O.C.G.A. § 15-11-490 (2019)

Annotations

Cross references. - Venue for criminal actions generally, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and § 17-2-2. Intrastate transfer of cases among Juvenile Courts, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 5.3.

Law reviews. - For article discussing venue problems in juvenile court practice and suggesting solutions, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 341 (1972). For article, ‘‘An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody,’’ see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 275 (1973).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - Many of the following annotations should be examined in light of the amendment to Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) which took effect November 1, 1981. In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101, pre-2000 Code Sections 15-11-15 and 15-11-16 and pre-2014 Code Sections 15-11-29 and 15-11-30, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. Determining legal residence. - Juvenile proceeding for delinquency or unruly conduct may be tried either in the county where the child resides or in the county where the unruly or delinquent conduct occurred. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15). In determining where a juvenile resides for purposes of venue, it is generally the legal residence that controls. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15). In a proceeding against a juvenile for the status offense of unruliness, the juve-

nile’s legal residence for purposes of venue was in the county of the Department of Family & Children Services having custody over the juvenile, even though the place of the offense and the juvenile’s family residence were in other counties. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15). Delinquency adjudication hearing serves same purpose as arraignment. - Delinquency adjudication hearing merely serves the same purpose in the civil juvenile court proceeding as an arraignment under the criminal code. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101); D.C.E. v. State, 130 Ga. App. 724, 204 S.E.2d 481 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101). Adjudication proceeding is actually nothing more than pretrial hearing held in the county where the child was apprehended and in the custody of local authorities for committing the alleged unruly acts or delinquent behavior. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101). Order entered following a delinquency adjudicatory hearing under

former Code 1933, § 24A-1201 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-17 and 15-11-490) was not a final judgment appealable under former Code 1933, § 6-701 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34) but was instead merely an order entered in a pretrial hearing similar to an arraignment. D.C.E. v. State, 130 Ga. App. 724, 204 S.E.2d 481 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101). Former statute did not conflict with general venue provisions of Constitution insofar as delinquency proceedings were concerned. G.S.K. v. State, 147 Ga. App. 571, 249 S.E.2d 671 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101). Venue lies in county where juvenile committed criminal act. - Although some of the proceedings in juvenile court are of a criminal character, not all are. For those that are, delinquency, unruliness and juvenile traffic offenses, the venue provisions of the Juvenile Code and the state constitution, that venue lies in the county in which the act was committed, are in accord. Quire v. Clayton County Dep’t of Family & Children Servs., 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101). Juvenile’s change of residence did not bar the exercise of jurisdiction over the juvenile by the juvenile court in the county in which the offense occurred. In re D.L., 228 Ga. App. 503, 492 S.E.2d 273 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15). Evidence showed that the delinquent conduct occurred in the victim’s house, which was sufficient to establish the venue of the case wherein the juvenile was properly adjudicated. In the Interest of M.C., 322 Ga. App. 239, 744 S.E.2d 436 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29). Officer testified that the officer responded to a stolen-vehicle dispatch; that officer arrived at the scene of the location where the vehicle or vehicles reportedly had been stolen; the juvenile was at that location; and the vehicle had been stolen out of DeKalb County; thus, from that testimony, the juvenile court could have concluded that the delinquent act occurred in DeKalb County, Georgia. In the

Interest of A. P., 348 Ga. App. 638, 824 S.E.2d 94 (2019). Insufficient proof of venue. - In a juvenile delinquency case, the state failed to prove venue since the state offered no evidence that a church where an aggravated assault occurred was within the boundaries of the county in question; as to charges of obstruction of an officer, there was no evidence as to the location of the houses where the acts in question occurred. In the Interest of D.D., 287 Ga. App. 512, 651 S.E.2d 817 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29). Although there was sufficient evidence to support a juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency based on the finding that the juvenile had committed acts, which, had the juvenile been an adult, would have supported a conviction for burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), the adjudication was reversed because the state failed to present any evidence to establish proof of venue beyond a reasonable doubt. The investigating officers’ county of employment did not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard; however, the reviewing court noted that retrying the juvenile was not prohibited under the Double Jeopardy Clause because the evidence presented at trial was otherwise sufficient to support the adjudication of delinquency. In the Interest of B.R., 289 Ga. App. 6, 656 S.E.2d 172 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29). Because the state failed to prove the element of venue beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was no indication in the record that the juvenile waived that requirement or that the court took judicial notice of venue as an element of the offenses charged, the juvenile’s adjudications of delinquency had to be reversed. In the Interest of J.B., 289 Ga. App. 617, 658 S.E.2d 194 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29). Dispositional hearings conducted in county where defendant resides. - It was at the dispositional hearings provided for in former Code 1933, § 24A-2201 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-101 and 15-11-210) that the actual ‘‘case’’ was tried, thereby comporting with the constitutional mandate that civil

cases shall be tried in the county where the defendant resided. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101). Transfer provisions were not violative of Constitution. - Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1, by providing that after adjudication of delinquency in a court of another county the proceeding shall be transferred to the county of the child’s residence for disposition, is not violative of the Georgia Constitution. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201). Failure to transfer prior to notice of appeal. - If it is undisputed that a child was a ‘‘nonresident child’’ as defined in former paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30 at the time of the delinquent act and at the time of the adjudication of delinquency, in that the child then resided in Spalding County, Georgia, the juvenile court of Henry County erred in failing to transfer the case to the county of the

child’s residence for disposition prior to the filing of the child’s notice of appeal in accordance with former subsection (b) of that section. In re R.W., 186 Ga. App. 885, 368 S.E.2d 824 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-16). Dispositional hearings held in county where defendant resides constitutional. - It was at the dispositional hearings provided for in former Code 1933, § 24A-2201 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-110 and 15-11-210) that the actual ‘‘case’’ was tried, thereby comporting with the constitutional mandate that civil cases shall be tried in the county where the defendant resided. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201). Authority to grant new trials. - Juvenile courts are courts of record; therefore, juvenile courts are authorized to grant new trials. In re T.A.W., 265 Ga. 106, 454 S.E.2d 134 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-16).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. Failure to comply prejudices constitutional rights of child. - Failure to comply with the transfer provisions of former subsection (b) of Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 would prejudice the rights of the child under the venue provisions of the

Georgia Constitution to have a dispositional hearing in the county of the child’s residence. 1979 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U79-4 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201). Transfer after delinquency or unruliness adjudication. - Once a child has been adjudicated delinquent or unruly in juvenile court, the child would have to be transferred to the juvenile court in the county of the child’s residence. 1979 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U79-4 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 27 et seq. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 39 et seq. C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 180 et seq.

U.L.A. - Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) §§ 11, 12. ALR. - Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights, 92 A.L.R.5th 379.

T.15, C.11, A.6, P.3

PART 3 CUSTODY AND RELEASE OF CHILD