferred to that county and are estopped from raising this issue. In re M.J.G., 203 Ga. App. 452, 416 S.E.2d 796, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 796 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

By a parent's actions and inactions, the parent waived the parent's right to object to the venue of termination proceedings. In the Interest of H.D.M., 241 Ga. App. 805, 527 S.E.2d 633 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

Venue lies in county where juvenile committed criminal act.

- Although some of the proceedings in juvenile court are of a criminal character, not all are. For those that are, delinquency, unruliness and juvenile traffic offenses, the venue provisions of the Juvenile Code and the state constitution, that venue lies in the county in which the act was committed, are in accord. Quire v. Clayton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).

Juvenile's change of residence did not bar the exercise of jurisdiction over the juvenile by the juvenile court in the county in which the offense occurred. In re D.L., 228 Ga. App. 503, 492 S.E.2d 273 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).

Evidence showed that the delinquent conduct occurred in the victim's house, which was sufficient to establish the venue of the case wherein the juvenile was properly adjudicated. In the Interest of M.C., 322 Ga. App. 239, 744 S.E.2d 436 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).

Insufficient proof of venue.

- In a juvenile delinquency case, the state failed to prove venue since the state offered no evidence that a church where an aggravated assault occurred was within the boundaries of the county in question; as to charges of obstruction of an officer, there was no evidence as to the location of the houses where the acts in question occurred. In the Interest of D.D., 287 Ga. App. 512, 651 S.E.2d 817 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).

Although there was sufficient evidence to support a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency based on the finding that the juvenile had committed acts, which, had the juvenile been an adult, would have supported a conviction for burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), the adjudication was reversed because the state failed to present any evidence to establish proof of venue beyond a reasonable doubt. The investigating officers' county of employment did not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard; however, the reviewing court noted that retrying the juvenile was not prohibited under the Double Jeopardy Clause because the evidence presented at trial was otherwise sufficient to support the adjudication of delinquency. In the Interest of B.R., 289 Ga. App. 6, 656 S.E.2d 172 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).

Because the state failed to prove the element of venue beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was no indication in the record that the juvenile waived that requirement or that the court took judicial notice of venue as an element of the offenses charged, the juvenile's adjudications of delinquency had to be reversed. In the Interest of J.B., 289 Ga. App. 617, 658 S.E.2d 194 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).

Dispositional hearings conducted in county where defendant resides.

- It was at the dispositional hearings provided for in former Code 1933, § 24A-2201 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-101 and15-11-210) that the actual "case" was tried, thereby comporting with the constitutional mandate that civil cases shall be tried in the county where the defendant resided. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).

In a deprivation proceeding, the court erred in basing venue on the childrens' brief visit to the county where the deprivation petitions were filed because the children were residing and attending school in another county at the time. In re B.G., 238 Ga. App. 227, 518 S.E.2d 451 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).

Because a child was born in Lee County and had lived with the child's mother and maternal grandparents in Lee County for ten out of the 16 months of the child's life when a petition alleging deprivation was filed under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-270 and15-11-401), Lee County was the proper venue for the action. In the Interest of C.R., 292 Ga. App. 346, 665 S.E.2d 39 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).

Service on mother in county of residence sufficient.

- Service of process on the mother in the county of this state in which the mother of an illegitimate child resides is sufficient to give the county juvenile court jurisdiction over both the mother and the child regardless of whether there was a "detention" of the child and in spite of the fact that a welfare worker obtained possession of the child outside of the state. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 138 Ga. App. 49, 225 S.E.2d 441, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).

Venue exists despite absence of child.

- If a particular county is the residence of the child and of the child's mother, venue properly exists there for temporary custody actions even if the child was not personally present within the boundaries of that county on the date of the filing of the petition to the court for temporary custody. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 138 Ga. App. 49, 225 S.E.2d 441, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).

Venue in county of child's residence and where child born.

- Requirements for proving that venue was properly in Cobb County were met because a mother was residing in Cobb County when her child was born and when the underlying proceeding alleging deprivation commenced and that the child remained in the custody of Cobb County Department of Family and Children Services through the time the juvenile court entered the court's deprivation and non-reunification order. In re R. B., 309 Ga. App. 407, 710 S.E.2d 611 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).

Challenge to court's jurisdiction unsuccessful.

- Although former Code 1933, § 79-404 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-2-4) provided that the domicile of an illegitimate child shall be that of his or her mother, yet, where the plea to the jurisdiction alleged "this court has accepted jurisdiction and custody of the minor child . . . and is holding said child subject to the order of this court," which clearly showed that the child was before the court, and there was no allegation showing the domicile of the mother, who was present in court, or any other reason why the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction, it was not error to overrule the plea. Springstead v. Cook, 215 Ga. 154, 109 S.E.2d 508 (1959) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 87, § 3).

Child was residing in Cobb County when an underlying proceeding alleging deprivation commenced and had remained in the custody of Cobb County Department of Family and Children Services through the time a termination of parental rights order was entered; accordingly, requirements for venue in Cobb County were met. In re R. J. D. B., 305 Ga. App. 888, 700 S.E.2d 898 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).

There was sufficient evidence that venue was proper in Douglas County, Georgia, in a deprivation proceeding, as the Douglas County Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) had been involved with the family for some time; the subject child's parent lived in a shelter in Douglas County in May and June of 2010, and at the time the deprivation petition was filed the child was in the custody of the Douglas County DFCS, where the child remained through the entry of the deprivation order. In the Interest of D. S., 316 Ga. App. 296, 728 S.E.2d 890 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).

Juvenile hearing must meet essentials of due process and fair treatment.

- Juvenile hearing need not conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. Robinson v. State, 227 Ga. 140, 179 S.E.2d 248 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2411).

Presentation of evidence.

- In a hearing held to determine if a juvenile should be adjudged delinquent for committing acts that would have supported convictions for driving on the wrong side of the road and second degree vehicular homicide if the juvenile had been tried as an adult, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by allowing the state to reopen the state's case for the purpose of introducing evidence which showed that a person who sustained injuries in an accident the juvenile caused died as a result of those injuries. In the Interest of A.L.S., 261 Ga. App. 778, 584 S.E.2d 27 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).

Requirement of independent corroboration of an accomplice's testimony, now set forth in O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, is to be applicable to a juvenile proceeding. In re J.H.M., 202 Ga. App. 79, 413 S.E.2d 515 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile probation officer cannot accuse child under own care.

- It is error for a juvenile probation officer to conduct accusatory proceedings against a child who is or may be under the officer's care or supervision, even with a licensed attorney who thus could be considered "legal counsel for the child," because the official whose statutory responsibilities include the supervision and assisting of juveniles can best serve that function if the official remains an objective and unbiased figure. In re P.L.S., 170 Ga. App. 74, 316 S.E.2d 175 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Appellant juvenile's failure to object to accusatory proceedings conducted by a juvenile probation officer denied appellant's right to rely on that error as a basis for reversal on appeal, but if such a procedure is allowed over proper objection appellate courts should not hesitate to reverse. In re P.L.S., 170 Ga. App. 74, 316 S.E.2d 175 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Trial judge has right to propound question or series of questions to any witness for the purpose of developing fully the truth of the case; and the extent to which the examination conducted by the court shall go is a matter within the judge's discretion. T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1801).

Court examination may be cause for new trial.

- Lengthy examination by the court of a witness called by either party will not be cause for a new trial, even though some of the questions propounded by the court were leading in character, unless the court, during the examination of the witness by the court, expresses or intimates an opinion on the facts of the case, or as to what has or has not been proved, or the examination takes such course as to become argumentative in character. T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1801).

Limits on exercise of right of cross-examination by judge.

- It is most important that a juvenile court judge exercise the right of cross-examination so long as the examination does not constitute a manifest abuse of discretion nor go beyond the boundaries of becoming argumentative or expressing or intimating an opinion. T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1801).

No interference with juvenile court discretion unless manifest abuse.

- Former Code 1933, § 24-2420 vested in the juvenile court judge broad discretion which the Court of Appeals had no right to control unless the discretion was manifestly abused by the juvenile court judge. Land v. State, 101 Ga. App. 448, 114 S.E.2d 165 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2411).

Hearings without jury were intended for benefit of child to spare the child from the unfavorable publicity of a public trial before a jury. Robinson v. State, 227 Ga. 140, 179 S.E.2d 248 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2411).

Hearings without jury do not deny due process or fair treatment.

- Provision that the hearing shall be without a jury does not deny due process or fair treatment to the juvenile. Robinson v. State, 227 Ga. 140, 179 S.E.2d 248 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24-2411).

Presence of murder victim's mother.

- Trial judge did not err in allowing the mother of a murder victim to remain in the courtroom during delinquency proceedings. In re L.D.H., 213 Ga. App. 297, 444 S.E.2d 387 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Presence of assault victim's relative during hearing.

- Juvenile court may permit a relative of the victim of an assault to be present in the courtroom during the hearing on that offense since the victim has suffered a significant loss of vision as a result of the assault and the relative is the person who took the victim to the hospital after the assault. C.P. v. State, 167 Ga. App. 374, 306 S.E.2d 688 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Juvenile must be warned before waiving counsel.

- Juvenile did not make a knowing and intelligent decision to proceed without counsel since the referee did not warn the juvenile or the juvenile's mother of the danger of proceeding without counsel or of the consequences of an affirmative finding or admission of the charge enumerated in the petition; the juvenile appellant and the juvenile's mother did not stand before the court with open eyes, knowing the danger and consequences of proceeding without the benefit of legal representation. In re W.M.F., 180 Ga. App. 397, 349 S.E.2d 265 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Recording of proceeding.

- Recording was waived since the juvenile court failed to record an in-chambers interview with a child and the parents acquiesced in such procedure. In the Interest of A.R., 248 Ga. App. 783, 546 S.E.2d 915 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).

Quality of a tape-recording of a termination-of-parental rights hearing was so poor that the court reporter could not understand much of what was said; as it was the mother's burden to provide the transcript of the hearing and since the transcript was inadequate to address a claim of error, the appellate court assumed the trial court's ruling was correct. In the Interest of C.T.M., 278 Ga. App. 297, 628 S.E.2d 713 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41).

New hearing ordered for unrecorded proceedings.

- Once it was discovered that a portion of the proceedings went unrecorded, a party was entitled to a new hearing on the party's modification petition, and to have such a hearing recorded in its entirety as mandated by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-17). In re T.M.C., 206 Ga. App. 595, 426 S.E.2d 247 (1992); In re L.G., 230 Ga. App. 153, 495 S.E.2d 628 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Indigent parent entitled to paupered transcript for use in appeal.

- Indigent parent, whose parental rights have been terminated by an order of a juvenile court on a petition filed by an agency of the state, is entitled to a paupered transcript of the proceeding in the juvenile court for use in appealing the decision of that court. Nix v. Department of Human Resources, 236 Ga. 794, 225 S.E.2d 306 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1801).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 27 et seq. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 40 et seq.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 40 et seq.; 88 et seq., 96.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 163 et seq., 180 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) §§ 11; 24.

ALR.

- Right to jury trial in juvenile court delinquency proceedings, 100 A.L.R.2d 1241.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.

Propriety of exclusion of press or other media representatives from civil trial, 39 A.L.R.5th 103.