Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-21, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-49, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Notice and hearing requirements of former Code 1933, §§ 24A-1402 and 24A-1404 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-501,15-11-502,15-11-506, and15-11-507) were mandatory and must be adhered to in order for the juvenile court to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. If for some reason the statutes were not, dismissal of the petition would be without prejudice. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).

Provisions for detention and prosecution of a juvenile are mandatory, and a failure to comply with the provisions prejudices or injures the due process rights of the juvenile. In re B.A.P., 180 Ga. App. 433, 349 S.E.2d 218 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21).

Failure to comply with notice and hearing requirements of the Juvenile Code, after an allegedly deprived child has been taken from the parent's custody, prejudices or injures the rights of the parent, primarily the right to possession of the child under former Code 1933, §§ 74-106, 74-108, and 74-203 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-1,19-7-25, and19-9-2). Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).

Applicability of provisions of this section.

- Subsection (c) of former Code 1933, § 24A-1404 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-506) had no application unless a juvenile was taken into custody, not released under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58), but instead brought before the juvenile court or delivered to a detention or shelter care facility designated by the court and then released after an investigation under subsection (a) of former Code 1933, § 24A-1404. D.C. v. State, 145 Ga. App. 868, 245 S.E.2d 26 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).

Because a juvenile's allegations that the state failed to comply with the procedural requirements under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-49(c)(1) and (e) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-506) should have been raised in the superior court and had no bearing on the validity of the delinquency petitions or the substantive charges against the juvenile in juvenile court, said court properly prevented the juvenile from presenting evidence regarding the same. In the Interest of K.C., 290 Ga. App. 416, 659 S.E.2d 821 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-49).

Section inapplicable.

- Former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-506) did not apply because the juvenile was released to the juvenile's parents after being taken to the police station. In re C.W., 227 Ga. App. 763, 490 S.E.2d 442 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21).

Failure to comply with time limits requires dismissal.

- Time limits established by the General Assembly in the Juvenile Code are jurisdictional and must be strictly adhered to. A failure to comply with the time periods set out in the statute requires dismissal. R.A.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 366, 274 S.E.2d 752 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re R.D.F., 66 Ga. 294, 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).

Dismissal without prejudice for violating five day time limit.

- In dismissing a deprivation petition because the petition was filed outside of the five-day limit of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-49(e) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-506), the trial court properly made the dismissal without prejudice. The Georgia Supreme Court had stated that in such a case any dismissal for failure to follow one of the procedural rules was without prejudice. In the Interest of E.C., 291 Ga. App. 440, 662 S.E.2d 252 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-49).

Running of time limit for holding hearing.

- If juvenile was originally under the jurisdiction of the superior court, the time limit for holding a juvenile detention hearing did not begin running when the Attorney General mailed a letter to the juvenile court declining prosecution as an adult, but began to run when all the requirements for transfer were met and a petition for delinquency was filed. In re T.C.S., 220 Ga. App. 545, 469 S.E.2d 802 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21).

Importance of procedural due process in juvenile proceedings.

- Safeguarding of the child's procedural rights take on the same importance that procedural due process has in an adult criminal proceeding context. R.A.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 366, 274 S.E.2d 752 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re R.D.F., 66 Ga. 294, 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).

Waiver of requirements of former section.

- Although the procedural requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-506 have been held to be mandatory, such requirements can be waived. Irvin v. Department of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 101, 282 S.E.2d 664 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21).

Right to counsel of accused juvenile.

- An accused juvenile is entitled to counsel at an "informal detention hearing,", or at any of the other stages of any proceedings alleging delinquency, unruliness, and deprivation. A.C.G. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 156, 205 S.E.2d 435 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).

Jurisdiction linked to petition.

- Former statute indicated that assumption of jurisdiction by a juvenile court was linked to an authorized petition. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).

No acquisition of jurisdiction by juvenile court ordering place of detention.

- Juvenile court's order for detention was merely a designation of the place of detention as required by former statute, the juvenile court did not acquire jurisdiction by the court's order for detention. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).

Former Juvenile Code recognized that parent was "party" to proceedings involving the parent's child. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).

Definition of "day."

- Word "day," not being qualified, means a calendar or civil day consisting of 24 hours from midnight to midnight. J.B.H. v. State, 139 Ga. App. 199, 228 S.E.2d 189 (1976), overruled on other grounds, In re R.D.F., 266 Ga. 294, 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1404).

Charging petition "logged" in by clerk deemed "presented to the court."

- When the chief deputy clerk and calendar clerk received a petition charging a minor with commission of various delinquent acts and "logged" the petition in, the petition was "presented to the court" within the meaning of subsection (e) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-506). P.L.A. v. State, 172 Ga. App. 820, 324 S.E.2d 781 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21).

Adjudication hearing required after an initial hearing.

- By restraining the child at an initial hearing, the juvenile court implicitly found probable cause, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-46.1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-415). The juvenile court therefore erred in later deciding that a 10-day adjudication hearing was actually a detention hearing and in resetting the 10-day adjudication hearing. In the Interest of K.L., 303 Ga. App. 679, 694 S.E.2d 372 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-49).

Illegal detention.

- When the petition on the charge on which a juvenile was detained had not been presented within 72 hours of the detention hearing, the state was not at liberty to hold the juvenile until the state developed evidence of other crimes or discovered the juvenile had committed other crimes, although if the charge upon which the juvenile had been detained was properly petitioned within 72 hours and the juvenile was then lawfully detained, the state could have prosecuted the juvenile at the subsequent adjudicatory hearing within ten days under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-522) for any offenses the state uncovered in the meantime, including one upon a petition filed the day of the adjudicatory hearing. In re B.A.P., 180 Ga. App. 433, 349 S.E.2d 218 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21).

Since the petition was not presented within 72 hours of a detention hearing as required by subsection (e) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-506), the state cannot thus illegally detain the child and then render such a jurisdictional defect harmless by setting the adjudication hearing within 13 days (72 hours plus 10 days) of the detention hearing under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-522). In re B.A.P., 180 Ga. App. 433, 349 S.E.2d 218 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21).

Return of a child to custody following the child's escape was not an "informal detention" pursuant to subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-506) so as to require a hearing within 72 hours of the child's recapture. In re J.L.P., 226 Ga. App. 160, 486 S.E.2d 387 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21).

Dismissal of depravation complaint.

- Because a child's mother and stepfather tested negative for chlamydia and were cooperating with authorities, pursuant to Ga. Unif. Juv. Ct. R. 8.1 and former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-49 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-506), the trial court properly dismissed a depravation complaint for lack of reasonable grounds showing intentional or unintentional misconduct resulting in abuse or neglect of the child. In the Interest of J. F., 310 Ga. App. 807, 714 S.E.2d 399 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-49).

Additional charges.

- Since a child remained in custody continually from the child's arrest on December 31, 1990, and a detention hearing was held on January 2, 1991, and the 72-hour period following that hearing did not expire until January 5, the state was authorized to bring additional charges at a detention hearing on January 7, 1991, and the additional charges constituted compliance with subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-506). In re S.E.M., 201 Ga. App. 454, 411 S.E.2d 350 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21).

Timely hearing.

- When the defendant was arrested in the early hours of Friday, a hearing conducted at 9:00 a.m. the following Monday was timely. Livingston v. State, 266 Ga. 501, 467 S.E.2d 886 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21).

Findings made in unrecorded hearing reversed.

- Because the juvenile court primarily based the juvenile court's decision that a parent's two children were deprived, awarding temporary custody of the children to the county, on evidence received at an unrecorded hearing, and a waiver requiring a transcript of that hearing was not in evidence, those findings were reversed, and the case was remanded. In the Interest of D.P., 284 Ga. App. 453, 644 S.E.2d 299 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-49).

Consideration of evidence from detention hearing at adjudication.

- Although evidence presented at a juvenile detention hearing was for the purpose of determining whether preadjudication custody of the child was required, a juvenile court did not err in considering evidence presented at the detention hearing during the adjudication hearing; any error was harmless as the same judge, counsel, and witnesses participated in both hearings and the evidence was substantially the same. In the Interest of C. S., 334 Ga. App. 153, 778 S.E.2d 396 (2015).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 69, 72, 73.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 140 et seq., 226 et seq., 239.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 17.

ALR.

- Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights, 80 A.L.R.3d 1141.